UNITED STATES-SOVIET RESEARCH STUDIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2919

A BILL TO HELP ENSURE THE NATION'S INDEPENDENT FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES, TO HELP MAINTAIN THE NATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TRAINING ON WHICH THAT KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS, AND TO PROVIDE PARTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL PROGRAMS TO SERVE BOTH PURPOSES

SEPTEMBER 22, 1982

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UNITED STATES-SOVIET RESEARCH STUDIES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pell, and Biden.

Senator LUGAR. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs is called to order.

We are here today for testimony on Senate bill 2919. The Subcommittee on European Affairs will consider the U.S. capability to conduct significant and timely research on the Soviet bloc.

Our capacity as a Nation to analyze and understand our primary adversary, the Soviet Union, is eroding. There are many symptoms of this erosion. Faculty positions in Soviet studies are being eliminated. Fellowships for area training have dwindled. Specialized research libraries are curtailing acquisitions, and research journals face closure.

The field of Soviet studies is simply not attracting sufficient numbers of bright young Americans to maintain it at the strength which our Nation requires. Seeing a future of diminishing opportunities and shrinking funding from private and public sources, younger scholars are turning away from Soviet studies to what appear to be more promising career fields.

If this national capability, which has been painstakingly built over several decades, is lost, it will take decades and enormous cost to recreate it. There is considerable need to address the situation now and to provide a stable foundation for Soviet studies. There is a strong national interest in taking steps to restore and to expand our capability to know about the Soviet Union, its allies and its proxies. Knowledge of the entire area is of importance to the formation of American foreign policy and national security, and is now seriously deficient.

If we are to formulate and implement coherent self-interested policies toward the Soviet Union in the 1980's and 1990's, we must establish a strong base of knowledge from which to do so. It is important to understand, for example, Soviet goals in the conduct of arms control negotiations, the important demographic changes occurring in the Soviet Union, Soviet activities in each of a myriad of Third World countries, and contraints and opportunities confront-

ing Soviet decisions in the field of agriculture, industrialization, and the like in coming years.

It is for these reasons that Senator Biden and I have joined together to introduce S. 2919. It represents the establishment of a special endowment of $50 million in the Treasury Department for Soviet and East European studies. Once established, the program will be self-sustaining, and will require no further appropriations. Each year, interest payments from the endowment would be distributed to the leading umbrella organizations in the field of Soviet studies.

The endowment approach, we believe, will provide a stong foundation for Soviet studies which will not be subject to the shifting priorities of the yearly appropriations process.

We are well aware of the competing demands for Federal resources, but we believe that this approach is very much in our national interest, and tailored to meet budgetary constraints that we must face.

[Text of S. 2919 follows:]

II

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2919

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of Soviet-bloc countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 16 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 8), 1982

Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. BIDEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Labor and Human Resources, by unanimous consent

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A BILL

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of Soviet-bloc countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Soviet-Bloc Research and Training Act of 1982".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds and declares that—

(1) factual knowledge, independently verified, about Soviet-bloc countries is of the utmost importance for the national security of the United States, for the furtherance of our national interests in the conduct of foreign relations, and for the prudent management of our domestic affairs;

(2) the development and maintenance of knowledge about Soviet-bloc countries depends upon the national capability for advanced research by highly trained and experienced specialists, available for service in and out of Government;

(3) certain essential functions are necessary to ensure the existence of that knowledge and the capability to sustain it, including—

(A) graduate training;

(B) advanced research;

(C) public dissemination of research data, methods and findings;

(D) contact and collaboration among Government and private specialists and the facilitation of research based on the extensive data holdings of the United States Government; and

(E) first-hand experience of Soviet-bloc countries by American specialists including on-site

conduct of advanced training and research to the extent practicable;

(4) three existing institutions already organized to conduct the functions described in this section on a national scale are the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the International Research and Exchanges Board of the American Council of Learned Societies; and

(5) it is in the national interest for the Federal Government to supplement the support for the functions described in this section furnished by local, State, regional, and private agencies, organizations, and individuals, and thereby to stabilize the conduct of these functions on a national scale, consistently, and on a long range basis.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

(1) the term "Board" means the International Research and Exchanges Board organized in 1968 by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council;

(2) the term "Center" means the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution;

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(3) the term "Fund" means the Soviet-Bloc Research and Training Fund established under section 4;

(4) the term "institution of higher education" has the same meaning given such term in section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965;

(5) the term "National Council" means the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia in 1978; and

(6) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET-BLOC RESEARCH AND TRAINING FUND

SEC. 4. There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the Soviet-Bloc Research and Training Trust Fund. The Fund shall consist of—

(1) amounts appropriated to it by section 5; and

(2) interest and proceeds credited to it under section (8)(c).

APPROPRIATIONS TO THE FUND

SEC. 5. There are appropriated to the Fund, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $50,000,000.

PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND; USES OF PAYMENTS

SEC. 6. (a) The interest on any obligations held in the Fund shall be available, as provided in advance by appropriation Acts, for payments to the National Council for use in accordance with this section.

(b)(1) One-quarter of the payments made in each fiscal year shall be used by the National Council to—

(A) develop and conduct a research agenda of a national research program at the postdoctoral or equivalent level in the field of Soviet and East European studies to be designed in consultation with officials of the Federal Government designated by the Secretary of State;

(B) disseminate information about the research program described in clause (A) and solicit proposals for research contracts from American institutions of higher education and not-for-profit corporations, which contracts shall contain shared-cost provisions; and

(C) award contracts for such research projects as the Board of Trustees of the Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing the proposals submitted under clause (B).

(2) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year shall be used by the National Council to—

(A) establish and carry out a program of graduate, postdoctoral, and teaching fellowships for advanced training in Soviet studies and related studies conducted (i) at American institutions of higher education and (ii) on a shared-cost basis;

(B) disseminate information on the fellowship program described in clause (A) and solicit applications for fellowships from qualified institutions of higher education and qualified individuals;

(C) award such fellowships as the Board of Trustees of the National Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing applications submitted under clause (B); and

(D) disseminate research data, and findings on Soviet studies and related fields in such a manner and to such extent as the Board of Trustees of the National Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(3) One part of such payments made in each fiscal year to the National Council shall be used for payments to the Center to—

(A) provide fellowship support and research facilities in Washington, District of Columbia, for American specialists in the field of Soviet studies to conduct ad-

vanced research with particular emphasis upon the use of data on Soviet-bloc countries:

and

(B) conduct seminars, conferences, and other similar workshops designed to facilitate research collaboration between Government and private specialists in the field of Soviet and East European studies.

(4) One part of such payments made in each fiscal year to the National Council shall be used for payments to the Board to conduct specialized programs in advanced training and research on a reciprocal basis in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other nations of Eastern Europe designed to facilitate access for American specialists to research institutes, personnel, archives, documentation, and other research and training resources located in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such nations.

(c)(1) Payments under this Act shall be made as soon after approval of the application as practicable.

(2) Payments under this Act may be made in installments, in advance or by way of reimbursement with necessary adjustments on account of overpayments and underpayments.

APPLICATIONS

SEC. 7. (a) The National Council shall prepare and submit an application to the Secretary once each fiscal year. Each such application shall—

(1) provide a description of the purposes for which the payments will be used in accordance with section (6); and

(2) provide such fiscal control and such accounting procedures as may be necessary (A) to insure a proper accounting of Federal funds paid to the applicant under this Act, and (B) to insure the verification of the costs of the continuing education program furnished by the applicant.

(b) The Secretary shall expeditiously approve any application that meets the requirements of this section.

MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND

SEC. 8. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to invest such portion of the Fund as is not, in his judgment, required to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be acquired (1) on original issue at the issue price, or (2) by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for which obligations of the United States may be

issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act are extended to authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund. Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United States then forming a part of the public debt; except that where such average rate is not a multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum, the rate of interest of such special obligations shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum next lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall be issued only if the Secretary determines that the purchase of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States on original issue or at the market price, is not in the public interest.

(b) Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.

(c) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.

REPORT

SEC. 9. The National Council shall prepare and submit to the President and the Congress at the end of each fiscal year in which the National Council receives assistance under this Act a report of the activities of the National Council, and the activities of the Board and the Center, supported by assistance under this Act, together with such recommendations as the National Council deems advisable.

Senator LUGAR. The subcommittee is pleased to welcome today three panels of distinguished witnesses who possess among them substantial expertise in the areas the subcommittee will examine. The first panel will be made up of the Honorable Walter Stoessel, Deputy Secretary of State; General William E. Odom of the Department of Defense, and Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; but prior to hearing that panel, the subcommittee will hear testimony from Dr. Howard R. Swearer, because he has time constraints.

We are grateful that you have come, Doctor. We want to hear you, and know that you must leave shortly. So, with the indulgence of the panel, we will hear his testimony, and then we will proceed with the first panel.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, without trespassing on his time or making him later than he already is, may I say just a word, because I see there is a live quorum call on the floor?

Senator LUGAR. Of course.

Senator MATHIAS. I want to congratulate the chairman for taking the initiative to introduce the bill and to call this meeting, because this is an extremely important subject. It is a subject with which I have been concerned for some time, and I am glad to see that some action is finally being contemplated. It was first brought to my attention by former Ambassador George Kennan, who is deeply concerned about the deterioration in both the volume and the level of Soviet studies. That concern is shared by Marshall Shulman at Columbia and Marshall Goldman at Harvard, two distinguished Soviet scholars.

I think it is an intriguing idea to establish an endowment for the support of Soviet studies, and I hope that the idea might succeed. I interrupted and asked to speak early because I want to pose two questions that I hope the witnesses will address.

One is, it may take a little longer than the chairman hopes to scrape together $50 million. Admiral Inman has had some experience in funding operations of this kind. Even with the best of credentials, and best of causes, and the best of sponsorship, it does not come easy. So, I think we have to think about doing something faster, perhaps, than the collection of an endowment. That is my first point.

I have had some conversations with Frank Carlucci, for example, about what might be done in this area. It is worth exploring.

Second, suppose we get the $50 million. Suppose the interest on the endowment rolls in. Suppose we enlist the brightest students as Soviet scholars and they all make A's and graduate. Then what do we do with them? There has to be employment in a positive and meaningful sense for the people who are going to be trained under this program. I hope the witnesses will also examine what they would envision as professional careers that would be open to people willing to make this commitment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me say that if I leave it is not because I am not interested in your answers. I will find out what your answers are. It is only because I have to go over to answer the quorum call.

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Senator LUGAR. We are grateful for your presence and cosponsorship of this legislation and the questions that you pose respectively.

Dr. Swearer, would you offer your comments?

STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. SWEARER, PRESIDENT, BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R.I.

Mr. SWEARER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will take just a couple of minutes. I have written a paper which I have submitted to the committee staff. You have a very distinguished group of witnesses, and do not need to hear from me for more than 2 or 3 minutes. I do, however, want to express very strong support for this bill. I think it is important, as one who used to be a practitioner in the field and now has the responsibility for a university.

Let me make a couple of quick points. First, this bill certainly is not going to solve all the problems in this field. It is modest in scope, but it is important. Not all the problems in the field are financial, either, but I think it will help with some of these other problems as well—which I will mention in a moment. It is important because it puts a floor of funding under a very important aspect of Soviet studies.

I also want to point out that this bill would not help just one or two or a handful of universities. It is really to support the field of Soviet studies, and therefore would be of benefit to many colleges and universities, and particularly to the scholars in those universities.

Also, we are not talking about a major or crash expansion for the field of Soviet studies. It does need a modest expansion, in my opinion; but the greater concern that I have is, if we do not do something like this very soon, we are going to begin to see the infrastructure which has been built up over the last 20 or 30 years in this country begin to crumble.

The Soviet field is a more mature field than many of the other areas. The older scholars are retiring or turning to other fields, and there will simply not be people to take their place. Once you begin that kind of downward spiral, it is very difficult to turn it around. The best young people are now, we are worried, not going into the field. We find that the language competence of the graduate students is not as good as it used to be. As the towering figures in the field retire, there will not be comparable replacements available. We will not attract the very best graduate students.

We are also finding with the pinch of finances in higher education, that universities are skimping on library materials. Once we go through 3 or 4 years of that, you also will find that it is difficult to recoup.

Let me say a word about the availability of positions for trained people, in answer to Senator Mathias' question. Yes, I think there will be positions. There will be positions in higher education if you have well-trained people. I think there will also be positions in business and in Government.

One of the questions which I am sure will be asked, I will anticipate and try to answer, and that is, what about funds from the private sector, from foundations and corporations? It was the founda-

tions, particularly the Ford Foundation, which put so much money into area studies and Soviet studies in the 1960's and 1970's. In my opinion, that kind of foundation funding is gone, and gone forever. I worked for the Ford Foundation in the late 1960's. In 1967, the Ford Foundation was putting something like $40 million into area studies in American universities. Last year, I think the figure was something like $2 million. This year it is less than that.

There are a number of reasons for it. I think one cannot blame the foundations. There was an anticipation that the Federal Government would pick up this obligation, but it never did.

As far as corporate support goes, yes, there is some corporate support, and I know that the Harvard and Columbia centers have tried very hard to get that corporate support; but, in my opinion, it is limited. I think I have had as much fundraising experience as anyone in the room and I think it is difficult, because you do not have the kind of self-interest on the part of the corporate world in the Soviet field as you do in some other areas of the world where the corporations are more directly involved. So I think there will be some corporate support, but it clearly is not going to be sufficient.

In addition to that, the corporations are being asked to pick up many other things, both domestic and international, which used to be financed by the Government.

I believe these funds are necessary. They will provide an important underpinning to the financing of the field of Soviet and East European studies. It will, I think, help maintain the infrastructure and prevent a downward spiral.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Swearer's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. SWEARER

I would like to mention, in the space of a few minutes, some of the interlocking factors which have brought Russian and Soviet studies into their present dangerous situation in the course of the last dozen years or more. Let me begin with the difficulties faced by American universities—the heart of the Russian and Soviet field—in the 1970's. As is well known, unfavorable demographic trends produced a shortage of academic jobs in a number of disciplines, and the academic community has been dominated over the course of more than a decade by a crisis of overproduction and a glut of Ph.D.'s. The danger at present is that this glut will not be succeeded by sufficiency but by famine. The period of oversupply has drastically curtailed the number of young men and women electing to receive advanced training in Soviet politics, economics, language or sociology. But there are a number of other reasons as well for the incipient crisis.

It is also significant that the social sciences (economics, political science, sociology) have tended to move away from the study of "foreign areas" in recent years, in the direction of more "scientific" and more universalistic programs of study. These may be curricula based on "modernization" theory, suggesting that the entire non-European world is experiencing a broadly similar kind of development into modernity, or interest in behaviorist techniques for studying political changes. In either case, one result is that fewer and fewer specialists in these disciplines any longer have an interest in Russia or the U.S.S.R. per se, or know the Russian language. The study of something so specific as Soviet foreign policy, or Soviet-American relations has also suffered, not only because of the paucity of jobs, but because that kind of topic is widely assumed to be methodologically old-fashioned and intellectually uninteresting. Professors convey these attitudes to their graduate students directly and indirectly, and the brightest and best go into other areas. These students also cannot help but observe that when a senior specialist in the Soviet area retires, his department is likely to use the slot for a position which it regards as closer to the "cutting edge" of the discipline.

Concurrent with these developments has been the irregular but, on the whole, dramatic movement of American foundations away from the funding of international studies, in favor of America's domestic needs; in what remained for international studies, projects in "Third World" countries often took a larger share. Over the course of the late 1960's and 1970's, these shifts in the interests of foundations unfortunately coincided with a decline in the overall size of the pie to be divided, further depleting the resources available to international studies from this quarter. During the post-Sputnik boom, colleges and universities had rather complacently become accustomed to a variety of support from the foundations, for everything from language-training fellowships to bloc grants of the kind that supported the Russian Research Center at Harvard and the Russian Institute at Columbia for so many years.

In the case of the Ford Foundation, which I know from personal experience, this support peaked in 1965 and 1966, dropped off sharply in 1967 and even more so in 1968. The decline continued irregularly over the next decade, until by 1979 the Ford Foundation was allocating only about $2 million for international studies, and I believe that the figure was below that last year. In 1966, Ford devoted well above $40 million to international studies (depending to some degree on precisely how you define it) of which Russian and Soviet studies received a generous share.

While demographic trends, loss of foundation support, and the changing intellectual interests of faculty and students were taking their toll on the nation's campuses, détente was coming to prevail in Washington. Although there is obviously no necessary correlation, much impressionistic evidence suggests that détente was bad for the study of Russia and the U.S.S.R. in Washington. This may have been in part because a general impression came to exist that established analysts were too "anti-Soviet" for the new era; or merely that one could deal more easily with the U.S.S.R. without them; or it may simply have been that the improvement in relations suggested that the United States might not need the services of all the analysts who had been set to work in the course of the 1960's.

Finally, for those organizations dependent on corporate support for their activities—the Russian Research Center at Harvard, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, for example—the situation has grown bleaker still over the last several years. A great deal of the corporate support which has underpinned the basic operation of those organizations depends on the vitality of trade and other economic links between the Soviet Union and the United States. For understandable reasons, the interests of American companies are shifting away from East-West trade, drastically diminishing one more source of funding. The result is that as I testify before you today, it is more or less accurate to say that colleges and universities, foundations, the government and private corporations are all doing less than they have in the past for the study of the Soviet Union, or have been until very recently. And inflation continues to eat away at those funds upon which most of the activities in the field have been built.

Throughout its relatively short life, the Russian and Soviet field in the United States has been quite unstable, largely due to the way it has been tied to geopolitics and people's perceptions of them. Prior to World War II, Russian history and literature were taught and studied on a modest scale in the United States, but the new bi-polar world and the close relations between government and academia that resulted from cooperation in World War II led to a major effort to create an interdisciplinary "Soviet studies," centering around the social science disciplines. When by the mid-fifties that effort had relaxed a bid, *Sputnik* led to fears that the United States was falling behind its Soviet rival in a variety of fields, from science and engineering programs to language study. New infusions of federal and foundation money followed, and another ten years of slight chaotic growth ensued. Since about 1968, however, the roller coaster has been headed down, and if something is not done, the enormous investment in cadres, library resources, publications, and every kind of academic training will be seriously damaged, necessitating a good deal of replacement at a far higher cost.

What do we mean, more concretely, when we speak of the roller coaster going down an increasingly steep grade? We are referring to the loss of academic faculty positions in Soviet politics, economics, sociology—on occasion, even history. We mean that the best graduate students get the smaller number of fellowships for advanced training—and fewer and fewer of those are in the Russian-Soviet field. We mean that there are fewer and fewer for scholarly research and released time for academic specialists—although here one must point out that the cooperation between the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and various government bodies—DOD, State Department, CIA, ACDA—has been one of the few bright spots, having provided research contracts to 98 scholars from 58 institutions.

But great academic centers for the study of the Soviet Union like Harvard and Columbia now have only a few thousand dollars a year to subsidize the scholarship vital to this nation's understanding of the U.S.S.R.; the Russian Research Center at Harvard, as I understand it, is not able to offer even one full fellowship per annum to a senior scholar in the field.

We are also talking about research libraries that are less and less able to keep adequately abreast of Soviet publications, although one should honor the enormous achievements and service to the profession rendered by the University of Illinois library over the last decade. And we are also speaking of the drying up of government and foundation funding which used to make possible the publication of a wide variety of Russian and Soviet material. With publication costs skyrocketing and subsidies disappearing, the outlook is for fewer and thinner publications on the Soviet Union.

Perhaps, I might wind up this litany of disaster with a more subtle aspect of it that touches me, as a university president with experience in the foundation world, particularly. At the close of World War II, Russian and Soviet studies in the United States was built by a close and harmonious alliance of academia and Washington. Men like Philip Mosely and William Langer had comparable achievements in both spheres, and were admired and trusted in both. American politics in the 1960's, and particularly the Vietnam war, destroyed this enormously valuable relationship, and we have not yet succeeded in substantially repairing it. We need to work together harmoniously for the national interest, but we now have a substantial legacy of mistrust with which to deal. I believe we must overcome it, and we can.

But the challenge is major and it is urgent. It is well-known that decline produces circular and self-reinforcing effects. Everyone who has been concerned with the young people entering this vital field realizes that their quality has been declining. With individual splendid exceptions, they are a bit less capable all the time; they use Russian less well; the work they ultimately produce seems slighter and less innovative than that produced by their teachers. Enrollments then tend to decline, and departmental and university administrators react to lower enrollments, and so the spiral continues downward.

It would be a mistake to turn the roller coaster upward again, although many Soviet specialists might express pleasure at the prospect. But the bill which Senators Lugar and Biden have introduced will scarcely do so. What it will help to achieve is a bit more stability in the field, the assurance that there is a floor under us somewhere, below which we cannot fall. More than five years ago now, a group of distinguished academic specialists, foundation executives and government representatives met here in Washington under the aegis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University to discuss many of these problems, which have become more serious since then. Mr. Gerald Sullivan, the rapporteur, began his account of the proceedings by observing that nothing was more certain than that Americans would live out the remaining years of the twentieth century enmeshed in foreign entanglements, of which the most important, the most demanding and by far the most dangerous was certain to be that with the Soviet Union. On our ability to manage that conflict depends not only our own security and safety, but that of the entire planet. The Soviet Union in its own way knows this full well, and over the last dozen years or more they have enormously increased their expenditures devoted to studying the United States and its role in world affairs. At the same time, our effort has slipped, to the point where in 1980 more American college students studied Latin than Russian and Norwegian than Polish. We badly need to undertake a whole series of cautious and well thought out actions to reverse the critical decline of this vital field. This bill provides and excellent place to begin.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Swearer, for coming here today representing Brown University so well, as well as a long tradition of Soviet studies.

I would like to call on the panel in the order they appear on the agenda, the Honorable Walter Stoessel first, Admiral Inman second, and Major Odom third, for such statements as you may wish to make. Then we will have questions for the panel as a whole. We are deeply indebted to each of you for coming here today. You are all well known to this committee, and to people who have followed this area for a long time, and have had a deep dedication to this country and to its strategic purposes. Clearly, one of those is at issue today, that is, how we are to move ahead.

At this point, I would like to call upon you, Walter, for your thoughts about this subject. We are indebted to you again for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was pleased to receive your invitation to appear before the subcommittee this afternoon on a matter of national concern, the growing need for greater United States expertise on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

In a few days, I will be retiring after almost 41 years of Government service during which I have frequently had responsibilities involving the Soviet Union and the nations under its sway. Over the course of these years, I have watched our Nation's need for knowledge of the U.S.S.R. and its allies grow steadily. I would like to identify for you some of the reasons why I believe this national need will continue to increase, and thereby to explain why I think an investment in the intellectual capital of the Nation is wise.

It is perhaps obvious to all of us that the collection of peoples and societies that calls itself the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is different from the United States. It is the degree and nature of that difference which is hard to absorb. I do not stress this point to dwell on the reconcilability or irreconcilability of our differences, but to emphasize that without deep and difficult study of these intangibles, we can be misled by the common and pervasive products of science, technology, and industry into thinking those peoples are pretty much like us. They are not.

It takes hard research and analytical work over a long period and firsthand experience in the Soviet Union to wrench us out of our own cultural assumptions into theirs, to appreciate the differences between their society and ours. It is not always a pleasant or even a safe endeavor, but that is what it takes to make competent specialists. As a Nation, we need the contribution of such specialists to our understanding of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe and to the prudent management of our foreign policy.

Soviet society remains essentially closed. Now, that is not just a Soviet trait. It goes back for centuries, rooted in a history of foreign invasion, domestic repression, social hierarchies characterized by almost absolute power over subordinates, and periodic terror. Those in power in the U.S.S.R. seek to control all public media, to define and limit the information and beliefs communicated. I make this point to illustrate why it takes hard, skillful, and constant research to extract reliable information about the U.S.S.R. and to verify it.

Congressional action in the area will provide heartening evidence to those few individuals who toil in this difficult vineyard that the Congress and the Nation recognize and value their work.

Let me turn to some of the reasons why the need for skilled specialists and for research has increased and will continue to do so.

The first is simply that the Soviet Union has greatly increased its military capacities and foreign involvement. By massive and sustained effort, deprivation, and sacrifice, and by the use of force,

the U.S.S.R. has become an empire and is increasingly projecting its presence and involvement on a global basis. Where once there was little or no need to be knowledgeable about Soviet activities and policies in Latin America or Africa or the Middle East, there is now hardly a geographic area from Antarctica to outer space where the U.S.S.R. has not attempted to further its interests and project its influence. The territory for Soviet and East European studies has increased, as has the variety of activities they must encompass.

In addressing ourselves to these vital issues, we need and will need more in years ahead well-trained and highly motivated men and women who can advise us knowledgeably about Soviet intentions, strengths, and weaknesses.

There is another major reason why our need will increase for the knowledge, skills, and research. It is the increase in the breadth and complexity of the domestic and Eastern European issues facing the Soviet leadership as their society and those under their immediate sway mature. It is no longer a matter of draining unskilled labor from the villages into primitive heavy and military industry, of iron discipline and inhuman terror costing millions of lives. Those simple days and simple, if lethal, "solutions" are gone.

The Soviet Union and what we may justifiably call its empire comprise a much more complex web and face much more complex issues. The difficulties and problems of the U.S.S.R.'s relations with Eastern Europe are manifest, and range from the economic through the political, military, psychological, and religious. Poland is but the most recent and vivid illustration to catch the world's attention.

It is for these reasons that I welcome your subcommittee's interest in finding a means to finance increased study of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. We congratulate you very much again on 41 years of public service. It is great that you are here today as perhaps a final opportunity to testify and serve in this way.

Admiral Inman.

STATEMENT OF ADM. B. R. INMAN, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Admiral INMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Having recently retired after 31 years of public service and discovering yet another facet of all that wonderful support I got from secretaries and other staff over those 31 years, I do not have a formal statement. So if you will tolerate a few informal remarks, I would appreciate it.

Senator LUGAR. We will indeed.

Admiral INMAN. As you know, I have been increasingly concerned over the last several years in our discussions, in my testimony before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its companions concerned about our national security status, the Armed Services Committees and the Intelligence Committees. My concern has grown as I have watched us be subject to surprise time and again, surprise where we have had insufficient assets applied

to problems, and surprise because we did not understand the events that we had some inkling were under way, and all too often in doing ex post facto examination I have found the fault lay in mirror imaging, well meaning, hard working analysts who examined the problem on the basis of their experience as good American citizens but with little understanding of the totally different motivations that moved individuals in other countries, whether it was the Soviet Union or Iran or too many other sad examples.

As I look back over the performance over a long period of time in national estimates, particularly where the Soviets were concerned, there were rare occasions when we overestimated. There were many occasions in which we underestimated what the Soviets would eventually do. In looking at it, we have become very good at counting things, at understanding what they have in hand, and very poor at projecting the challenges that we are likely to face.

I believe increasingly that is a result of the lack of deep understanding of those societies, what motivates them and how they are changing. The need for scholars inside the Government and outside to challenge Government policy is going to be much greater in the 15 years ahead of us, I believe, than it has been in the past 15 years. I believe we are moving into an increasingly hazardous time.

The Soviet Union as our principal adversary will increasingly be looking for opportunities to use its vast array of power in the interest of the state, and they will have a mobility that they have never had in the past at a time when there will be a whole new generation of leaders. We have been reasonably confident in predicting how the current old Bolsheviks will respond. We should have far less confidence about our ability to predict how a new generation of leaders may respond, given the depth of scholarship that has gone into studying their backgrounds, the influences which impact on them, and even more so, those which may impact on them in the years ahead.

The country is extremely well served at this point in time to have at the Central Intelligence Agency as its new Deputy Director of Intelligence Dr. Robert Gates, who was a youngster in the sixties. He got his master's at the University of Indiana in a Russian studies program which was heavily funded by the Ford Foundation. That funding has disappeared, and I worry greatly as I visit campuses and look around about where the Bob Gateses are that this country will critically need 10 years from now.

I have to tell you honestly that I do not believe this legislation answers all of the problems. It simply addresses the most critical. I think ultimately the Government is going to have to take a responsibility in insuring that there is deeper area study of areas that have traditionally been our friends but may well be intense competitors in the years out ahead economically, politically, hopefully not militarily, but the most pressing problem is indeed the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and therefore giving priority to that problem first I support. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Admiral.

General Odom.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE PENTAGON

General ODOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear here today. I still have secretarial support, not having retired. Therefore, I will submit my written remarks.

Senator LUGAR. They will be made a part of the record.

General ODOM. Rather than read or repeat them, I would like to summarize what I think are some of the key aspects that may be worth emphasis here. I would really like to addresss the issue of the endowment from two viewpoints, one from that of a former teacher and researcher, and second from the viewpoint of the U.S. Army and the intelligence community.

From the first viewpoint, it seems that if you look back to the forties, fifties, or sixties, and follow what happened in Soviet area studies, it went from boom to bust. We started off slowly. We built up a rich monographic literature by the late 1950's. Then the post-Sputnik period came. A lot of money flowed into the field, and the field overproduced. A lot of institutes were set up which created more jobs, which created also more students looking for more jobs, and by the late 1960's, early 1970's, we had lots of quantity, and in the process I think some of the quality slipped, and the overproduction began to discourage a lot of young people from entering the field. Now we are back to a bust period.

The thing I like in particular about the endowment is that it does not promise to overinfuse the field with an abundance of funds but rather it seems to promise the possibility of building a fiscal floor, a rather austere one, under a broad set of functions, which recognize that a Soviet area expert is not trained in a year or 2 or 3, but over a 10- or 12-year period. If we do not maintain some support in that broad range of functions, we may merely dump a large amount of money into post-graduate research while ignoring the other areas. In that case, I do not think the product or the results will be what you are seeking or what the Government in particular needs. Therefore, from the academic viewpoint, I think this bill has many, many attractive features.

I might, by way of amusing digression, refer to Senator Mathias' question of what will we do for employment of many new Soviet experts. I think this was addressed in part by Howard Swearer's remark. We might be producing future college presidents. He said that Soviet area studies proved very good training for dealing with university politics.

Second, from the viewpoint of the intelligence community, the Soviet Union obviously is our prime concern.

I endorse fully all of the remarks Admiral Inman has made. I share almost all of those insights from my own experience. I would simply add and say in a little different way that more frequently than not I think we blame ourselves for intelligence failures as failures in collection. I think the failures in intelligence in the 1980's will be failures of analysis caused by the kind of concepts and perspectives that we bring to the material that is available to us.

The quality of the analysis that we are going to be able to bring into the intelligence community has its origins in the academic world, and it is a direct reflection of the health of the university

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infrastructure. I am not one of those who believes that professors should be here advising us all the time on all issues, and that if we have any problem we turn to them for immediate support. I do think they have an enormous and sometimes greatly underestimated influence in the books they write and in the students they teach. Those people come into the Government, and they bring the insights and the conceptual perspectives of that literature, and our analysis really does not, in its intellectual quality, rise a great deal above that level.

When the field of Soviet studies falls into disrepair, the quality of our cadres, after a lag period, also begins to reflect that. From purely an Army viewpoint, we have now about 280 officers who are qualified as Soviet area specialists. In order to acquire that specialty, they go through a language training period, a graduate study period, and then a field training experience. Therefore, I need for the Army a good university structure to which to send future trainees in that program.

For the sum of these reasons then, I think it is an extraordinarily useful and promising effort which the endowment embodies, and I heartily applaud your initiative in drawing up this bill.

[General Odom's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues today. A review of the health and adequacy of Soviet studies in the United States is indeed timely. I would like to contribute to it from three viewpoints: first, as a scholar and former teacher who began training in the field over two decades ago; second, as a member of the intelligence community in the government today; third, and most important, as a military officer with direct responsibility to the Chief of Staff of the Army for knowledge of the Soviet bloc.

From the viewpoint of a scholar and teacher, a number of factors would seem to bear strongly on any decision the Senate might take to provide an endowment for Soviet studies. The history of graduate training and research in the Soviet area in the United States since World War II has been a bit like silver mining in Colorado, from boom to bust and ghost towns. A small group of able and sagacious men launched the expansion of Soviet studies in the immediate postwar decade. Philip Mosely and Geroid T. Robinson were the founders and early teaching staff of the Russian Institute at Columbia University. Philip Mosely in particular had seen the need in his own diplomatic experience during World War II for a corps of highly knowledgeable experts in Soviet affairs. He gave up a government career to go to Columbia and build an institutional base for educating not just experts for government service but also for training scholars to broaden our teaching capabilities throughout our university system.

Columbia's Russian Institute was not alone, but it did launch the expansion of the field, an expansion that progressed slowly at first, yielding very high quality monographic literature by the mid and late 1950's. A comparison of the reading lists for courses in Soviet politics and history for 1954 and 1960 will reveal at a glance the progress that was made.

The 1960's, riding on a burst of funding in the post-Sputnik reaction in the United States, witnessed an explosion in the field. Institutes for Soviet studies began to spring up at many universities. Jobs grew in number but MA and Ph.D. degrees grew even faster. The boom was full bloom by the late 1960's, riding on the heavy infusion of money largely from the national security departments of government, Defense, State and the CIA. The 1970's witnessed the bust. Not only did the government money dry up; student activists made it difficult for universities to accept it. Not surprisingly, the quality of the monographic literature became mixed and spotty. Quality graduate students found the field less attractive. And the infrastructure began to decay.

It would be a mistake, in my view, simply to infuse the graduate training base with a new and large amount of money. The experience of the 1960's should not be repeated. A far more sensible approach, in my view, is to begin with the recognition

that it requires 10 to 15 years to train a high quality expert in Soviet affairs. That is true both for teaching scholars and for government officials. The educational process includes language training, several years of graduate work, and finally practical experience through travel, research, and writing.

We should also recognize that quality is more important than quantity in Soviet area studies. The boom years produced many Soviet area specialists who lacked depth in Russian and Soviet history, who spoke little or no Russian, and who had not acquired a sensitivity for Soviet and Russian literature. The late Henry Roberts, while he was editor of the Slavic Review, expressed great concern abut this weakening of quality through overproduction. He complained in the years just before his death about the intellectual sloppiness that had come to characterize much of the field. Any new program for support to Soviet studies, therefore, should be directed toward quality. It should not be used simply to save impoverished area studies institutes. To use the trade language of economics, we should fund the "production function," not the "welfare function."

In light of these considerations and realities, it seems to make more sense to build a permanent but modest floor of support under each of the activities that make up the 10 to 15 years of training. I have in mind graduate education, graduate and undergraduate teaching, postgraduate research, travel for research and other scholarly purposes both to the U.S.S.R. and within the United States to centers with research materials, and publishing.

The draft legislation under consideration offers precisely this approach. The earnings from the endowment would go to these activities. The vicissitudes of interest rates will, of course, cause variations in the earnings from year to year, but there will always be at least some funds available for each activity. Both students and teachers will be inclined to make the long-term commitments required for quality education and publication, given the certainty that such funding would provide. While an endowment of this sort would not prevent "booms" in funding from other sources, it would prevent "busts" of the kind we are in today. That, in my view, is its most critical service.

Next, let me speak from the viewpoint of the intelligence community. It is popular to talk of intelligence failures when things go wrong for our foreign policy and military policy. Most often such failures seem to be attributed to lack of intelligence collection, and sometimes that is true. But just as frequently they are due to failures in analysis. The big intelligence failures in the 1980's and 1990's, in my judgment, are likely to be in analysis.

A healthy university training base for Soviet studies can prevent faulty analysis in at least two major ways. First, by training people to work in the intelligence community, it provides greater expertise for dealing with the plethora of information we collect. The boom period of Soviet studies gave us lots of so-called experts, but the quality was uneven. That is why I am particularly concerned that any new program be aimed at better quality in student selection and teaching. The universities mis-serve us when they do not hold to high standards of tough-minded objectiveness in analysis. The next great help the universities can provide the intelligence community is a rich monographic literature of scholarly work on all aspects of Soviet affairs. Gradute students will have difficulty learning more than what the books on course reading lists offer. And what they read influences the analytical perspectives they will retain throughout most of their careers if they later come to work in the government. Many people fail to realize that scholars' greatest influence on intelligence analysis and policy analysis in the government occurs through their published works. The impact is not immediate. It works its way into government, carried by their students.

Let me cite some conspicuous lacunae in the literature today. In Russian history we are rich in monographs on the revolutionaries. We have precious little on the government institutions of the Imperial period. On Russian military institutions we have very little. Yet the Imperial Russian budget throughout the 19th century shows the Russian Army as the largest recipient of government monies. Although the 1950's produced a number of studies of Soviet institutions, particularly economic institutions, they have not been updated. It has long been my view that our study of the Soviet economy has ignored the vast non-budgetary allocations to Soviet defense. Little of note has been published on this topic. Many unclassified aspects of Soviet military institutions can be studied in the universities. Yet they have received only spotty attention. And the national minorities in the U.S.S.R. are another area of enormous importance for new research. The economy, the military, and the nationalities are the critical determinants in Soviet political development. Yet they remain mystery areas in many regards.

You may believe that we need more Soviet area scholars to advise you and the Executive Branch on Soviet affairs. While I am not opposed to that source of advice, I am inclined to give it much lower priority than teaching and published research. The universities tend to suffer, in my view, when professors become distracted by too many opportunities to consult with policymakers. And policymakers in the final analysis depend more on their staffs to accumulate and digest information from scholars' work than they do on scholar consultants. Moreover, the highly charged atmosphere of policy disputes on our relations with the Soviet Union tends to polarize the scholarly community and destroy its objectivity. I do not believe, therefore, that you should expect from an endowment of Soviet studies a flood of academicians into Washington to tell us what to do about problems with the Soviet Union. Their influence will be broader, wiser, and more profound if it is indirect, through their writings and their students.

Let me balance this observation with another. Unlike all other regional area studies, the primary constituency for their work is the government, particularly the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. The business community and foreign sources are appropriate funders and users of the work in most other regions. Soviet studies have no reliable alternative to government support. That is a very powerful argument in favor of the proposed endowment we are considering today.

Finally, let me speak as a military officer, the Army's senior intelligence officer. The Army has long recognized the need to prepare a cadre of Soviet area experts. It has a Soviet foreign area program which dates back to 1946. It involves language training, graduate schooling, and 2 years at the U.S. Army Russian Institute in Germany where advanced courses are taught entirely in Russian by native Russian speakers. Through the ups and down of fiscal support, we have kept that institute alive, producing 10 or 12 graduates each year. The State Department and NSA have also used it for their Soviet specialists. The graduates of this program have vindicated it many times. The former Director of DIA, Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, is a graduate. At the Vienna Summit in 1979 when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown met with Minister of Defense Ustinov, a graduate of that institute was the interpreter for Harold Brown. My office in the Department of the Army has several of its graduates. So does DIA. The quality of the Army attachés in Moscow has been uniformly high because of this program. Many distinguished Foreign Service officers, who have served in Moscow, profited from the program. If you will permit me a lack of modesty, I believe the Army has contributed more to our cadre of Soviet area experts in the Department of Defense than any other single source.

I cite this experience and record for two reasons. First, the program depends in part on graduate schooling. In other words, the universities have contributed directly to its quality. I want that to continue and to improve. Second, it demonstrates that a sustained, consistent, and very modest funding of a studies program produces distinguished results. It involves a comprehensive approach, language training, graduate education, and field experience. It is a long program, 4 years of training followed by at least two utilization tours in the Soviet area. The rationale of the endowment proposal, it seems to me, is quite similar, and I see no reason that it should not produce even more remarkable results.

I hope my remarks have enlightened you on some of the many merits of the proposal for an endowment training fund for the Soviet area. I believe it will be an excellent high-return investment for our national security as well as for the general body of scholarly knowledge.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, General Odom.

I would like to ask some basic questions of the panel, so as to establish a record from this hearing. I think each of you has testified that we suffer from a serious depletion of expertise on the Soviet Union and Eastern European affairs. Why do you suspect from your governmental experience that this is so?

Clearly the focus of our Government for some time in almost all public rhetoric, whether from a foreign relations standpoint, a defense standpoint, or an intelligence standpoint, has been to highlight the problems that this Nation has with the Soviet Union, and clearly for our need for knowledge about the Soviet Union of all sorts.

Now, given that public stance, which I suppose each one of us in his own way from the President on down has been involved in, why or how could we have come up short and be facing this sort of problem that the endowment seeks to meet? Do any of you have a comment as to the train of affairs that would have brought us to this pass?

Ambassador STOESSEL. Mr. Chairman, I could comment just briefly on that. From my observation, I would agree with what General Odom has said, that we perhaps suffered from a boom and bust phenomenon here, and that earlier on we had a boom, and quite a few experts were trained, and it was quite in vogue to have training in Soviet affairs and area studies, languages, and so on. It was felt that there would be great opportunities opening up for contact with the Soviet Union, for business with the Soviet Union.

Now, many of those prospects were dashed, and they did not develop as had been expected. There was, for that reason perhaps, perhaps for other reasons, a falling off of funds available to support study programs, a lessening of interest on the part of many people in going into this field simply because of the difficulties in the relationship and the lack of prospects for meaningful contact, meaningful study, business contacts and so on.

We have seen this in the Foreign Service, in the type of people we have coming in as Foreign Service officers. In the past, we had quite a few who had already had experience and training in university and had their master's degrees, some with doctor's degrees in the Soviet area. It is very useful to have people like that. They can hit the ground running, and build on that expertise. We see very little of that now. We have very few applicants with that kind of background. We do feel it is important that this be given renewed attention, so that again we can see this type of interest and support for the area studies.

Admiral INMAN. Mr. Chairman, there was no conscious decision that led us to this process, but rather a whole series of inadvertent decisions. The contribution of education to national security simply was not addressed as an area topic. Precisely at the time when the fruits of the investments of the fifties and early sixties were beginning to pay off, with scholars that might have moved to Government, we were into Vietnam. Guns and butter was at work and we were not adding to the numbers, although we were subtracting from the numbers devoted to other problems, to add to the additional coverage on Vietnam.

Then, in turn, as we began addressing other problems, the gold flow problem in 1967 probably did more than any other single factor to impact on our use of humans in this whole area. As we became focused that our No. 1 requirement was to reduce American presence abroad, not on how well did we know what was going on in given countries, we began to reduce the size of the Foreign Service, and the size of the intelligence establishment.

That continued throughout much of the seventies before we really began to assess the impact of that and to approach some readdressal. There was, of course, great interest in being able to verify treaties. Fortunately, we paid attention to that, and we are probably better today than we have ever been in understanding the general status of the Soviet military, but I believe we are going to

find increasingly the worry 15 years out ahead will not be the size or scope, but how they may elect to use it.

It is there that we are going to fail unless we get on with the problem, the shortfall of the in-depth examination of political, economic, and commercial potential. There is not yet a broad recognition, I believe, that depth of knowledge of foreign countries is an essential component of our national security health, and until we have that firmly established, we will not address the problem in a rational way.

General ODOM. I cannot add a lot to that. I agree with all of the points that were made. I do think that the boom-or-bust issue does explain a great deal about some of our shortages now, but I think it would be a mistake to describe the field as absolutely destitute today. There are some very, very able people. The thing that concerns me is not that. The thing that concerns me is the absence of a new generation coming on, and a reluctance on the part of some of the highest quality graduate students to commit themselves to an area where employment and the quality of the resources available are uncertain. The endowment, it seems to me, will provide a basis for giving someone a certain amount of security if he is willing to make that long-term commitment.

I also think that some developments within the Soviet Union have given us new kinds of information and new concerns so that some of the literature and the analysis from the fifties and sixties is not adequate today. In military affairs, the national minorities, and new changes or efforts, or failures to change, reorganizations, et cetera, within the economy—those three areas, the domestic aspects of military, the economy, and the nationalities, are very critical issues in Soviet politics. Yet I think they may not be as well studied as would seem to be warranted in light of activities and behavior that we have seen.

Senator LUGAR. Let me follow up what each of you have touched upon in one way or another, as Senator Mathias did in his earlier question. In many areas in which this country performs well, the economic market of this country offers incentives for people to enter fields. We keep getting back, and away, to the fact that even after the Ford Foundation initiative and the interests of those people in giving us a number of scholars and potential promise, that not only will there be interest in governmental service, but broad-based trade contacts and potential in academic life and other sorts of things, for various reasons these have not worked out in quite that way.

As a matter of fact, trade, aside from grain sales and all, is very limited with the Soviet Union. This is one reason we come to this piece of legislation today. What does our society do when the market does not work in this particular area? Clearly, it is not in the best interest of policy, I suspect, for us to offer salaries in Government that bring superstars into this field, although in a way our lives may well depend upon it, as they do on many things that are critical in Government collectively.

Essentially, how do we bridge this gap? What would make it interesting, lucrative, and stimulating for people to come in large numbers into Soviet studies, and in fact after we have stimulated this interest, where would people go? Specifically, is this another

role that legislation must play or will the governmental apparatus work its will in a way that would assimilate the new scholars and those that we would stimulate to come into this field? In other words, have people been reading it right that there really were not any positions, and as a result they just did not arrive?

General ODOM. May I begin with a short answer to that? I would like to make the point again that I do not think it would be a good idea to attract large numbers of people into the field again. I emphasized that in my remarks. I think it is important to attract a small, steady flow. If we were enormously successful in having a marked attraction to a large number of people, we would be back on the boom-and-bust cycle. It seems to me it would be very wise to avoid that.

The second point that I would like to make was touched upon very briefly by my colleague earlier, Howard Swearer. The natural constituency for Soviet area expertise is the national security community, the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the intelligence community, rather than the business world. Therefore, I do not think the market model is necessarily the best model to take to describe the forces best able to produce this expertise.

Admiral INMAN. May I take a slightly different viewpoint on the last point? I agree that that is where the principal consumer area will be for the talent that is developed, but when one looks at the perspective, it was precisely in the sixties that we began diverting and then drawing down the size of the national security establishment as part of reducing the size of Government, while the domestic agencies were burgeoning in very large proportion. We finally, after a very long period of time, have begun assessing what is the impact of that very long period of drawdown, and it is not just hardware impact. There is clearly people and depth of talent that already has been recognized, a commitment which has drawn broad bipartisan support for rebuilding the intelligence community.

I believe it will follow, but maybe a little slowly, that there is going to be some emphasis in growth in the Foreign Service and its representation abroad and its concentration on these problems, and likely in some other areas of government as well. So, the real problem is, we have already recognized the increasing need and have begun opening the opportunities, and the talent is not there coming out of the university structure to give you the choice in quality of applicants that we ought to be able to get.

So, we may have taken away the job opportunities inadvertently as a lot of the last scholars were coming, but now we have begun creating the additional billets before we have the mechanism in place to produce the scholars to fill them.

Senator LUGAR. You have all commented favorably on the limited objectives of this endowment approach in this legislation, and it is a limited approach, and it is narrowly focused really on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries. A comment has been made that perhaps it would be in the best interests of this country to know a great deal more about many other areas of the world, too, which is clearly the case. Is this the best way to approach it, and if it is a useful way, what other things should we be doing, or

alternatively, if we were to spend the same amount of money in a different way as a nation, what else would we do?

Admiral INMAN. Since I am the one who is already retired, and therefore less likely to feel the pangs of difficulty for encouraging spending money, the beauty of the approach in the legislation is that it is a long-term commitment, not one that is subject to annual debate about appropriations or even cyclical swings with elections. The further we move toward this sort of approach all across the national security account, the better off we will be.

There are some measures, in response to Senator Mathias, that we have been trying in the last several years in partnership between Defense and CIA in funding a couple of programs to try to expand the Soviet research which has the virtue of producing scholarly efforts that are at least focused on problems you know you have now and not ethereal studies of things that took place 25 or 50 years ago, but I think over the longer term we need not only this program but a series of others parallel to it that insure an endowment for in-depth area studies and language studies across the whole spectrum of foreign countries with which we must do business commercially and as a government on a day-by-day basis.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. Walter?

Ambassador STOESSEL. I would agree, Mr. Chairman, with Admiral Inman's remarks here. I think it is a very good thing that the proposal is long term in its nature. I believe that there is a need for something of this kind since, as you say, the market has failed to work in this area. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have to be a subject of major concern on the part of the United States. The incentives for the type of study and the type of commitment on the part of scholars or those who would like to be experts is simply not the same as it is in many other areas of the world, while I think we need more study and more work on other areas such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In many of these areas there are already incentives in this direction and opportunities in private life, business, and trade are greater than they are with regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Senator LUGAR. General, do you have a thought?

General ODOM. You asked is it the best way. There are other ways. I think it is as good a way as I have heard of doing something about the university infrastructure. It does not promise to solve a great number of the problems in the Russian area as far as the Army is concerned. Broad-based language training for people who may not have advanced degrees is a different problem, but there will be spinoff effects for language training as a result of this endowment. So, I think in what it addresses, if it is not optimum, it is close to optimum.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The Chair would like now to welcome the distinguished ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Biden of Delaware. Senator, do you have an opening comment?

Senator BIDEN. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, you and I, as members of both the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees, are well aware of the importance of having the best possible information about other nations, especially those with the capability or intention to challenge U.S.

interests and policies abroad. We need information not only about current developments, but also about underlying structures and trends. Just as knowledge is power, so inaccurate or inadequate knowledge contributes to weakness.

We believe that our intellectual resources regarding the Soviet bloc are eroding, and that we urgently need to reconstitute and expand our capabilities to analyze and understand developments in those nations. That is why we have introduced S. 2919, the Soviet Bloc Research Fund bill. That is also why we have a distinguished set of witnesses this afternoon—men with direct personal experience in the nurturing and use of research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Since any expenditure of public funds, especially in current economic conditions, requires the most solid and compelling justification, I hope that our witnesses will each give us an answer to one basic question: Is it clearly and directly in our national security interest to expand our research capabilities on the Soviet bloc at this time?

I think that the answer is yes, but I welcome the informed testimony of our witnesses.

Thank you.

I apologize to you gentlemen for being late. It is one of the few advantages of being in the minority, that is, being the ranking member rather than the chairman. You know your being late will not preclude the meeting from going forward.

I believe I will address my question to all three of you. The only one I will ask at this time is this: What are some of the specific indicators, if you can give me any, or concrete results of the apparent, and I emphasize apparent, decline in our research capabilities for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

Admiral INMAN. Senator Biden, in my earlier comment I underlined my concern as I have looked at our record for forecasting where the Soviets will go, what kinds of things will they do in the future, and how they will use particularly the power that they are steadily accumulating. The great shortfall has been increasingly one of mirror imaging. We do superbly at counting what they have now and in understanding how they use it, but in projecting how they would use it increasingly I believe there is an absence of depth of scholarship. We have a great tendency to make judgments as to how we as Americans might react in certain situations. I believe that will be increasingly a critical problem for us when the new generation of leaders comes to power in the Soviet Union and has at its disposal a greater array of power than any Russian ruler ever has had, and now is the time we had better get started filling that gap of depth of scholarship, watching political, economic, and cultural factors inside the Soviet Union to help us make better projections about how they will respond to events and how we hopefully can avoid the kinds of challenges that spur the alarm that we see.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Senator, as I mentioned earlier in my remarks, we have seen a definite and quite significant falling off in the number of people applying for the Foreign Service who have a background in Soviet studies and expertise, higher degrees, and so on. The same also for our research activities in the State Depart-

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ment. We are just not seeing that same degree of interest and experience in the young people coming in. I think this is a reflection of the situation of erosion in the general academic community in the field of Soviet and Eastern European studies.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

General Odom, let me cover just a little different side of your question. I will run down what I think are some lacunae in the monographic of literature on the Soviet Union today, but not only the Soviet Union, because we are talking about the broad university base, but also the Russian historical period.

First, military affairs, although they get a lot of cursory or thin monographic treatment and some journal treatment, we really lack monographs on many of the military institutions which could be studied from the open sources. We know little or nothing about their system for raising and training of military manpower. There is little or nothing about the involuntary or voluntary contributions that people make in the way of their private incomes to defense activities which are not routed through the State budgetary system at all.

One could name a number of other topics of that sort. The economic area, I think, warrants an enormous amount of attention. I cite some areas of interest where I can find nothing very satisfying to read from the field today. In the 1950's, books by Joseph Berliner and David Grannick went into fine grained analysis of the institutional relations and managerial relations inside firms and ministries. Some of that work has been updated, but not a lot. It is long overdue that we revisit those sorts of issues.

There is a great deal of discussion about what East-West trade will do to Soviet politics internally. I think if we had a very good study of the history and the present operational methods of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, we would have a lot better idea of whether we are really going to free up any of the decisionmaking at the center and decentralize it as is often argued will happen. I do not think we can know what will happen until we have better knowledge of those kinds of institutional relations.

I mentioned earlier national minorities. Some have had some rather fine treatment, but many are untouched, and many that were treated earlier have not been followed lately.

In the area of Russian history, I think if you look through the reading lists of most history courses, you find them heavily slanted toward the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century, and you would find a paucity of monographs on tzarist institutions. The largest budget item throughout the nineteenth century in the imperial budget was the military establishment. There are three or four books that I can think of now on the library shelves, many of them out of print, which deal with that institution in all of the nineteenth century, and I think the authors of all of them would not claim that they had exhausted the subject.

Those are just a few examples of what I consider work that really needs to be done by the academic community.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. I do have one more question.

Among the criticisms that Senator Lugar and I have received or will receive as a consequence of pushing this measure—obviously, it has our names on it, so we think it is a good idea—are not only

the cost of the endowment, but also why Eastern Europe, the Soviet bloc, and not Latin America, Asia, Africa, or the Middle East.

It was already pointed out to me by one of my friends, a very well informed gentleman, that in moving forward with this legislative approach I was once again reinforcing my myopic view of the world and I was once again confirming that I was part of that eastern intellectual establishment which only tended to look to United States-Soviet, United States-European relations. This reminded me of a conversation which this person had with me, which is similar to a conversation I later had with you, Admiral Inman.

It was during the Iranian crisis and this person was pointing out that we had really no expertise in the academic institutions of America—I think you were able to dig up a total of three or five people in all of America who spoke Farsi fluently and understood it, understood the culture, followed it, and were able intelligently to comment on the Moslem revival and what it meant, and if it meant this, and so on and so forth.

This particular person said, here you go again, Biden, back to focusing what limited funds we have on your same old concern, and it is just reflective of the fact that you cannot break out of that mold.

Admiral INMAN. I did not accuse you of quite that in my opening remarks, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I did not hear your opening remarks, but in our conversation at the time you did not accuse me of any of that. Of course, I did not hear your opening remarks.

Now, how do I respond to that?

Admiral INMAN. You are dealing with the most critical problem. All of them need additional study. This is only the beginning of addressing the series of problems that directly affect our national security, but this one is the most critical simply because we are going to need more urgently on this topic than on any other to be able to understand the motivations, the thought processes, and the direction of a new generation of rulers, because they will have in their hands power no Russian rulers have had and the potential for using it in ways ranging from inimical to disastrous for this country.

So indeed, as one looks at the whole range of problems, there are others that certainly need to be addressed, but the depth of understanding on this problem is probably more critical to real questions of war and peace than the others.

Senator BIDEN. Are there any further comments?

General ODOM. I can only repeat briefly what I said earlier. Almost all other areas have other constituencies to serve, as well as the Government—the business community or other private people with interest in the area. There are lots of other sources of funding for non-Soviet regions.

There are not very many sources of funding for Soviet studies deriving resources from within the Soviet Union. The natural funding source, then, is the Department of Defense, State, CIA, or the Government. I think that is the soundest argument as far as how you divide up the area studies resource pie in the United States, in

addition to the one which Admiral Inman made, which is also compelling to me.

But I would offer this argument if you need an additional one for your answer.

Ambassador STOESSEL. I would simply say that it is one of the most difficult fields to study, and as I mentioned earlier we know the Soviet Union is a closed society. It is very hard to figure out what is going on there. The Soviets do everything they can to cover it up, distort it, and so on.

So it takes real effort and a real commitment over a long period of time to get at that and study it and work at it. I think that is just another reason why we need to make a special effort in this field, to get special help.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you. I think it is important that that be on the record. It may already have been on the record. I may merely have asked each of you to repeat yourselves.

General, let me follow up briefly on what you said. In addition to the allocation of resources from the private sector and other areas, there is also not merely the allocation of resources for study and training, but in practical onsite participation, so that we do have in most of the other areas the ability to have feedback, and something more than cursory feedback.

I have no more questions for this panel, Mr. Chairman, so I will conclude with this statement. I really hope not only that Senator Lugar and I are successful in this matter, but I hope it is the beginning.

I think what we have failed to focus on in our effort to grapple with this Nation's problems, both domestically and in the international arena, is R. & D. I view this as comparable to additional money for research and development in medicine or the space program, or in how to make a better steel product or a better automobile.

This is research and development, and I hope for the meager amount of funds that we are really talking about, once this is passed, God willing, that we can come back and make it clear to our colleagues and to the American people that it is a very minor expenditure for a major payback, if in fact we are willing to do it.

Quite frankly, I think, in the absence of a policy decision made by this Government to reinvigorate the intellectual side of the equation, we are lead pipe cinch losers. I do not know how we will get through the first part of the 21st century unless we really revamp our human resource base.

Anyway, that was more of a speech, obviously, than a question. But I know we all will have to be leaving here soon.

Senator LUGAR. Well spoken. Thank you.

Senator Pell is our distinguished ranking member of the full Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I regret very much that I cannot stay, but I wanted to commend and congratulate you and the Senator from Delaware on your legislation, which seems to me to be very worth while indeed. I know it has often been said that to understand an adversary you have to know him, you have to imagine yourself in his skin for a period of time. That is one of the reasons why I have advocated that we have

psychiatrists attached to our negotiating teams, so that they can better estimate and guess what the responses will be of our adversaries.

In essence, the more we know about our adversaries, the better off we are and the better we can deal with them. This is just what your legislation does.

I am struck here in seeing Ambassador Stoessel into recalling our days together in the East European division, when we thought the fellows in the East European division, those men and women, though there were not many women then, we felt we were really the elite of the service, I think. I notice that over many years our Ambassadors to Moscow came out of the Eastern European division. And in recent years they have not; they have either come from the outside world or from other geographic areas.

I think there is a very real need, shown if by no other way than by the source of our Ambassadors to Moscow, that this legislation should go through.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Senator Boschwitz has joined us. Do you have a comment or a question, Senator?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you. I want to associate myself with the remarks that I just heard Senator Pell deliver. I am pleased to join your bill as a cosponsor.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your testimony. At this time we will relieve you of that responsibility, and thank you very much for coming today.

Ambassador STOESSEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral INMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General ODOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. At this juncture the Chair would call forward Dr. John W. Ryan, president of Indiana University.

[Pause.]

Senator LUGAR. Earlier we heard from a distinguished academic, Dr. Howard Swearer of Brown University, who would have joined Dr. Ryan for our second panel, but he had to leave early.

Dr. Ryan, it is a pleasure to see you in a solo performance, and it is a very special personal pleasure to greet you to this subcommittee this afternoon on behalf of the State of Indiana and Indiana University. Would you please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN W. RYAN, PRESIDENT, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, IND.

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is John Ryan and I am president of Indiana University. I am very pleased to appear before you and your subcommittee at this hearing in that capacity, as well as in my capacity as chairman of the international affairs committee of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, an association of 140 members. My remarks represent the support and desires of those institutions.

In addition, the calendar and therefore seniority has made me chairman of the Association of American Universities this year,

and I know that many member institutions of that association are vitally interested in the subject that this legislation addresses.

Mr. Chairman, I also have some prepared remarks which I should like to submit for the record. I will therefore concentrate my remarks in a less formal and perhaps more brief manner, so that I might respond to any questions that you might have.

Senator LUGAR. Very well.

Mr. RYAN. First, I should say that I commend you for the initiative that this legislation represents. You have heard from earlier persons on the panel before me who have stressed the point that support for international student and scholar exchange, support for research in Soviet and East European areas, support for programs of study that prepare people to be competent in the intricacies of the history and economics, the language and so forth, of the Soviet bloc area, that interest and support for this area has waxed and waned in these past years.

My good friend and colleague, President Swearer, indicated that perhaps the best preparation he had for being president of Brown University was his background as a student of Soviet politics. And perhaps the best preparation I had for president was being called upon some 24 or 25 years ago by the then vice president of the University of Wisconsin to work with an equally labyrinthine organization, the Ford Foundation, in attempting to obtain support for the development of area studies programs at the University of Wisconsin.

Because of the generosity and forward-looking policies of that foundation and the rich resources of the University of Wisconsin, a great program developed, and in terms of this specific legislation, a great resource for the study of Russian and East European areas came into being, as indeed happened in our own university, Indiana University.

Funding support for Soviet studies from foundations, Government, individuals, corporations, and universities has declined by almost 30 percent in the last 5 or 6 years. This decline is at a time, as those who preceded me demonstrated, when the need for expertise in these matters, has never been more critical; not only for the very important function of public policymaking, but also for fostering public understanding of another people, adversary perhaps, but people nonetheless.

This legislation could not come forward at a more appropriate time, as both private and public universities with existing Soviet area studies programs are under the greatest financial strain of the last 3 or 4 decades.

One reason for the diminishing number of young scholars entering into this study, is that current levels of support from the institutions themselves stand very much in jeopardy. And so this legislation gives a welcome lift and a bit of enthusiasm to those institutions that want to maintain, if not improve, Soviet bloc area studies.

Mr. Chairman, the legislation offers a kind of reliability and continuity of funding previously unseen at the university level and the likely result would be the infusion of new talent and new intellect into these areas. The legislation very wisely calls upon universities,

an already proven vehicle to be nationally responsible for carrying forward this program.

The university of which I am president and the universities and colleges I represent here wish to be recorded as urging the subcommittee to recommend to the full committee and to the Senate that this legislation become law.

Mr. Chairman, if it is not inappropriate I would like to suggest that some attention be given to one minor, but not unimportant feature; the section of the statute which calls for the creation of a study committee to set research priorities for the endowment funds.

My suggestion simply is that the participation and the advice of the community of scholars in Russian and East European studies be considered and applied in the creation of that agenda. I therefore suggest that consideration be given to modifying the language so that some appropriate source within the academic community be asked to nominate such scholars who, in collaboration with the consultants drawn from and appointed by the Department of State or other appropriate Government agency, might draw that agenda.

The idea simply is to make more explicit the invitation to the academic community to participate in the development of the programs that will be carried forward because of the existence of the endowment.

Mr. Chairman, I think I will conclude there, because you may have some questions and I have little more to say that has not been covered by earlier witnesses.

[Mr. Ryan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN W. RYAN

As President of Indiana University and Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, I bring the perspective of the national academic community as well as the concerns of my own institution for Soviet and East Bloc studies to support S. 2919. This legislation will strengthen the ability of universities to produce academic and government specialists with the expertise necessary to improve public understanding and policy making in managing our nation's relationship with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Government and the academic world face the reality that younger scholars are turning away from Soviet and area studies to pursue more promising and lucrative career fields. The numbers entering the field are not sufficient to replace those who are retiring or to expand research into areas that have received insufficient attention. In the study of Soviet economics, for example, at a time when Soviet economic performance is central to the future international capabilities of the U.S.S.R., only a handful of new specialists are in American graduate schools.

For young scholars contemplating specializing in Soviet and East European area studies the disincentives are substantial. A variety of academic alternatives are economically preferable in terms of salary prospects. Additional academic requirements, such as language study and study in the relevant country, add to the preparation time for apprentice scholars. Compounding the disincentives is decreasing fellowship, research and institutional financial support. Funding for international studies from major foundations and the federal government has declined consistently during the 1970's. According to a survey of 278 American university and research institutions conducted by the Rockefeller Foundation, support for area studies is declining in real terms by 28 percent from 1980 to 1982. The likelihood of the private sector meeting research needs is slim: Ford Foundation support for international studies, for example, has declined from a peak of $20 million annually to nearly zero.

Thus the volatile nature of funding sources for scholarly research is discouraging entry into a career with a long "lead time" like that of Soviet studies. The national interest requires not only that we increase the numbers of students in the field, but

also that the most capable and brilliant young scholars be encouraged to become Soviet area specialists.

S. 2919 offers an innovative and constructive approach to rectifying the impending decline of American expertise in Soviet Bloc studies. Senator Lugar and the cosponsors of the legislation are to be congratulated for having the foresight to address national needs not yet at the "crisis" stage, but needs that by necessity require long range planning to be adequately met. The $50 million endowment fund for advanced research and training in Soviet Bloc affairs deserves the enthusiastic support of universities throughout the United States.

The university community is uniquely stuctured to prepare specialists with the broad expertise necessary to cope with the increasingly interdependent political, economic and social complexities of the Soviet Union and its allies. S. 2919's emphasis on a broad based approach involving academicians, journalists, governmental officials and other professionals properly encompasses a wide spectrum of university based educational resources. Experts in history, culture, languages and other disciplines are relevant, not only to the immediate policy oriented needs of government, but also to the public's understanding of international relations.

High quality programs in Soviet and East European studies at Indiana University operate as examples of how the university system has developed its resources to foster area studies. Specializations in Polish, Hungarian, Yugoslavian and Inner Asian studies, to name but a few, provide vital research in areas of strategic and cultural interest. Continued vitality of such programs, however, is threatened by cuts in educational funding, particularly in states with economic problems such as Indiana's.

An attractive feature of S. 2919 is its designation of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research as the endowment fund's administrative body. The mechanism of the National Council ensures that the fund will be independent of any individual university. A long tradition of effective operation on behalf of Soviet and East European studies indicates that the National Council's organizational structure will provide cost effective adminstration.

S. 2919 could be improved, however, by amending section 6(b)(1) to provide for the involvement of universities in the establishment of research priorities. The language that refers to setting the research agenda "in consultation with officals of the Federal Government designated by the Secretary of State" should also include "and with an advisory board of university scholars in Soviet and East European studies." By considering the advise of the community of scholars in Soviet area studies, development of endowment programs will take place with the full cooperation of universities.

By contrast to the decline of Soviet Bloc studies in the United States, American studies in the Soviet Union have been growing rapidly. Yet because of the closed nature of Soviet society, outflowing information is difficult to obtain and requires thorough and extensive analysis. Building a strong national defense in terms of military manpower and hardware is not enough if we do not adequately understand who we are defending against. S. 2919 will ensure that minds and libraries remain part of our strategic arsenal.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Ryan. The suggestion you have made is an important one. It certainly will incorporate into the thinking of this committee.

From your own experience as administrator of a great university, have you seen the same decline that these statistics furnished to this subcommittee has shown, that American college enrollments in Russian language courses are alleged to have dropped by about one-third between 1972 and 1980; and with regard to enrollment in the language of other East European countries, maybe even a more decisive drop?

Mention has been made of the Ford Foundation program and the number of people who were originally involved in Indiana University. So that situation may be abnormal. But what is your own comment about the trend of enrollment, with the amount of decline? And what sort of jobs await those who are your students now? What kind of advice or counsel can you give to them?

Mr. RYAN. Someone commented earlier, and I agree, that this is an important piece of legislation, but that it addresses only a part of a much bigger problem. First of all, across America in secondary schools and at the undergraduate and graduate levels in college, there is a decline in the study of foreign language. I think that is deplorable.

I think it can be corrected only if Government support provides encouragement for more student to study foreign languages. We have no shortage of studies, very good ones, that describe the problem. However, the declining numbers of persons studying foreign languages, is not going to be rectified by this legislation alone.

As I recall the funds available from the proposed endowment would support in the neighborhood of 40 students, or an annual number of about 10 persons completing their preparation.

The future career for these graduates is to enter Government service and then return to programs to provide a source of expertise for colleges and universities and research institutes. In turn, they will stimulate teachers of language and improve understanding on the part of journalist, economists, and so on.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN. I might say—and I think perhaps you know this, Mr. Chairman—what incentive is there for a young man of great talent, who knows he is going to pursue a Ph. D. in economics, to decide he is going to make himself a specialist in Soviet economics, if that adds 3 to 5 years to his preparation time?

Well, one incentive must be the simple desire in that person to learn and discover the thrill that comes from mastering a subject and choosing an intellectually stimulating career. But there has to be a second practical incentive, it seems to me, and that is confidence that the funds will be there to enable one to complete the program.

Senator LUGAR. What comment could you make, sir, on the capability of universities to provide quality studies to the students? The thought has been given today that the number of people who are available to teach may be in decline, too, that we are simply sort of working our way through a process in which the whole insfrastructure has eroded.

Is that the case presently? Are there in the universities of this country in your judgment adequate scholars to provide quality programs of studies to students?

Mr. RYAN. My colleagues at Indiana are very worried about the small number of people in the pipeline preparing themselves to take the places of the very competent people we do have. I do not know how many is enough or if we ever really have enough.

I think there would be very little disagreement that we are not now prepared to replace the current generation of specialists and experts with equally competent and well prepared specialists and experts. That is the major problem.

Second, let me say that it is a matter of concern not only for the Government. A colleague of mine, Bill Bowen, who is president of Princeton University, commented in a different context that simply having a supply of persons in the graduate programs culminating in a Ph. D. is not enough. What concerned him, is that it may no

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longer be true that the very best young men and women are the students in those graduate programs.

I submit that if we are to have a crack at the very best intellects in area studies, in this case in Russian and East European studies, at least there must be the reliability of support for them through their preparation years.

In terms of this legislation, at least, we are talking about a very modest number of people.

Senator LUGAR. Senator Biden, do you have questions of Dr. Ryan?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, are we essentially competing for a relatively small pool, among a relatively small pool of students who have picked the general discipline but not the area? In other words, with this bill are we going to be pulling people out of Latin American studies because of the certainty of funding, assuming you are able to do this?

Are they going to move into Eastern European and Soviet studies, or in your experience as an educator are we going to be able to get some of the best minds that are now getting MBA's and LL.D's and M.D.'s and Ph. D.'s in engineering or in molecular biology, chemistry, et cetera? Who are the people who are going to move this way because of this bill?

Mr. RYAN. I feel a little bit like the man who has skipped to the last chapter of a murder mystery. I know who is coming after me. I know they can deal with the question much better than I can. But let me try, Senator.

If we were talking about a crash program of preparing thousands of people for specific jobs, I have no doubt we would find at least initially some dislocation of people. Persons who have found themselves in an MBA program may find themselves in this program.

I do not think that is the case. The numbers involved here are not that high, and there is not that degree of interchangeability. I cannot say from my own knowledge, but I cannot imagine that you would find that a person who really planned to enter graduate school to be an M.D. would see himself as a likely person to choose instead to spend time in the Soviet Union studying economics or politics or something else, in order to return and have that kind of career.

So I do not see dislocation as a problem. But I think your question suggests another problem, if you do not mind my referring to it briefly. Let us take the MBA. A student of the intellectual capacity that would be required for any of the programs I can think of that this legislation would make possible, could certainly also be admitted to an MBA program where, after four semesters of preparation, positions are available which pay rather large sums of money, as compared to the 3 or 4 or 5 more years that same person would have to spend to qualify in terms of expertise in international subjects.

So we start out dealing with a different kind of individual, not simply intellectually competent but motivated beyond financial or career status considerations. Yet, absent some intervention, if not the Federal Government then the foundations, it is not practical, to expect potential Soviet scholars to totally ignore financial considerations in making career choices.

Some intervention is necessary to take this spirit of our very competent young people and encourage them to think that it is a good choice of career.

Senator BIDEN. Is it fair to say that people who have the intellectual capability, curiosity and dedication that are needed for what we are talking about here are out there, and there is a sufficient abundance of them, but they are being discouraged as a consequence of the lack of financial help to succeed in their goal?

Mr. RYAN. I certainly think it is fair to conclude that, and I submit, how does it happen? How is a young woman or a young man discovered? A professor discovers that person most of the time and the professor says to the person, have you thought about this, would you like to do this? I would like to put you into a position to qualify for thus and so. Well, the professor cannot say that now.

Senator BIDEN. That is a good point and I think a valid one.

We have the same difficulty, Mr. Chairman, as you well know, in other disciplines. One of the things we talk so much about these days on the Hill is a figure every Senator probably has added to his speech book, that is that Japan has graduated twice as many engineers with advanced degrees as America has. And if we are going to stay ahead in the high tech area we need more engineers, and so on and so forth.

Those who make these arguments assume, many of them, that the reason why these brilliant young men and women are not going into that area is because they have decided to become lawyers so that they can make more money, or they have decided to become businesspersons or whatever to make more money.

I have been of the view that you have just expressed about people in this field, that it is not merely because of the promise afterward but of the inability to reach the goal and no one out there encouraging them to the extent that we have in the past.

And the second thing, and I would like you to comment on it. It seems to me, Senator Lugar—you and I are contemporaries. It seems when we were in undergraduate school there was a good deal of status and standing to be associated with the kind of program we are trying to promote here. To be one of the people who are sitting behind us, who are some of the very people that we are trying to produce more of by this legislation, had a good deal of social standing. It was something to be very proud of.

One of the things that worries me is, we seem to be hovering in sort of a re-emergence of a know-nothing period in America, where anything that has a deep intellectual base to it is suspect. Everybody wants simple solutions and simple answers, and it is no longer as prestigious to be the woman or the man who got that fellowship to go to the Soviet Union for 2 years to study whatever. It is more prestigious——

Well, let me ask a question: Is it more prestigious on the college campus today to be the young person who got the grant to go with some major firm at a salary starting at $45,000? What I am trying to say is, it seems to me there is something beyond the money. It is not merely that people, young people, have become more hungry for the buck, but with the dollar there is more status and standing now. It is not merely because the money brings it.

Do you understand what I am trying to get at?

Mr. RYAN. I do. I would submit, if you do not feel it is impertinent of me, that the president of a university probably has less judgment on this than anybody else because he sits in his office and nobody comes to see him. But I will give you my impression, and that is that it is no less and no more true today than 10 or 20 or 30 years ago that students have a great deal of, "Wow, you lucky fellow," if you get a $40,000 appointment somewhere. That is evidence, if not of instant success, at least of a very good chance you are going to be successful.

I would say many more would want to be in that person's shoes than would not—than would overlook it or turn their nose up at it. But it remains true, as true as it was when I was an undergrad or a graduate student, that there is fundamental respect for a mark of recognition. Now, for some students that is the $40,000.

Another mark of recognition is for you to ask one of our graduates or undergraduates to come and work for you, because you represent to them what they want to be. In fact, by selecting them somehow you are telling them, maybe they look like something they want to be.

And I would say the same thing is true of area studies programs that make study periods of a year or more, available to scholars in the country or the area under study. It is not simply the importance to the substance of the research, but the very evidence that, yes, they have prepared and they look like they are the kind of person they aspire to be, namely the professor they have been working with.

So, what I am saying is that the youth of the country is no more materialistic than it was when I was young, but no less full of commonsense that says that anything really good that happens to you along the line of your career and honest is something to respect.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, doctor.

And I would like to tell the folks sitting behind me that this is not all that great a job, so I would not look too much toward it. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. President Ryan, we are in debt to you for having come here today, for your testimony, and for the work you are doing. Thank you for coming.

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. The Chair would like to call now upon the very distinguished panel of citizens who have testimony on this legislation. They are: Herbert S. Levine of the National Council for Soviet and East Europe Research of Ardmore, Pa.; Dr. Allen H. Kassof, executive director of the National Research and Exchanges Board of New York City; Mr. Vladimir I. Toumanoff, executive director of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research of Washington, D.C.; and Dr. James H. Billington, Director of the Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen, we are grateful to you for coming and for your patience in waiting until this hour. We look forward to hearing your testimony. If you would attempt to summarize the papers that you have given, I will assure you that each of the papers will be published in full as a part of the hearing record. And we would like to hear from you in the order in which you were introduced. First of

all Dr. Levine, then Dr. Kassof, then Mr. Toumanoff, and then Dr. Billington.

Mr. Levine.

[Mr. Levine's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF HERBERT S. LEVINE

An internationally known expert in Russian economics and planning, Dr. Herbert S. Levine is Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania's Faculty of Arts and Sciences. He sees the Soviet Union facing a critical period of economic restructuring in order to master modern technology and maintain an acceptable pace of economic growth.

Dr. Levine is a consultant to the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (Centrally Planned Economies Projects), SRI International, and the U.S. Government, on the Soviet economy and East-West trade. He has contact with a number of Russian economists whom he has conferred with on his many visits to the Soviet Union. In June 1974 he was the economic advisor to the American chairman of a week-long conference in Moscow which brought together U.S. and Soviet business leaders to discuss the issues of U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic relations. In 1977, he visited China, where he met with Chinese economic officials and economists. And in the fall of 1981, he was on a speaking and research tour in Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union, and several East European countries.

Through his research and writings, Dr. Levine has made major contributions to the analysis of Soviet economic growth and planning, and the effect of political pressure on planning. He contributed chapters to a number of significant studies, including "International Trade and Central Planning" (1968), the first major penetration into international trade aspects of the centrally planned economies of the communist nations; "Comparing Economic Systems" (1971), which has become a major influence on economic analysis of planned economies; and the "Modernization of Japan and Russia" (1975), a comparative study of the modernization of Japan and Russia from the 1860's to the present, which sheds new light on the process of modernization itself. One of his recent works, an application of SOVMOD (Soviet Econometric Model) to an evaluation of Soviet growth prospects to the end of the century is included in the volume "The Soviet Economy Toward the Year 2000" (1982) which he co-edited.

Born in 1928, Dr. Levine, who is married and has three children, graduated from Harvard, magna cum laude—Phi Beta Kappa, in 1950 and received his Masters in Russian Studies two years later. He held a Russian Research Center Fellowship at Harvard from 1954 to 1960, receiving his Ph. D. in Economics in 1961. Dr. Levine came to the University of Pennsylvania in 1960. He has also lectured at Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, and Berkeley. In 1968–69, he was a visiting scholar at the London School of Economics on a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Fellowship, and in 1973–74 was at Columbia University on a Russian Institute Research Fellowship. In 1965, he was awarded the Lindback Prize for Distinguished Teaching by the University of Pennsylvania.

Herbert Levine is currently Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research; formerly he was Chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies-Social Science Research Council Joint Committee on Soviet Studies. He has published more than 40 articles in professional journals on planning and the Soviet economy. His current work includes: the further development of the Soviet econometric model and a system of East European econometric models, and their use in the analysis of such matters as prospects for Soviet growth, East-West trade and technology transfer; certain theoretical aspects of Soviet planning; and the role of entrepreneurship in centrally planned economies.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT S. LEVINE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden. I appreciate the opportunity to testify in regard to Senate bill 2919. I have a formal statement which I have submitted for the record and which I would like to summarize in the time allotted to me.

I appear before you today both in my capacity as a professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania and as chairman of

the Board of Trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Since the National Council, which will be the executive arm for the legislation that is under consideration, is a relatively new organization—it was founded in 1978—let me say a few words about it and about its role under the new legislation.

The National Council is a product of the concern shared by many in the Federal Government and the academic community over the national decline affecting Soviet studies since the late 1960's. It is a federally funded, nonprofit, autonomous academic corporation whose purpose is to develop and sustain a long-term program of basic research on a national scale dealing with policy issues and questions of Soviet and East European social, political, economic, and historical developments. Through the conduct of this research program, the Council also endeavors to encourage the training of professional personnel capable of sustaining the program.

The Council pursues its purpose by providing through national competitions research funds to independent scholars via research contracts with their universities. It does not itself perform research. The results of the research are delivered to the funding Government agencies, but are the property of the individual scholars who retain the right to copyright and publish their research.

The Council is run by a Board of Trustees who have been designated by the presidents of 10 major research universities and two institutions. The Board can also elect additional members to its Board. It is administered and managed by an Executive Director who is appointed by the Board.

When the National Council was founded, it was established that the Council would meet annually with representatives of Government user agencies to review the program and discuss subject areas of special interest, and that the Council would from time to time set out in relatively broad terms a kind of research agenda based on those discussions. However, the principle was that scholars were to be free to proffer research projects of their own choosing, and the central assumption was made that the overlap of what scholars wished to investigate and what the Government would wish to have investigated is sufficiently extensive so that a national program of $1 million annually would fit into that space.

It was hoped that the cumulative knowledge of the field and of the scholars in it, which were embodied in the Council's trustees, would make their choices wise and that the respect in which they would be held by their colleagues would invest the proposals, labors and products with quality and timeliness.

How has the National Council fared since its beginning in 1978? In a word, the record has been mixed. I think the research production, the product, has been good, but, as has been emphasized over and over again in the testimonies of others today, the instability, delays and uncertainties in funding have had serious repercussions on the program.

To date the Council has been able to contract for 79 projects involving 98 scholars from 58 institutions covering 22 States. An appendix to my formal statement contains a list of all of our research contracts and their institutions. The projects have been in a wide range of fields, including economics, political science, history, sociology, law, and literature.

To date the contract funds provided by the National Council have led to the publication of at least 9 books, 60 articles, and 35 papers presented at professional meetings in about the 4 years of its existence, which I submit is a rather decent product.

Second, the Council has held and sponsored a number of meetings to formulate research.

An third, the Council is involved in administering a very large-scale interview project of Soviet emigrees who are residing in this country. In my statement I describe at further length that research program.

The major problem and the basic reason why the proposed legislation is so essential to the success of the Council's program derives from the fragility of the Council's funding. This funding has been dependent on changing individuals within Government and has been subject to repeated delays, wide fluctuations, and great uncertainties. Scholars who, as it is said, punch calendars rather than time clocks, find it extremely difficult to operate under such conditions.

Furthermore, in order to attract young scholars into the field, as has been repeated here many times, funding must be reliable over a long period. The difficulty in the funding under present conditions is threefold: The Council and the field do not know from one year to the next, first of all, whether there will be any funds and whether indeed the Council will be in existence. They do not know what the level of funding will be, only that it fluctuates widely. They do not know when it will be made available.

After receiving funds from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and, beginning in 1981, from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Council was caught up in 1981 in the review by the new administration of all funding programs. Happily, the decision was ultimately favorable, but there was a delay of almost 12 months in the Council's ability to contract for research, and until the last moment it was uncertain whether the funds could be processed before they reverted to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Funding in the current fiscal year, 1982, has been nearly uncertain, and in both years the amounts were sharply reduced.

The uncertainties, delays and sudden interruptions in the Council's support of the field have damaging immediate consequences and make the attainment of its objectives uncertain in the long run. Applicants whose research projects have been approved are left unsure for a year or more whether they will be funded, and some are ultimately dropped for lack of expected funding. The start of research is sometimes delayed by as much as 2 years. Other research is interrupted for varying periods in midstream because the Council can fund 2-year projects only 1 year at a time under present conditions. The Council is unable to stimulate research on important topics because it can give no assurance of support. As much as 4 years may pass from the time the Council announced its last research agenda to the time some of the projects designed in response to it will be able to produce results.

The Council's experience demonstrates that it is perhaps impossible to reconcile the academic schedule, which demands forward teaching commitments almost a year ahead, with the Federal

schedule of appropriations, allocations, contract amendments, and fiscal year deadlines, especially when several Government agencies are involved. The end result is that, from the viewpoint of the specialists and potential trainees in the field, the entire effort is so uncertain and unreliable as to make a professional commitment dubious.

That is why the funding procedure provided for in the proposed act is so essential to the achievement of the act's long-range purposes. Under the provisions of the proposed act the National Council will, first of all, consult with a committee of Government officials designated by the Secretary of State in designing a research agenda, and it will then monitor all disbursals of funds and will report to the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Treasury on the activities supported by assistance under the act.

In regard to a question raised moments ago by President Ryan, I would like to comment that since the members of the Board of Trustees of the Council are designated by the presidents of leading research universities as representative scholars in the field, what President Ryan was urging already does exist in the legislation. There will be representatives of the scholars in the field meeting with Government officials.

Second, the Council will use its allotment to continue to carry out its support of research and meetings to stimulate research.

Third, the National Council will organize a national manpower development program and public information program. This is new in the National Council's activities. The National Council will help organize it, but will not necessarily administer it directly. The purpose of the national manpower development program will be to foster flexible, comprehensive, integrated manpower training programs for young specialists pursuing long-term Ph. D. disciplinary and short-term masters level area studies programs.

The program would seek to provide support at each stage in the training, and in the initial stages of employment, of Soviet and East European affairs specialists. Funds would be made available on a competitive basis for students entering area studies programs, but in addition, students following a year or two of graduate training in an academic discipline would be encouraged to apply for a preparatory fellowship.

The aim of the preparatory fellowship program would be to attract students who have already proven themselves in disciplinary programs into the Soviet field. Preparatory fellows could receive up to 2 years of support at this stage of their educational careers to supplement their disciplinary training with work in the Soviet and East European field, such as the study of appropriate languages or othe area studies.

Therefore, in response to the question raised by Senator Biden, whom would we be drawing from, under this part of the proposed legislation we would have an opportunity to draw from those who have already demonstrated strengths in economics, in sociology, in political science, who when they entered graduate school might not have had an idea or an intention of going into area studies.

And one of the problems that we face today in area studies is the fact that, given the financial pressures on universities, the departments, who in many universities are the powers in the universities,

tend to move toward their cores, and therefore it is very difficult for students who have area training, or even young professors who are area specialists, to get employment in these departments.

Senator BIDEN. What do you mean, move toward the core?

Mr. LEVINE. They move toward their main areas. For example, in economics they move toward such subjects as economic theory, international trade and industrial organization. So what many of my fellow economists consider peripheral areas, such as Soviet economics, my own specialty. Under present conditions, when I retire in not too many more years, it would be very difficult to get my department to replace me with a tenured professor who is also a specialist on the Soviet economy.

Therefore, in addition to this training support and the exchange program that Dr. Kassof will talk about, the bill also contains a program of employment where the group administering the training and development program would, on a cost-sharing basis with a university for say a 3-year period, encourage the employment of a new assistant professor who is a specialist on the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.

In addition, the bill speaks about a public information program.

Let me just conclude by saying that as the bill is now written, with the existing umbrella organizations as described by Senator Lugar, involved in its administration, it would not appear necessary to have a new administrative bureaucracy created either within the Government or outside of it. Thank you.

[Mr. Levine's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HERBERT S. LEVINE

INTRODUCTION

I appear before you today both in my capacity as a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

The National Council, which will be the executive arm for the legislation under consideration, was founded in 1978. It is a product of the concern shared by many in the Federal Government and the academic community over the national decline affecting Soviet studies since the late 1960's. At the same time that support by universities, foundations, and the Government was dwindling rapidly, the capacity for basic research on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe within the Government was also shrinking, or at least so it was perceived at very high levels. A variety of steps were advocated in response. What emerged after several years of discussion among Government officials and scholars across the country was the National Council: a federally funded, non-profit, autonomous academic corporation whose purpose is to develop and sustain a long-term program of basic research on a national scale dealing with policy issues and questions of Soviet and East European social, political, economic and historical development. Through the conduct of this research program, the Council also endeavors to encourage the training of professional personnel capable of sustaining the program. The Council pursues its purpose by providing through national competitions, research funds to independent scholars via research contracts with their universities. It does not itself perform research. The results of the research are delivered to the funding Government agencies, but are the property of the individual scholars who retain the right to copyright and publish their research.

THE COUNCIL STRUCTURE

The National Council for Soviet and East European Research consists of a Board of Trustees and an executive staff. The original twelve members of the Board were designated to their office by the Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley; the Provost of the University of Chicago; the Presidents of Columbia University,

Duke University, Harvard University, the University of Illinois, Indiana University, the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; and the Chairman of the Academic Council of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Wilson Center. The right to designate a Trustee remains with these institutions unless, upon the departure from the Board of such a designee, the Board decides to turn to some other institution for designation. The Trustees may also elect up to six additional members of the Board for a maximum total of eighteen.

All Trustees, whether designated or elected, serve as individuals and not as representatives of their home institutions. They serve 3-year terms. No Trustee may serve more than two consecutive terms in office. The Trustees establish Council policies, review and select proposals for funding, represent the Council for substantive questions on research contracts, and conduct most of the Council's substantive business. Administration and management are the responsibility of an Executive Director appointed by the Board.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

In recognition that the national interest is served by a capacity to generate and disseminate reliable independent knowledge of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, the Council was to be the vehicle for a Government share of funds in support of that national capacity; while the scholarly composition of the Council's Board of Trustees and the Council's autonomy of decision were to insure against Government prescription of research and to protect freedom of inquiry and conclusion. The support provided through the Council was intended to encourage existing scholars not to leave the field of Soviet studies, and to encourage new scholars to enter it, not just through the actual dollars transmitted, but also by having the long-term commitment of the Government serve as witness that the society recognizes and values their work.

It was established that the Council would meet annually with representatives of Government using-agencies to review the program and discuss subject areas of special interest, and that the Council would from time to time set out, in relatively broad terms, a kind of research agenda based on those discussions. However, on the principle that free toilers in the vineyards of knowledge are the most productive, scholars were to be free to proffer research projects of their own choosing, and the central assumption was made that the overlap of what scholars wish to investigate and what the Government would wish to have investigated is sufficiently extensive that a national program of a million dollars annually would fit easily into the space. A parallel assumption was that the products of research would be useful to the Government, would inspire further scholarship, and through publication would help inform the public at home and abroad. It was hoped that the cumulative knowledge of the field and of the scholars in it, embodied in the Council's Trustees, would make their choices wise, and that the respect in which they would be held by their colleagues would invest proposals, labors, and products with quality and timeliness. It seemed reasonable to expect that since the Council would support the central purpose of universities, i.e., scholarship, the latter would not cavil at cost sharing, and the program would be more frugal than one the Government could run directly.

And finally, the critical supposition was accepted that the value systems, habits of thought, and bureaucratic practices of the Federal and academic communities were not so incompatible as to prevent the Council from functioning between them without being crushed. It was thought that the Council might even serve in some small way as a bridge between Government and academia to ease the estrangement and mutual distrust of the previous decade.

The Council was incorporated in February 1978 in the full knowledge that it was an experiment and an act of faith in a difficult society, albeit supported by ample good will and a mass of ingeniously devised legal and administrative scaffolding. How has it fared? In a word, the record has been mixed. The research production has been good. But the instability, delays, and uncertainty in funding have had serious repercussions on the program.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Council has sought to carry out its joint academic-government mandate in three ways: contracts with universities for research by individual scholars, a variety of meetings, seminars, workshops, consultative conferences and pilot studies to stimulate research, and a large Soviet emigre survey project.

The centerpiece of the Council's activities has been the research contracts. To date, the Council has been able to contract for 79 projects involving 98 scholars from 58 institutions in 22 states (see appendix). The projects have been in a wide range of fields including economics, political science, history, sociology and law. One-fifth have been on Eastern Europe. Eight have been Soviet minority nationality studies.

The product of each study is a final report which is distributed among the various government funding agencies. The researchers themselves use their work to write articles or to expand into books. To date, contract funds provided by the National Council have led to the publication of at least 9 books, 60 articles and 35 papers presented at professional meetings. Examples of the range of studies produced include:

1. A demographic study, using Soviet statistics, of a major population shift in the U.S.S.R. from Slavic peoples to Moslem nationalities and the short-term and long-term implications of that shift.

2. A historical and political study of Soviet relations with Latin America both state-to-state and within the international Communist movement.

3. A structural study of the Warsaw Pact military forces to understand their role as an internal control mechanism.

4. A study analyzing current trends in Soviet economic development and projecting trends forward to the end of the century.

5. An analysis of the political succession process in the U.S.S.R. with a particular focus upon the possible outcomes of the Brezhnev succession.

Second, the Council has held and sponsored a number of meetings to formulate research, among them three meetings, in different parts of the United States, on Eastern Europe; a workshop on political decisionmaking in the U.S.S.R.; conferences on defense economics and on the second economy, and two workshops on law and science and technology. The Council has helped finance two research newsletters, one on agriculture and the other on the military and society.

The third major area of activity of the Council has been the Soviet Interview Project. There are now over 100,000 former Soviet citizens recently arrived in the United States. Ever since this exodus began in the early 1970's it has been the ambition of American scholars to conduct a large scale systematic survey of these newcomers to find out what they could tell us of the U.S.S.R. Recently that became a possibility. At the request of the Government, the Council undertook to sponsor the design of such a survey, and signed two contracts with the University of Illinois to that end. The design is for a project that consists of a general survey of a systematically selected sample of approximately 3,000 individuals, complemented by intensive interviewing of 1,500 more for specialized topics. The project is intended to fill gaps in our knowledge of the structure and functioning of Soviet society and, to the extent possible, to measure change since the similar Harvard project of the early 1950's. It is estimated that the project, directed by a large research team with the aid of a professional survey organization, will take about five years. The design was completed and the project got underway in the autumn of 1981 under a separate contract between the Council and the Department of State. The benefits to the field and to the country should be considerable. A substantial number of established scholars will be involved, and a much larger number of graduate students and junior scholars are expected to take part. The data compiled, systematized, and made machine readable, will be available to all scholars and government specialists in the future and should provide material for much more research than even the project itself contemplates. The Harvard project of thirty years ago was the source of much valuable information and creative scholarship for years.

PROBLEMS

The major problem and the basic reason why the proposed legislation is so essential to the success of the Council's program derives from the fragility of the Council's funding. This funding has been dependent on changing individuals within Government and has been subject to repeated delays, wide fluctuations and great uncertainties. Scholars, who as it is said, punch calendars rather than time clocks, find it extremely difficult to operate under such conditions. Furthermore, in order to attract young scholars into the field, funding must be reliable over a long period of time. The following chart illustrates the fluctuations and delays in the receipt of funds from one fiscal year to another.

Council funding by fiscal year

Date received:	*Amount*
September 1979	[1] $570,000
Total for fiscal year 1978	$570,000
April 1979	600,000
September 1979	525,000
Total for fiscal year 1979	1,125,000
October 1979	67,607
January 1980	420,000
May 1980	450,000
September 1980	400,000
Total for fiscal year 1980	1,337,607
September 1981	[2] 365,000
Total for fiscal year 1981	365,000
December 1981	245,000
April 1982	250,000
July 1982	175,000
Total for fiscal year 1982 (to September 21)	670,000

[1] In August 1978, the ACDA offered an additional $50,000, but it could not be processed before the end of the fiscal year.

[2] In June 1981 the DCI allocated $125,000 which was not processed before the end of the fiscal year.

The difficulty is threefold. The Council and the field do not know from 1 year to the next whether there will be any funds, and whether, indeed, the Council will be in existence. They do not know what the level of funding will be, only that it fluctuates widely. They do not know when it may be available, but do know that contributions have been lost because the complexity of interagency transfers and contract modifications could not be completed before fiscal years ended.

Initial funding for the Council was provided by the Departments of State and Defense, which were joined almost immediately by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. For a variety of reasons, efforts to obtain contributions from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy, and the ICA have not been successful thus far. However, a contribution by the Director of Central Intelligence was made in 1981 and has been repeated this year. The Council was caught up, in 1981 in the review by the new Administration of all funding programs. Happily, the decision was ultimately favorable, but there was a delay of almost twelve months in the Council's ability to contract for research, and until the last moment it was uncertain whether the funds could be processed before they reverted to Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Funding in 1982 has been nearly as uncertain, and in both years the amounts were sharply reduced (although the total for 1982 may yet change).

The uncertainties, delays, and sudden interruptions in the Council's support of the field have damaging immediate consequences, and make the attainment of its objectives uncertain in the long run. Applicants whose research projects have been approved are left unsure for a year or more whether they will be funded, and some are ultimately dropped for lack of expected funding. The start of research is sometimes delayed by as much as 2 years. Other research is interrupted for varying periods in midstream because the Council can fund 2-year projects only 1 year at a time. The Council is unable to stimulate research on important topics because it can give no assurance of support, and as much as 4 years will pass from the time the Council announced its last research agenda to the time some of the projects designed in response to it will be able to produce results.

The Council's experience demonstrates that it is almost impossible to reconcile the academic schedule which demands forward teaching commitments almost a year ahead with the Federal schedule of appropriations, allocations, contract amendments and fiscal year deadlines, especially when several Government agencies are involved. The end result is that from the viewpoint of the specialist and potential trainees in the field, the entire effort is so uncertain and unreliable as to make a

professional commitment dubious. That is why the funding procedure provided for in the proposed Act is so essential to achievement of the Act's long-range purposes.

FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL UNDER THE ACT

Under the provisions of the proposed Act, the National Council will, first of all, monitor all dispersals of funds and will report to the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Treasury on activities supported by assistance under the Act.

Secondly, the Council will use its allotment to continue to carry out its research-based program in pursuit of its three long-term objectives: (1) to provide information, interpretation and policy recommendations to the Government; (2) to check the national decline in postdoctoral research on the Soviet Union and East Europe; and (3) to help ensure the development and availability of a cadre of highly competent professionals in the field to step into the shoes of the post-war generation of specialists.

It will provide funding by contract to universities on a cost-sharing basis for use in individual post-doctoral research projects focusing on such issues as the operation of and long-term prospects for the Soviet and East European economies, including the defense burden; long-term developments in Soviet and East European foreign policies, especially as they affect the United States; long-term trends in Soviet and East European societies; and Soviet and East European intentions, objectives and policy options. Such studies should be especially concerned with the ability of the regimes to foster, manage, and contain processes of change and with the possible consequences of their efforts to do so. The Council will also provide funding for meetings, conferences, workshops, consultations, pilot studies and other activities to design, stimulate or facilitate relevant research, and the publication of results.

Finally, the National Council will organize a National Manpower Development Program and a Public Information Program.

NATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The pupose of the National Manpower Development Program will be to foster flexible comprehensive integrated manpower training programs for young specialists pursuing long-term Ph. D. disciplinary and short-term Masters-level area studies educational programs. The Program would seek to provide support at each stage in the training of Soviet and East European affairs specialists. Funds would be made available on a competitive basis for students entering area studies programs. In addition, students, following a year or two of graduate training in an academic discipline, would be encouraged to apply for a Preparatory Fellowship. The aim of the Preparatory Fellowship Program would be to attract students who have already proven themselves in disciplinary programs, into the Soviet field. Preparatory Fellows could receive up to two years support at this stage of their educational careers to supplement their disciplinary training with work in the Soviet and East European field (such as the study of appropriate foreign languages). After the Preparatory Fellowship period, a student would be eligible for the IREX exchange. Following the exchange experience, a graduate student could then apply for Dissertation Support or funds to support additional training necessary for the completion of the graduate education cycle of career development. In this manner, an integrated national program of long-range support for individual scholars based upon targeted goals of national need could develop.

The funding proposed is estimated to allow a pool of 40 students to receive support under the National Manpower Development Program at any one time. Since the length of the training program is envisaged to be on the average 4 years (excluding the year in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under the IREX program), this pattern would generate an entry group of approximately 10 scholars each year. Therefore, the National Manpower Development Program will serve only as a minimal program designed to supplement already existing sources for graduate support. However, the new program would be sufficiently flexible and attractive as to encourage talented students to move into Soviet studies from various social science disciplines in order to pursue research interests and language training for areas of particular need.

The reorientation of many university social science programs away from area studies toward disciplinary approaches has made the initial placement of young Soviet and East European affairs specialists in teaching positions increasingly difficult. A National Junior Faculty Placement Program will be established to allow those participants in the National Manpower Development Program who choose to pursue an academic career an opportunity to teach through a cost-sharing program with universities. It is also hoped that universities lacking a particular component

of a well-rounded Soviet and East European Affairs Program might be encouraged by the existence of this cost-sharing arrangement to hire a younger scholar to meet such a need. The funding available would allow the placement of approximately 10 teaching fellows on a 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement in any one year. The term of appointment would vary according to the need of the scholar and of the university. However, three-year average terms of appointment would probably be the norm. It is anticipated that junior faculty would then be in a position to move into regular tenure track positions at the end of the fellowship period.

The National Manpower Development and National Junior Faculty Placement Programs would combine to create a coordinated program of support for young specialists in the Soviet and East European fields from the time a young scholar has established his or her position in a graduate program through to job placement. It will maximize the possibility of encouraging students to move into areas of particular national need while eliciting institutional responses to the decline of their Soviet and East European Studies Programs which might otherwise not be possible. In this manner, it would inhibit the further erosion of our Soviet and East European training capability while encouraging the production of trained specialists for public, private and educational service.

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

The Public Information Program of the Soviet-Bloc Research and Training Fund would be used to support a variety of activities undertaken by other institutions selected through a national competition designed to encourage the interaction of academic specialists with government analysts, members of the business community and the mass media, as well as the public at large. For example, the fund could support a series of Summer Workshops focusing upon specific topics. These workshops would bring together scholars, public officials, businessmen and journalists to discuss in depth a specific subject area of particular concern during a given period. Such a workshop program would, in particular, serve the needs of young faculty, businessmen and journalists who are located throughout the United States in areas that do not have strong research centers in Soviet and East European Studies. In addition, funds could be used to support public forums at which Soviet affairs specialists might discuss new developments in that part of the world. Finally, a significant proportion of the Public Information Program's funds would go to help finance university-supported media productions which would make use of local academic and non-academic specialists. Such programs have already been successful, for instance, in the State of Washington, where University of Washington officials produced a series of programs examining the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for the local Public Broadcasting System affiliate.

With the National Council performing the functions just described, no new administrative bureaucracy will need to be created to administer the Act, either within the Government or outside of it.

APPENDIX

RESEARCH CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

Since its fomation in February 1978, the National Council has concluded 79 research contracts allocating a total of $3,419,636 to research projects on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The investigators, their institutional affiliation, the project titles, the contracting institutions, and the allotted amounts in that orders are listed below. Asterisk signifies that a Final Report has been submitted to the Government.

*Robert Axelrod, University of Michigan; "Politics and Deception in the Soviet Press"; University of Michigan, $19,558.

*Alexandre Bennigsen, University of Chicago; Rasma Karklins, University of Chicago; "Ethnic Relations in the USSR"; University of Chicago, $44,095.

*Abram Bergson, Harvard University; "The Soviet Economy to the Year 2000"; Harvard University, $24,600.

*Joseph Berliner, Brandeis University; Barney Schwalberg, Brandeis University; Christopher Davis, University of Birmingham, United Kindgom; "The Economics of Soviet Social Institutions"; Harvard University, $163,263.

*Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University; "The Politics of Change in the Soviet Union"; Columbia University, $20,832.

*Yaroslav Bilinsky, University of Delaware; Tönu Parming, University of Maryland; "The Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Republics"; University of Delaware, $33,660.

*Cole Blasier, University of Pittsburgh; "Soviet Relations with Latin America"; University of Pittsburgh, $51,108.

*Daniel Bond, SRI International-WEFA; "Study of Soviet Research on Multi-regional Modeling"; International Research and Exchange Board, $18,720.

Morris Bornstein, University of Michigan; "Pricing of Research and Development Services in the USSR"; University of Michigan, $47,309.

George Breslauer, University of California, Berkeley; "Policy Orientation of 1st Party Secretaries in the RSFSR," University of California, Berkeley, $35,000.

*Paul Cocks, Stanford University; "The Role of the Party in Soviet Science and Technology Policy"; Stanford University, $22,740.

Stephen F. Cohen, Princeton University; "The Social Dimensions of De-Stalinization"; Princeton University, $20,000.

Stanley Cohn, SUNY-Binghamton; "Soviet Investment Policy Imperatives," SUNY-Binghampton, $30,000.

*Vera Dunham, City University of New York-Queens College; "The Worker and the Soviet System"; Columbia University, $27,216.

*Murray Feshbach, The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; "A Study of the Multi-Dimensional Impact of Current Demographic Trends on Soviet Society"; Georgetown University, $38,388.

Mary Ellen Fischer, Skidmore College; "The Romanian Political Leadership"; Harvard University, $38,388.

Raymond Garthoff, The Brookings Institution; "American-Soviet Relations in the 1970's"; The Brookings Institution, $52,504.

Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan; "Bureaucratic Encounters in the USSR"; University of Michigan, $74,920.

Seymour Goodman, University of Arizona; "Integration of the COMECON Computer Industries"; University of Virginia, $34,340, University of Arizona, $6,622.

*Kenneth Gray, North Texas State University; "Livestock Cycles in the Soviet Union with US Comparisons"; North Texas State University, $22,477.

Newsletter—Kenneth Gray, North Texas State University; "Research Newsletter on Russian, Soviet and East European Agriculture," North Texas State University, $4,875

*Paul Gregory, James Griffin, University of Houston; "The Analytical and Econometric Estimation of 'Correct' Measures of Relative Soviet Defense Effort"; Transecon, Incorporated, $52,423.

Jan Gross, Yale University; "Russian Rule in Poland, 1939–1941"; Yale University, $53,374.

Gregory Grossman, University of California, Berkeley; "A Workshop and a Conference on the Second Economy of the USSR"; University of California, Berkeley, $74,928.

*Edward Hewett, University of Texas at Austin; "A Theoretical Approach to CPE Macro Models and An Experimental Application for Hungary"; University of Texas at Austin; $45,873.

*Franklyn Holzman, Tufts University; "US-Soviet Economic Relations"; Tufts University, $30,000.

Franklyn Holzman, Tufts University; "A Comparison of US and Soviet Defense Expenditures"; Tufts University, $10,000.

*Holland Hunter, Haverford College; "Testing Soviet Economic Policies, 1928–1941"; Haverford College, $32,400.

*Christopher Jones, Marquette University; "Perfecting Mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact"; Harvard University, $41,432.

*Arcadius Kahan, University of Chicago; D. Gale Johnson, University of Chicago; "East European Agriculture;" University of Chicago, $82,477.

Aron Katsenelinboigen, University of Pennsylvania; "Toward the Concept of Measuring Economic Potential: The Soviet-American Case"; University of Pennsylvania, $63,000.

Mark Kuchment, Harvard University; Stephen Sternheimer, Boston University; "An Assessment of Soviet R & D Capabilities," Harvard University, $120,276.

Fyodor Kushnirsky, Temple University; "The Regional Economy of the Soviet Union: A Modeling Study"; Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc., $103,138.

*Gail Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley: "Workshop on Contemporary Soviet Policy-Making"; University of California, Berkeley, $21,350.

Richard Laurino, Center for Planning and Research, Incorporated; "A Study of Red Army History"; Center for Planning and Research, Incorporated, $15,000.

Wassily Leontief, New York University; "The Position of the Soviet Union in the World Economy"; New York University, $50,000.

Ronald Linden, University of Pittsburgh; "The Impact of International Change on Romania and Yugoslavia," University of Pittsburgh, $50,000.

*Bernice Madison, San Francisco State University; "The Soviet Welfare System"; San Francisco State University, $35,055.

*Peter Maggs, University of Illinois; Donald Barry, Lehigh University; Gordon Smith, University of South Carolina; "Soviet and East European Law and the 'Scientific-Technical Revolution' "; University of Illinois, Urbana, $64,376.

*Shane Mahoney, Eastern Washington State University; "Role of the Soviet General Staff in Military Management"; Eastern Washington State University, $29,994.

*Michael Marrese, Northwestern University; Jan Vanous, University of British Columbia; "Costs and Benefits of Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe"; Northwestern University, $56,645.

News—Bruce Menning, Miami University (OH); "Military and Society in Russia and Eastern Newsletter Europe: A Research Newsletter"; Miami University, $10,246.

*James Millar, University of Illinois, Urbana; "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration" (Design); University of Illinois, Urbana, $254,260.

*James Millar, University of Illinois, Urbana; "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration" (Design); University of Illinois, Urbana, $46,500.

Martin Miller, Duke University; "Mental Illness in the Soviet Union," Duke University, $39,504.

Adel Nikolskaya, Illinois State University; Maria Neimark; Natalie Sadomskaya; "Soviet Family of Two Post-War Generations"; Illinois State University, $92,349.

Martha Olcott, Colgate University; "The Development of Nationalism in Kazakhstan"; Colgate University, $35,000.

Jeffrey Osleeb, Boston University; Craig ZumBrunnem, University of Washington; "Energy Consumption and Analysis of Optimal Interregional and International Flows in the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry"; Boston University, $34,162.

*Walter Pintner, Cornell University; "Russian Army and Russian Society, 1700–1917"; Cornell University, $16,799.

*Alex Pravda, University of Michigan; "Industrial Workers and Political Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe"; University of Michigan, $39,000.

Gilbert Rozman, Princetion University; "Soviet Perceptions of Contemporary China"; Princeton University, $18,030.

*Boris Rumer, Harvard University; "The Dynamics of the Capital Coefficient of USSR Industrial Output"; Harvard University, $70,974.

*Boris Rumer, Harvard University; "The Investment Process in Siberian Indusry," Harvard University, $27,322.

*Stephen Sacks, University of Connecticut; "Large Corporations Under Yugoslav Socialism"; University of Connecticut, $20,000.

*David Segal, University of Maryland; Janet Schwartz, George Mason University; "Military Service and Civilian Employment in the Soviet Union"; University of Maryland, $48,000.

*Louise Shelley, American University; "The Role of Law in Soviet Society"; American University, $48,996.

Brian Silver, Michigan State University; Barbara Anderson, Brown University; "Language and Ethnic Identity in the USSR," Michigan State University, $9,546, Brown University, $10,429.

Dimitri Simes, Johns Hopkins University; "Soviet Military and Society"; Johns Hopkins University, $95,526.

*Robert Stuart, Rutgers University; Paul Gregory, University of Houston; "Fertility and Labor Supply: The USSR and Eastern Europe"; Transecon, Incorporated, $44,076.

*Robert Taaffe, Indiana University; "The Effects of Contemporary Soviet Approaches to Regional Planning, Locational Analysis and the Resolution of Regional Conflict on the Development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East"; Indiana University, $32,541.

*Judith Thornton, University of Washington; "Soviet Response to Changing Fuel Costs and Availabilities: The Case of Electric Power"; University of Washington, $28,281.

*Robert Tucker, Princeton University; "Stalin: A Case Study in History and Personality"; Princeton University, $20,000.

*Tibor Vais, Harvard University; "Studies in East European Labor Economics," Harvard University, $30,798.

*Elizabeth Valkenier, Columbia University, "Soviet-Third World Relations: The Economic Bind"; Columbia University, $13,001.

*Elizabeth Valkenier, Columbia University, "Soviet-LDC Relations in an Interdependent World Economy"; Columbia University, $26,361.

*Nils Wessell, Lafayette College; "Ground Rules for Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts"; Foreign Policy Research Institute, Incorporated, $13,740.

Sharon Wolchik, George Washington University; Jane Curry, Columbia University and Manhattanville College; "Specialists in the Policy Process in Poland and Czechoslovakia"; George Washington University, $39,430.

*Alexander Yanov, University of California, Berkeley; "The Debate on De-Stalinization in the USSR, 1961-1972"; University of California, Berkeley, $21,000.

*Murray Yanowitch, Hofstra University; "Work Attitudes and Work Organization in the Soviet Union"; Hofstra University, $17,499.

RESEARCH CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH—SIGNED SINCE MARCH 1982

Raissa L. Berg, Washington University; "On the History of Genetics in the Soviet Union: Science and Politics; The Insights of a Witness"; Washington University, $5,000.

Janet Chapman, University of Pittsburgh; "The Soviet Employment Service and the Search for Efficiency"; University of Pittsburgh, $30,000.

Ralph Clem, Florida International University; "A User's Guide to Soviet Censuses"; Florida International University, $14,821.

Kenneth Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley; "Communist International Relations"; University of California, $60,000.

Gail Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley; "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability in the USSR"; University of Califoria, Berkeley, $45,000.

Robert A. Lewis, Columbia University; "Regional Population Growth in the USSR and its Impact on Society: 1897-1979"; Columbia University, $74,696.

Gur Ofer, Harvard University; "Economics of the Soviet Urban Household in the 1970s"; Harvard University, $25,000.

Mervyn Matthews, Stanford University; "Poverty in the Soviet Union"; Stanford University, $48,000.

Vladimir Shlapentokh, Michigan State University; "Social Values in the Soviet Union After 1953"; Michigan State University, $33,430.

Ivan Szelenyi, University of Wisconsin-Madison; "Part-time Family Farming in Contemporary Hungary"; University of Wisconsin-Madison, $29,549.

Under a separate contract with the Department of State, the Council has concluded another research contract, involving a number of scholars and universities, to conduct a large scale survey of recent emigres from the U.S.S.R. The principal scholars and universities involved are as follows:

James Millar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Donna Bahry, New York University; John Garrard, University of Virginia; Paul Gregory, University of Houston; Rasma Karklins, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle; Norman Nie, University of Chicago-National Opinion Research Center; Brian Silver, Michigan State University; Michael Swafford, Vanderbilt University; Aaron Vinoku, University of Haifa; and William Zimmerman, University of Michigan: "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration"; University of Illinois, Urbana, $992,000.

INSTITUTIONS AND STATES WHICH HAVE RECEIVED FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL UP TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1982

American University, Washington, D.C.
Boston University, Massachusetts.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Brown University, Rhode Island.
Center for Planning and Research, Inc., California.
Colgate University, New York.
Columbia University, New York.
Cornell University, New York.
Duke University, North Carolina.
Eastern Washington State University, Washington.
Florida International University, Florida.
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Pennsylvania.
The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

Haverford College, Pennsylvania.
Harvard University, Massachusetts.
Hofstra University, New York.
Illinois State University, Illinois.
Indiana University, Indiana.
International Research and Exchange Board, New York.
John Hopkins University, Maryland.
Miami University, Ohio.
Michigan State University, Michigan.
New York University, New York.
North Texas State University, Texas.
Northwestern University, Illinois.
Princeton University, New Jersey.
San Francisco State University, California.
Stanford University, California.
State University of New York-Binghamton, New York.
Transecon, Incorporated, New Jersey.
Tufts University, Massachusetts.
University of Arizona, Arizona.
University of California, Berkley, California.
University of Chicago, Illinois.
University of Connecticut, Connecticut.
University of Delaware, Delaware.
University of Illinois-Urbana, Illinois.
University of Maryland, Maryland.
University of Michigan, Michigan.
University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania.
University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
University of Texas-Austin, Texas.
University of Virginia, Virginia.
University of Washington, Washington.
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin.
Washington University-St. Louis, Missouri.
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Association, Inc. Pennsylvania.
Yale University, Connecticut.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Levine.
Dr. Kassof.
[Mr. Kassof's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF ALLEN H. KASSOF

Dr. Allen H. Kassof is executive director of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), New York City. IREX, a non-governmental agency, is responsible for the principle U.S. research exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe. It represents American universities and advanced research institutes, and works in close conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency.

Dr. Kassof, a native of New York City, was educated at Rutgers University and received the M.A. (1954) and Ph.D. (1960) degrees from Harvard University. He taught at Smith College and at Princeton University before becoming the founding director of IREX in 1968. A specialist on Soviet society, he has written numerous books and articles, including "The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion." He also edited the collection "Prospects for Soviet Society" for the Council of Foreign Relations, of which he is a member. He served as a U.S. delegate to the Hamburg meeting (1980) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Dr. Kassof is a trustee of the National Council on Soviet and East European Research, a member of the Academic Council of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and a director-elect of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. He served on the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and was the founding director of the National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies (NCFLIS). At NCFLIS, Dr. Kassof organized the Task Force on National Manpower Targets for Advanced Research on Foreign Areas, whose 1981 report is a major study of U.S. needs for foreign area specialists.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN H. KASSOF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND EXCHANGES BOARD [IREX], NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. KASSOF. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, I am very grateful for the opportunity to testify on this bill. As I indicated in my written testimony, I think this proposed legislation will be seen as a landmark development in the effort to underpin U.S. foreign policy with high quality analysis and research.

I would like to associate myself with the remarks of previous witnesses who spoke in favor of this initiative, and I especially want to emphasize the bill's advantage of taking a measured and targeted approach to a serious national problem. It is not a crash program. It is, rather, an effort to produce a steady state supply of the kind of expertise we need not only on the Soviet Union but on Eastern Europe as well.

I will return in a moment to some of the points in my written testimony, but if I could digress for a moment, let me respond to some of the questions that have been raised, beginning with the question raised by Senator Mathias about the nature of the manpower pool and employment possibilities in this field.

I served on the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies and subsequently was founding director of the National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies, the followup group to that Presidential effort. The question of how we measure national needs, for advanced research on all world areas was of great concern, and I organized a study of national targets for advanced manpower in foreign language and international studies. That study, which is now available in draft form from the National Council took up the question, area by area of how many experts in various disciplines and working on various topics were necessary for essential coverge of each area.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the conservative judgment of the expert panel was that, leaving aside language teaching, there were about the equivalent of 1,100 full-time equivalents working in the universities and in the government on problems concerning Eastern European affairs and Soviet affairs, and that this represented a gap of about some 600 people. We also know from our experience at the International Research and Exchanges Board, where we have organized special training programs when funds were available, that in fact there are jobs for people in fields underrepresented in studies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

There is an apparent and temporary surplus only in a few fields—for example, in 19th century Russian history and literature. In the social sciences and also in many subdisciplines of the humanities, we find a critical shortage.

I want to emphasize that even in the areas which are temporarily in surplus, there is important work going on, and this work must be continued. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, much more so than in the West, important political dialog is often encoded in literary and cultural debates. We are fortunate to possess the resources that we currently have to analyze these debates. I can confidently predict that the temporary surplus in some fields of literature and history will also become a deficit as the market

overreacts unless some appropriate action is taken. This will be another boom-and-bust cycle in Soviet and Eastern European studies, as the earlier panels discussed.

Senator BIDEN. Doctor Kassof, would you expand on that a moment, about the boom-and-bust cycle? There is a surplus now. Then what will happen?

Mr. KASSOF. The surplus is only in a few subfields. For example, if you look at sociology and political science, a lot of areas in East European studies, Soviet nationality studies and minority studies, you find there are not enough highly-talented people to man posts at universities or to enter the Government. That shortage is already upon us and has been for some time.

Because of the tendency for the Soviet and Eastern European studies to develop with a very heavy emphasis on historical and literary studies, we find ourselves in the Soviet field replicating something that is going on in the humanities in general: as university staffs have begun to shrink, some of the people who were earlier in the pipeline are having difficulty finding suitable employment. The market is correcting that oversupply very rapidly. I fear that there will shortly be an overreaction and that we will find ourselves with shortages not only in areas where we see them now, but also in areas where we are currently staffed at some level of adequacy.

Senator BIDEN. How is the market correcting it now?

Mr. KASSOF. As in other academic areas, there are simply fewer young people coming into Soviet and Eastern European studies. As they look at the employment opportunities and see these opportunities shrinking, they turn to other things. To some extent, the market acts as a positive force in regulating supply and demand. But it can go too far, and I think predictably will go too far, even in those areas where we have a temporary adequacy of people.

In conclusion, I again want to emphasize that the humanities are absolutely integral in our understanding of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and our experience at IREX with a small and pilot program of preparatory fellowships indicates that the slightly more ambitious manpower developments program envisaged in this proposed legislation would undoubtedly have very positive effects on the entire field.

Let me turn from the general manpower question to the role of the IREX exchanges in assuring adequate training for America's specialists on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One absolutely essential part of the training and research cycle is on-the-ground access. The IREX programs send to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the principal core of American trainees and researchers on those countries.

On-the-ground research is a tough business. These are all societies which restrict access to outsiders. We have found it both necessary and effective from the American side to organize this access on a centralized basis. Our main tool to assure fair treatment and wider access for American participants has been reciprocity, and that is why we have exchange programs.

I think it is fair to say that these programs have revolutionized our on-the-ground comprehension of life, politics and society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Fifteen or 20 years ago, we found ourselves working from a distance in trying to understand

what was going on in those countries. Thanks to previous investments, we now have available significant numbers of experts in the universities and in the Government whose incountry experiences have added immeasurably to the nuance and sensitivity with which we understand developments in that very complicated part of the world.

Senator BIDEN. How is your on-the-ground access going these days? What do you see this year and next?

Mr. KASSOF. These programs, which involve the principal access for American professional specialists on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have, despite all of the difficulties of the last years, continued. We had a lot of good support from the U.S. Government, with which we worked very closely. The long experience, going back now 25 years, that we have had in working with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has made it possible to continue these programs.

The exchanges started before the period of détente. While there is no question that they have suffered some negative consequences from the cooling off of the East-West atmosphere, sober people on both sides understand that with the stakes so high it is simply essential to keep open these fundamental channels of communication. We have been fortunate to be able to continue, not in very large numbers but nevertheless in significant numbers, the flow of American specialists to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

We also have been very lucky to have the hardworking support of colleagues in the Government—in the United States Information Agency, and in the National Endowment for the Humanities— in continuing to make these programs possible.

There are, however, some problems, and the measures provided in this bill would go a long way toward solving some of the long-term problems that we have experienced in making possible this continuing American access.

The first problem is one that Dr. Levine has referred to in a slightly different context—reliability. We frequently start a program year in July literally without knowing what our budget is going to be. There have been years when we have waited until September before we have had any assurance that we would make it all the way through the program year. Fortunately, we have not had to pull anyone out of the field or send anyone home for budgetary reasons yet.

But we enter every year with a kind of Perils of Pauline expectation that this may one day be necessary. We are on an annual cycle, on a catch-as-catch-can budgetary situation. This creates practical problems for us, but, more seriously, adds to that atmosphere of uncertainty, unreliability, unpredictability, that drives people out of the field of Soviet and East European studies. It creates problems for specialists who are already in the field, and it does not present a very happy or inviting picture for younger specialists who are so badly needed in the field.

The second set of problems is that we have really never been able to find the budget level that would make it possible to fill some very urgent gaps. For example, there is currently no provision on the exchanges for taking graduate students at midlevel graduate careers and sending them off to Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union. Because of budgetary restrictions, we have had to focus on people who are working at least at the Ph. D. level. We know there is a need for younger people to get a semester or a year on-the-ground experience. As increasing numbers stop at the M.A. level, or enter Government or public service, we really need to develop some mechanism and the budget has to be found to send these people over earlier in their careers.

We do not now have provision for visits by established American professionals who need to go to the U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe for just a few weeks to check sources, talk with people, and collect data. We send researchers for a semester or a year, and that is our priority with a limited budget. But a small increment, as envisaged in this bill, would shore up the access that our American experts need by providing for short-term visits.

We have in recent years developed cooperative programs with our exchange counterparts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that are project-based. These also help to expand access by American specialists and introduce them to recent developments in Soviet and East European research from which they had previously been cut off. All too often we find that these important programs cannot be funded.

Let me conclude by noting the very great contrast between the nature and durability of the American effort to do research on the Soviet Union and what the Soviets do in studying the outside world in general and the United States in particular.

We see this at IREX because we see many of the Soviet researchers coming into the United States. The Soviets have not hesitated to make very heavy, very carefully planned investments in the study of the rest of the world, especially the United States.

Although they are limited by ideological restrictions in the quality and character of their work, the Soviets developed a healthy respect for a great amount of detail; and we have command of the long-term outlook that their research implies, and for the quality of people who are brought into the Soviet research apparatus.

Those who have testified before have indicated with great conviction, that the future welfare of the United States is going to depend increasingly on how well we manage to understand what happens not just in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but also in the interaction between the Soviet Union and other areas of the world.

We have in this country a very strong and very powerful institutional base which was built by hard work and substantial investments in earlier years. We have accomplished a great deal on the basis of those earlier efforts.

The great appeal of this legislation is that it is an effort not to start all over again—we do not need to do that—but to safeguard what we have already accomplished and, by small, measured, targeted increment see to it that the gaps that now exist can be narrowed somewhat and that we have continuity and perspective in our coverage of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Kassof's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLEN H. KASSOF

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on this significant and urgent bill. Despite the fact that the Soviet bloc is at the very center of our foreign policy concerns, the U.S. capacity for analysis and research on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe is in decline. This bill, through a very modest and limited but closely targeted investment, can be counted on to result in immediate improvements in our coverage as well as to yield long-term and continuing benefits in providing the nation with the objective and deep-going knowledge that we shall need in the years ahead.

Despite our considerable and impressive successes in the 1950s and 1960s in developing expertise on the Soviet bloc, we now find that specialists already in the field often lack the most elementary opportunities to carry out their research. Young talent is discouraged from entering the field of Soviet and East European studies because of the scarcity and unreliability of research facilities and teaching opportunities. This has inhibited the production of badly needed knowledge and disrupted the training cycle on which we depend not only for the vitality of our academic centers but for feeding high-quality manpower into critical government agencies.

Our coverage of most aspects of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. is dangerously thin, and in some cases non-existent. (In a few fields, particularly in some sub-specialties of history and of language and literature, there is for the moment a surplus of qualified personnel relative to current demand, but this margin will disappear as the manpower pool continues to shrink.) We need a rational response to these defects. Fortunately, our previous accomplishments give us a strong base to build on. We do not need a costly crash program, but a carefully planned and integrated effort that will produce, and maintain, modest numbers of the highest quality. This bill would assure such an outcome.

One major component of this bill will provide partial support for the programs of IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board. IREX is the principal U.S channel providing field access to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. It funds and administers exchange programs on a reciprocal basis that helps to assure fair access for U.S. specialists. Opportunities are provided for senior researchers as well as for advanced graduate students. Dealing as it does with societies that are exceptionally resistant to research by outsiders, IREX forms an indispensable link in the production of knowledge by negotiating on-the-ground research opportunities. The U.S. specialist community is almost entirely dependent on this national facility. During the 1981–82 program year, we had 56 American researchers in the U.S.S.R., and 52 in Eastern Europe. In addition, there will be short-term summer programs in the U.S.S.R. and in Bulgaria for specialists who teach those languages at our universities and colleges. The numbers, of course, are all too small when one considers the vast amount of research that needs to be done on, and in, the Soviet bloc, but the participants are at the core of our national expertise and have exceptional qualifications.

The IREX programs are made possible by grants from the United States Information Agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and from private foundations and corporate donors. While we shall continue to be dependent on this mix of public and private support and are deeply grateful to all those who have worked so hard to make it possible, it has not been fully adequate to the national need.

First, most of the budget must be sought on a year-by-year, catch-as-catch-can basis, so that the funding levels for the programs typically are not known until the very last minute; in fact, in most years we find ourselves several months into the programs without assurance that they can be completed. Apart from the immediate practical difficulties resulting from this pattern of uncertainty, it is a serious discouragement to the field as a whole when even near-term research plans, not to mention longer range expectations, are subject to this constant risk and fluctuation.

Even more serious, there are substantial and continuing gaps in the budget that have required us to turn away from important opportunities and to curtail, suspend, or cancel a number of programs that are essential to Soviet and East European studies in the United States. Their loss has aggravated the overall problems of the field.

The bill under consideration would make a significant contribution towards the solution of both these problems, even though by itself it is by no means a substitute for other sources.

What are the most urgent gaps in our national coverage, and how would this bill help?

Already in 1975, IREX was obliged for budgetary reasons to reduce by about half the exchange quotas with a number of East European countries. These cuts, which were to have been temporary, have never been made up. While in some cases the

remaining quotas are about adequate to the current needs of the highest quality researchers, a limited restoration of selected quotas with some countries would be very productive.

A second serious gap in coverage is that we are unable to provide short-term research opportunities for senior specialists who need to spend several weeks in Eastern Europe or the U.S.S.R. in conjunction with current research; our limited exchanges budget must be reserved almost entirely for longer-term stays, typically of a semester or a year, so that we have been unable to provide for briefer visits by researchers who need to consult sources in the field for the efficient completion of work in progress.

A third need concerns mid-level graduate student trainees. Because of financial limitations, the exchange quotas currently are restricted to those who have completed all of the requirements for the Ph. D. except the dissertation, and to senior researchers. We need to make provision for trainees sooner in their careers if they are to gain early on an effective, on-the-ground familiarity with the countries of their specialization. Moreover, for those who plan government or public service rather than academic careers and who will complete their training at the M.A. level, there currently are no provisions at all for in-country experience.

A fourth and highest priority need is for the restoration of IREX's preparatory fellowship program. This program, previously funded by private foundations, provided supplementary language and area training for graduate students in specialities underrepresented in the exchanges in which important research opportunities for field research have become available, but which the United States has lacked the manpower to exploit. The earlier effort, now suspended for lack of funds, made critical contributions in such fields as sociology, economics, and Central Asian studies. Neither our USIA nor NEH funds can be used for this purpose, and so far it has not been possible to persuade the foundations to take this up again. The demonstrated success of IREX's pioneering efforts have led to the inclusion in this bill of provision for a program of preparatory fellowships to be administered by the National Council on Soviet and East European Research. But there will still be a need for IREX to provide training grants in specific areas where new in-country research opportunities develop, and which would also provide for the re-training of faculty-level specialists to move into undermanned areas. For example, we have been trying to find funds to train a small number of experts who will have competence both in Latin American and Soviet studies in order to monitor the growing Soviet research on and involvement in Latin American affairs. Although a private foundation has offered the possibility of partial funding, we have been unable to raise the additional sums required to undertake this program.

The fifth need has to do with our project-based research cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Through a series of agreements that supplement the exchanges of individual scholars, IREX has created commissions on the social sciences and humanities with the U.S.S.R., Hungary, Poland and East Germany. Joint research projects identified and facilitated by these commissions make it possible for our U.S. specialists to become acquainted with the latest work of their counterparts in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and expand their access to institutions and sources in the bloc countries that previously were beyond our reach. While we have been able to maintain a certain number of these projects with the assistance of NEH and by miscellaneous grants from private foundations, others have had to be curtailed or delayed because of funding limitations.

The bill under consideration would help make it possible for IREX to respond more fully to these national needs, and would strenghen the U.S. research capacity on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

IREX participants come from all sections of the United States, from specialized university centers as well as from smaller universities and colleges where many of our finest specialists are found today. There is hardly a leading U.S. expert on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe who has not benefitted from these programs, whose research has not been enriched by an intensive immersion in the realities and complexities of the in-country experience. Moreover, the products of these programs are nowadays to be found not only in the academic world, but increasingly in the analytical and foreign policy branches of the government. IREX has provided training and experience for increasing numbers of specialists now to be found in the Department of State, at our Soviet and East European Embassies, among our ambassadors, in the defense and intelligence establishments, in the USIA, at the radios, and wherever expertise on Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. is at a premium. A number are now to be found as well in the U.S. business community as analysts and advisors on Soviet and East European developments. Their overseas experiences on the IREX programs have provided the Nation with an indispensable source of nuanced,

realistic, and objective comprehension of the Soviet bloc and its impact on the U.S. national interest. It is imperative to stabilize these programs and to provide better coverage of functions now neglected because of funding exigencies.

In speaking out in favor of this bill, I would like to emphasize that its IREX component is only one part of an integrated and coordinated effort to respond to the clear national need for improvements in our research and training on Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. There will be little use for exchanges, no matter how effective they are in opening up new opportunities for research in the Soviet bloc, if we fail to provide for the training of new specialists who can help us take advantage of this access. We must also see to the provision of research opportunities for our specialists in the United States: the exchange experience, if it is to be effective and useful, must be preceeded by intensive research and preparation at home, and needs to be followed up by a period of analysis, writing, active consultation with other scholars, and dissemination to users in the policy sector and the public at large.

I believe that this bill, by providing for the first time for an integrated system of training and research, will be seen in retrospect as a landmark accomplishment in the national effort to underpin U.S. foreign policy with the highest quality of training, research, and analysis.

Finally, I want to emphasize again that this bill represents a measured, carefully thought out response to a recognized and urgent national need. It creates no new bureaucracy, involves limited funding, and is based on a proven record of past accomplishment by all of the national organizations concerned. Past efforts and investment have already produced impressive results, but we are facing a period of increasing need and declining resources just when we most need to sharpen our work on the Soviet bloc. This bill, with its promise of modest but stable long-term support, can be expected to make a major contribution.

Addendum to the Written Testimony

I have been asked to supply additional testimony on the apparent surplus of personnel in the area of Slavic studies. To summarize my oral testimony on this issue as it applies to the bill under consideration:

1. There is an apparent and temporary surplus only in a few fields—for example, 19th Century Russian history and Russian literature. Most fields, especially in the social sciences but also some humanities disciplines, are in critical condition.

2. Even in the "surplus" areas, essential work is going on and must be continued. In Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., important political dialogue is often encoded in literary and cultural debates. We are fortunate to possess the resources we currently have in these areas: the danger is that here, too, the surplus will become a deficit as the market overracts unless action is taken.

3. The bill under consideration is geared toward the steady-state creation of a small number of high quality personnel in the Soviet and East European field, building upon the human capital we already have in hand, rather than toward the production of large number of new specialists. The most serious danger is that by allowing the present rapid shrinkage to continue, we shall soon be faced with the costly repair bill for starting all over again in all fields.

4. IREX's experience with a small program of preparatory fellowships in critical fields is that specialists of this type are in demand, and employable in academia, business, and government.

I also include, with the permission of the National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies, the draft report of the Soviet and East European Panel of the Task Force on National Manpower Targets for Advanced Research on Foreign Areas:

Report of the Task Force on National Manpower Targets for Advanced Research on Foreign Areas, National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies, New York, N.Y.

Report of the Soviet/East European Committee

The U.S.S.R. is our major adversary, our most critical competitor in an increasingly uncertain world where security is a commodity in short supply. Paradoxically, we have never fought a war with the Soviet Union, save as World War II allies—while Germany and Japan, adversaries in that conflict, are now critical allies of the United States. The United States-Soviet chasm yawns widely, with differing histories, conceptions of the proper role of the state and of force underlying differences in our political, economic and social systems. Soviet global ambitions, fueled by these elements and made alarming by an unprecedented arms buildup which threat-

ens to move (if it has not already) beyond parity, are a critical destabilizing force in the international environment.

The outcome of World War II radically altered the geopolitical face of the European continent. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were linked to the U.S.S.R. as client states in the Soviet bloc, with only Yugoslavia and Albania, in very different ways, extricating themselves. The division of Germany produced another Soviet satellite in the GDR. Here, the paradox for American interests lies in the sealing off, albeit partially, of a group of ancient European states from the Western world of which they have been historically a part, and their inclusion in a Soviet empire hostile to that world—sealing off especially the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, among whom, historically and today, the United States enjoys great affection and admiration. It is not paradoxical that among these "allies" the U.S.S.R. finds increasing unrest, dissatisfaction, and claims for greater freedom and autonomy—in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland at various times in the postwar period, but most recently in the as yet open-ended mass political mobilization of the Polish populace in 1980–1981. The massive Soviet preponderance of force in the area has thus far guaranteed the "security" Stalin sought by his occupation of the area; the failure of that preponderance to homogenize and render docile the diverse peoples of Eastern Europe testifies to the uncertainty and expense of that security.

Surely, one need not argue a "national need" for knowledge of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and for the manpower to produce and maintain it. The early postwar establishment of Russian studies centers at Harvard and Columbia reflected the relevance of such knowledge as the "cold war" commenced, and the post-Sputnik federal funding of more centers and fellowships allowed for the further expansion of Soviet and East European studies as the Soviet world grew more complex in its interrelationships. In a sense, Soviet and East European studies have been a real "success story" of university-government cooperation, their products staffing critical government and academic posts and, to a lesser degree, positions in the private sector. Yet one can well question whether our current resources are sufficient, our projected future resources anything but woefully inadequate, to deal with the many problems of a conflictual relationship which the two sides have shown differing readiness to moderate and control.

Examples abound. A decade of arms-control negotiations, strategic and conventional, have yielded SALT I, the controversial SALT II, and uncertain results on other fronts. To these deliberations the United States has brought a great deal of technical skill in the "hardware" areas, but arguably less expertise in Russian/Soviet military policy, doctrine, and history—critical resources in judging the meaning of Soviet proposals, positions and negotiating stances. The combination of political and technical expertise in such an area is an essential asset if ill-advised American concessions are to be avoided, and genuine progress, where possible, achieved.

In a time of Western economic problems, it is easy to take a certain comfort in the economic difficulties of the U.S.S.R. (and, by extension, CMEA as well)—especially when the Western economies seem in various ways hostage to OPEC and at risk in a world threatening further cartelization. Yet on such critical issues as the future Soviet oil picture, the likelihood that investment, consumption or defense will "give" as the Soviet economy finds it impossible to support all three, and prospects for post-Brezhnev changes in economic structure, we remain in an area of uncertainty. Answers to these questions—or tighter specification of the range of plausible alternatives—are important for U.S. policy makers, as well as for informed publics.

The onset of the 1980's sees Poland again the focus of instability in the Soviet empire, displacing, for a time at least, speculation over Soviet threats to Yugoslav independence and unity in the post-Tito period finally upon us. The "Polish events" surprised most Western analysts, as many other developments there and in other East European states have. In a region where "events" promise to mount as autonomous economic and social processes tax the ability of Soviet-type political structures to contain them, analysis and appreciation of prospective developments are essential. The United States and Western strategic economic and political interests are interwoven in Eastern Europe, and can be adequately served only on the basis of knowledge such analysis can provide.

Existing United States resources for analyzing Soviet and East European events and processes are, in the judgment of the committee, inadequate to the task and even the current level of primary personnel in the area is threatened by impending retirements, and difficulties in the recruitment and retention of specialists in academia and government.

Currently, the committee estimates 1,074 "primary personnel" work in the Soviet/East European area independent of about 222 involved in language/literature studies. This, it concludes, represents a significant deficit—1,660 primary personnel representing a reasonable "target" in the substantive areas, with a need for a total of 370 in the language/literature areas. What follows discusses the situation by various fields/disciplines, and problem areas.

SOCIOLOGY

We begin with a perennial "deficit" field in Soviet and East European studies. For a number of reasons, the early promise of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System in the 1950's—the development of a substantial sociological cadre in the Soviet area, and the implication that the same might be done for Eastern Europe—was never borne out. Sociology, as discipline and as academic enterprise, remains "thematically" oriented, inclined to reject area studies as peripheral particularization in a field whose central focus is ever-broader generalization. The effect has been to hinder the application of sociological perspectives to the analysis of "grassroots" social life and organization in the socialist states, and their relation to political and economic processes.

By our estimates, at most 15-16 sociologists work on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the vast majority on the former. Given time spent on non-area related teaching and research, this equals about 10-12 full-time equivalents (F.T.E.), to cover a wide range of topics and issues falling within sociology's ambit: family/sex roles; stratification and mobility; deviant behavior and social control; social movements; religion; ethnic relations; work and industry; demography; urban/rural life; consumption and lifestyles; and political sociology.

Some of these areas, on the Soviet side at least, have been better covered than others. The first three have generated a fairly substantial literature: we do know a good deal about family life, inequality, and deviance (less, however, about ethnic dimensions of stratification, and about law enforcement). Less also is known about social movements, religious and other belief systems. While the multinational mosaic of Soviet society is far from terra incognita, we still lack clear understanding of the policital attitudes of the Moslem populations. Other topics reflect both things well known and large gaps in knowledge. Consumption and life styles is an area where much has been recorded superficially, but little known about the subjective meanings of different levels of consumption, rises and falls therein. Sociology of work reflects, in what we know, a solid heritage of works on management and factory life (mainly by economists) but less on social dynamics in the work-place.

With regard to Eastern Europe, the situation is bleaker: one, two, perhaps three sociologists devote half or more of their time to the area. The deficit is in some measure made good, as with the U.S.S.R., by the efforts of several political scientists in addressing the relevant questions.

This all falls far short of a "critical mass"—a minimum number of F.T.E. working on a given issue, capable of exchanging ideas and perspectives and of reacting critically to one another's work. Judgments are unavoidably imprecise here, but 4 F.T.E. seems a reasonable number to work on a given issue, allowing for multiple collaborators in academia, government, and other sectors. This is an average, certainly; 4 F.T.E. is inadequate to deal with Soviet ethnic patterns, too many to deal with stratification and mobility in Bulgaria. But a reasonable rule of thumb for sociology's production of a cadre capable of responding to the national need would involve similar numbers for the U.S.S.R. and for Eastern Europe as a whole. The eleven issue areas outlined justify in these terms 44 F.T.E. or thereabouts for the U.S.S.R., and 44 for Eastern Europe; 88 F.T.E. in all.

Calculating the present "stock" as 10-12 F.T.E. sociologists, and adding another 16 political scientists and economists who work in these areas as 8 F.T.E., the current cadre equals 18-20 F.T.E. A four-fold increase is much to ask, given today's constraints on academic and governmental recruitment, but not immense when viewed against the task of analyzing and reporting on the everyday life of almost 400 million people in a bloc of vital concern to the United States. Such growth, proportionately quite large, would still leave sociology the smallest share of primary personnel among the disciplines separately discussed in this report.

POLITICS, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN

It is facile, but accurate, to say that "we cannot know too much" about political processes in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. It is also somewhat difficult to speak of "shortages" in this area—most undergraduate institutions offer courses on Soviet (though not East European) politics, and on international relations, wherein Soviet-

American conflict and accommodation are covered. Compared to sociology or economics, the area seems well-covered.

This coverage is in many senses illusory. The number of F.T.E. specialist personnel is much smaller than that of those doing "some" teaching or writing in the area of Soviet/East European politics. A rough estimate yields about 525 political scientists in the field, perhaps 475 of these working mainly or exclusively on the U.S.S.R. At most half might be regarded as spending total time on the area; hence a total of about 260 F.T.E., with a 9:1 "bias" toward the U.S.S.R. as opposed to Eastern Europe.

This group of primary personnel faces a great diversity of problems and issues. On the domestic side, party affairs, ideology, public administration, ethnic and religious issues, dissent, and formal or informal aspects of the polity-society relationship (law, working-class politics, etc.) as well as the role of the military need coverage in each state. Some of these issues are whole enterprises in themselves, internally diverse and impossible for one or two persons to handle adequately.

A whole panoply of foreign relations issues must be addressed. "Soviet policy toward ———" involves many relationships, and adequately dealing with them may require persons with dual regional expertise. Some are clearly critical to U.S. interests and the national need, other less so—but none completely peripheral to American concerns. Among first-order concerns, demanding a heavy personnel investment for persistent monitoring and regular team research, Soviet relations with the United States, Middle East and North Africa, and the PRC are near to adequate coverage, but those with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, and the Gulf area proper and South Asia are much worse served. This extends also to intrabloc relations, where the "northern tier" is reasonably covered, but the Balkan Warsaw Pact states and "mavericks" less so.

Important second-order concerns involve Soviet policy toward the U.K. and Italy, Mexico and the Caribbean, Latin America, the ASEAN nations and other Pacific states. For these, coverage is inadequate at present, and likely to be worse in the future, barring some positive intervention for the development and utilization of more primary personnel.

Nothing less than a doubling of effort in these areas—to a target of 500–520 F.T.E., with some readjustment toward enlarging the East European share—is called for. This will provide critical masses available to address standing issues, to cross issue lines as new concerns develop. The locus of many practitioners will perforce lie outside conventional academia, but the centrality of the U.S. relationship with the "Soviet world" and its enduring quality make, in any case, a strong argument for locating many of these specialists in government agencies now "stretching" personnel to monitor events and processes in more than one country, or to deal with many issues simultaneously.

ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE

The ups and downs of the Soviet economy, heightened East-West trade and American involvement therein, increased vulnerability of the CMEA and Yugoslav economies to Western business cycles, as well as the growing internal problems of the centrally-planned economies, all make economic intelligence on this area a critical component of preparedness. It is currently the enterprise, by our estimates, of about 100–200 people—slightly more than half of them in academia, another 35–40 percent in government or government-sponsored institutions, and 5–10 percent in the private sector. The great majority of these, given the large share of non-academic employment, can be regarded as F.T.E.

The major effort is concentrated on the U.S.S.R. economy (circa 65 pecent while among the remainder a focus on foreign trade, and the Polish and Hungarian economies, leaves little resources devoted to the GDR, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The greatest current deficit is thus in the East European area, although the rapid aging of the cadre of senior Soviet economic specialists imperils this group's continuity beyond the 1980's.

While much progress has been made in econometrics and system-modelling, as well as in foreign trade analysis, the growing availability of information and the need for better, more nuance study of national econmic performance and prospects—as well as the increased salience of economic performance for political stability in a socialist world facing the "politics of stringency"—argue for an expansion of current capacity. This should be, to meet the needs, of significant proportions—to 200–225 F.T.E., with some adjustments in the allocation between the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. This will cover the replacement of retirees in the 1980's (which according to an NEH-Ford Foundation report, places Soviet and East European eco-

nomics "on the list of academic endangered species"), and build capacity in numerous fields (demography, employment, economic reform, sectoral studies) now relatively neglected, especially in the East European context. It will provide an adequate critical mass.

How such an expanded cadre of primary personnel is to be maintained raises the problems of the weak responsiveness of economics departments to regional specialization and the unlikely absorption of the excess into fulltime employment in business, etc. Institutional restructuring, of sorts to be discussed separately, will be in order here, as it will be in other fields.

HISTORY

The discipline of history, whether focused on the remote past or on periods so recent it shares the field with political science, plays a large role in Soviet and East European studies. In their training, virtually all primary personnel, irrespective of discipline, have some exposure to history; without it, adequate preparation is inconceivable.

Beyond this, history's special relevance is twofold in the Soviet and East European area. Despite a recent past of "revolution," the whole area manifests a remarkable persistence in historically-conditioned political culture and social values; it is also extraordinarily "history-minded" at elite and mass levels, despite the evident supplanting of earlier ideologies by official Marxism-Leninism. Thus, the proper work of historians—elucidation of the past—informs and shapes our view of the area in the present. What we make of its history, and what we make of its inhabitants' view of that history, are important elements in our analyses of present and future.

Currently, a cadre of about 655 historians, the vast majority in universities, covers the area. Of these, perhaps 40–45 percent are actively engaged in the production of knowledge, and calculating each person at about two-thirds of an F.T.E., we have circa 420 F.T.E., 210 actively engaged in research.

Coverage by period and region varies widely. Russian history of the Imperial period (save for foreign policy and nationalities) is adequate, as is Polish history in many aspects. The Russian Revolution and Civil War period have also in recent years seen rapid growth of solid work.

Weak, on the other hand, is the history of Stalinist Russia (the 1920's-1930's) and the postwar U.S.S.R, since archival access limitations radically restrict opportunities to practice the historian's craft. For those periods, the efforts of political scientists and economists with retrospective interests bulk comparatively large in supplementing the work of historians.

In Eastern Europe, the picture is quite bleak, both on thematic coverage and individual country studies (save, as noted, above, for Poland). Albania and the GDR are especially weak cases. The interwar period of East European independence and the postwar transition to "satellization" both remain historiographical gaps, save for some general histories, many now aging. Social history from the 19th century on—industrialization, urbanization, the peasant and land problems—are all close to blanks as properly documented history goes. The "gap" is of more than academic concern since none of these topics represents "history for history's sake." The diverse modes of accommodation to and rebellion against the Soviet "model" and Soviet hegemony among the East European states all draw on the experience of earlier periods, earlier imperial hegemonies. Our understanding of the dynamics of an increasingly restive Soviet bloc, our ability to "place" the Lech Walesas in a useful perspective, can only profit from an enhanced understanding of the persistent forces which shape East European life today.

It is arguable as well that even the study of remote periods (Kievan and Muscovite Russia, the medieval state-formation-and-destruction period in Central Europe and the Balkans) yields benefits beyond the "merely" historical. Russian nationalism, absolutism and xenophobia, East European sensitivity to Western patterns and influences, rebellious nationalism and/or modes of accommodation to superior force are all rooted, at least partially, in these remote pasts.

Failure to appreciate such phenomena may lead to shallow assessments of the capacity of certain ideas to galvanize national sentiments, to provide bases for unity or conflict in the contemporary world.

Even the partial sufficiency of the current stock of historians is somewhat misleading. Retirements will outpace projected increments in the 1980's-1990's, with graduate students today numbering perhaps one-fifth of the 1970 total. The year 2000, according to current trends, will see perhaps only one-quarter of today's number of historians working the Soviet and East European area.

Even with a declining academic job market which today still remains the employer of first resort for historians, the issue is not one of "providing decent employment" for the proverbial history Ph. D. driving a taxi. It is, rather, the prevention of the loss of critical resources whose maintenance to serve national needs requires replacements, and expansion and redeployment as well. Our target is an increase of the current stock from 420 F.T.E. to circa 675, or as close to this as can be managed within the limits of institutional restructuring. Traditional modes of employment may not be the most efficient in linking historians' efforts to the national interest; alternate avenues of utilization must be explored.

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND CULTURE

Though it has been, along with history, a dominant focus within Soviet and East European studies, the sphere of language/literature/culture, both as a training enterprise essential for all specialists in the area and as its own mode of intellectural inquiry, is in trouble.

Enrollment figures for post-secondary language study, derived from a 1977 ACLS/MLA study, reflect some alarming problems. In 1977, 27,784 students were studying Russian—but the vast majority of these in the first or second years, with no guarantee either that they would continue toward command of the language, nor that such command would be put to any use. Thus, even a seemingly significant total in the neighborhood of 27,000 in fact hardly guarantees adequately-trained cadres of potential Soviet specialists—and this fugure exceeds the total of all who were in 1977 enrolled in courses in the other languages of the Soviet Union, or those of Eastern Europe. For example, Polish was studied by 1,156, Serbo-Croatian by 241, Hungarian by 109. Only 133 were working on Ukrainian, and only five, according to the ACLS/MLA report, on Uzbek, the language of the U.S.S.R.'s largest Central Asian minority.

A national need to monitor and understand the growing weight and importance of Central Asian Moslem peoples in the U.S.S.R., as well as its Ukrainian and Baltic components, to cover the diversity of restiveness of the East European states, cannot be met on the basis of such figures. Resources suffice neither for the instruction of future specialists in the language they need as tools, nor for the monitoring and analysis of literary and cultural production which is the research side of the activity of language and literature specialists.

Our conclusion, somewhat in line with those of the ACLS-MLA Task Force on the Less Commonly Taught Languages, is that Russian should be taught on the same basis as "world" languages at secondary and higher levels, toward producing a 1988 post-secondary enrollment of 100,000. From such a base, even allowing for those who "defect" from Russian after the second year or seek other career paths not utilizing fuller linguistic training, a sufficient number should survive for specialist training and employment in the field of Soviet and Russian studies.

Realism dictates smaller resources for the other languages, in three tiers of priority: (1) Polish and Serbo-Croatian; (2) Czech, Hungarian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Bulgarian; and (3) languages of other East European and Soviet nationalities, with a special but difficult to specify role reserved for a large-scale increase of competence in the Soviet Moslem languages. The first and second tiers need substantial instructional resources at the undergraduate level, the third predominantly, though not necessarily exclusively, at the graduate.

Uniquely, the language/literature area represents two concerns: personnel adequate to equip other specialists with the linguistic wherewithal to function at a high level, and to pursue the tasks of literature, language and cultural scholarship at a level adequate to the nation's needs to understand the cultural context of matters more directly related to security and profitable interaction with this part of the world. Primary personnel totals in the area may indeed represent virtually one F.T.E. per person, though that may be divided between two languages or a language and a literature, etc. Our recommendation of 370 F.T.E. above the elementary (i.e., first two years of "straight" language instruction) level (assuming the current supply is about 222 F.T.E.) is not inordinate—leaving Russian aside, Polish and Serbo-Croatian by themselves represent the native tongues of circa 50 million people, and the whole set of languages cover diverse cultures encompassing nearly 400 million. The tasks are large; the needs are understandably large as well.

OTHER DISCIPLINES AND CONCERNS

This report does not aim to be encyclopedic. The disciplines already discussed do not total the whole of Soviet and East European studies—others, smaller generally in numbers, play roles as well. Anthropology offers, where fieldwork is practicable

(as it is in some areas of Eastern Europe, less so in others and in the U.S.S.R.) valuable and often unique insights into patterns of change and stability as experienced by small communities, into religious and secular custom and ritual and their meanings. Its concerns mesh at points with those of sociology, or some other disciplines, but at other points remain its own. The number of F.T.E. anthropologists in the area is small--surely no more than 10—and some expansion, or at the very least maintenance of this cadre, is desirable.

Geography is again a "compact" profession, with a number but no surfeit of practitioners devoting significant work to the area. Demography, regional planning and development, and other problem areas "cross-disciplinary" from the viewpoint of other specialties are among the concern of geographers. But perhaps paramount in their importance is contemporary Soviet and East European affairs are issues of energy supply, economic development and resource dependency—issues geographers as well as economists have addressed in recent years. Retention and at least moderate expansion of a cadre including today hardly more than 30 F.T.E. geographers should be a priority.

Any number of other thematic issues—science and technology, environmental problems, public health—present themselves as critical to the study of Soviet and East European affairs today. One cannot, obviously, reserve "space" in hard-science departments, schools of public health and other technical and professional establishments for a determinate number of persons devoting a given percentage of effort to monitoring and analyzing the performance of the U.S.S.R. and the East European states in these areas. Some of these concerns can be adequately addressed by political scientists, economists, etc., with sufficient training and familiarity in ancillary areas. The issue here is to guarantee that such problem areas do find adequate coverage somewhere in the total enterprise to a target share of circa 7.5 percent of the total primary personnel.

SPECIAL CONCERNS: INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Largely unshared with other geographic areas, but a critical element in the U.S.-Soviet and East European studies enterprise, is the linkage of international broadcasting and its ancillary concerns with those of the broader academic/government/business communities involved in the area. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, organizations involved both in broadcasting and in short- and medium-term research of a high order, are critical assets in the field. The maintenance of their staffs of linguistically and professionally qualified personnel over the next decade, when anticipated retirement and some "drying up" of emigre sources of supply threaten to diminish them, is critical—both *in situ* as direct producers of information, and for the broader community as producers of research reports of various sorts used profitably by academic and government specialists. The RFE and RL staffs occupy a unique and essential role in the common enterprise.

SPECIAL CONCERNS: DATA AND AVAILABILITY

The Soviet world is a great producer of printed material—indeed the critical issue for many research and intelligence enterprises in the field is keeping up with the flow of communication, culling through the output to catch the critical information oftern contained therein, but only yielding itself up to careful sifting.

Here, both the basic bibliographic functions performed by libraries and research collections, and by certain translation services which render abstracts at least, full translations at most, accessible to a broader community, are critical. The non-broadcast work of RFE/RL is important here, making available to regional generalists a great deal of information across a span of languages no one specialist is likely to command. Similarly, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press renders inestimable service both through its weekly translation of diverse Soviet press materials, and its detailed index to the total content of Pravda and Izvestiia. The U.S. Government's Joint Publications Research Service series of periodical translations, and the daily Foreign Broadcast Information Service media translations are also valuable tools in research relevant to national concerns.

Any long-term strategy for maintenance and growth of national capacity in the U.S.S.R. and East European field must make a place for the continued support of major library collections as well as the other valuable services which increase in a decisive way the productivity of specialist cadres.

RESEARCH, EXPERTISE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

This report has not separated out as a distinct "discipline" the study and analysis of the Soviet military/defense establishment, foreign policy, bilateral and multilateral relations, intra-Soviet bloc and inter-bloc (NATO–WTO, EEC–CMEA) relations. In a direct sense, of course, these lie at the core of our definition of national need for expertise on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and provide the rationale for advancing a claim to government funding even in a time of financial retrenchment supported by a national consensus.

Dealing with these closely policy-related matters, as well as with the general pattern of Soviet domestic politics in its relation to foreign relations, is at its best a matter of multi- and trans-disciplinary approaches. The problems are multifaceted, so must be our attempts to grapple with them. Addressing expert manpower needs in these areas requires less the specification of a certain number than the recognition that deployment and utilization of economists, political scientists, sociologists, etc. in these problem areas must be guaranteed. A cadre of the size we project will be adequate if the private sector, universities and government provide the incentives and environment which make possible the concentration of expertise where it is most critical. It is beyond the scope of this committee report to discuss the aspects of institutional structure and innovations which may be required—these are addressed in other sections of the project report.

ESTIMATES

Our quantitative estimates of need find expression in Table 1. This reflects judgments made about the priority of coverage by country, as is evidenced in the table itself, and also judgments about the deployment of personnel across certain other boundaries (internal/external, etc.). Table 1's internal distributions derive, in large measure, from Table 2, an attempt on the part of the Soviet and East European committee as a whole to conceive an optimum distribution of an adequate (but numerically indeterminate) cadre of primary personnel.

It should be stressed that these are not "maximum" figures—indeed, the table total of 2,030 F.T.E. is smaller than either the 1979 Ph.D. total for the area, or the 1978 membership of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. The figures, nonetheless, do represent an increase in the number of primary personnel engaged in work in the field, a number not tapped by counting Ph.D.s or association memberships.

In addition, it need be emphasized that our language/literature/culture figure is more exclusive than the rest, since it leaves out that large number of personnel whose main work (relevant to the project objectives) is instruction of an elementary sort (the first two years) in each of the languages of the area. Without these, needless to say, little is possible—their numbers must, in line with the observations above, be maintained, and enlarged where necessary.

TABLE 1.—PRIMARY PERSONNEL INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION, NUMERICAL ESTIMATES IN FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS (F.T.E.)

	Russia/ U.S.S.R.	Albania	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia	Hungary	C.S.S.R.	Poland	G.D.R.	All EE	Total
Political science	312	10.4	10.4	20.8	41.6	20.8	20.8	41.6	41.6	208	520.0
Economics	135	4.5	6.75	9.0	18.0	11.25	9.0	18.0	13.5	90	225.0
History	438.75	11.8	23.6	30.7	44.8	30.7	35.4	44.8	14.1	236.25	675.0
Sociology	440	1.5	1.5	3.5	8.8	6.6	6.6	8.8	6.6	44	88.0
Language/literature/culture:											
(West Slav—29.6)	296									74	370.0
(East Slav—22.2)											
(Non-Slav—22.2)											
Other social sciences											152.4
Total											2,030.4

TABLE 2.—OPTIMAL PRIMARY PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION—IN PERCENTAGES

	Russia/ U.S.S.R.	Albania	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia	Hungary	C.S.S.R.	Poland	G.D.R.	All EE	Total
Political science	[1] 10.50	0.35	0.35	0.70	1.40	0.70	0.70	1.40	1.40	[2] 7.00	17.5
Economics	[3] 7.50	.25	.375	.50	1.00	.625	.50	1.00	.75	[4] 5.00	12.5
History	16.25	.44	.88	1.14	1.65	1.14	1.31	1.65	.53	8.75	25.0
Sociology	3.75	.10	.10	.30	.70	.60	.60	.70	.60	3.75	7.5
Language/literature/culture: [5]											
(South Slav—1.80)	[6] 24.00									6.00	30.0
(West Slav—2.40)											
(Non-Slav—1.80)											
Other social sciences											7.5
Total											100.0

[1] Domestic politics, 65 percent; foreign policy, etc., 35 percent.
[2] Domestic politics, 70 percent; foreign policy, etc., 30 percent.
[3] Domestic economy, 85 percent; foreign, 15 percent.
[4] Domestic economy, 70 percent; foreign, 30 percent.
[5] Includes art, music, philosophy, other traditional humanities; excludes "pure" language teachers engaged in the first 3 years of instruction.
[6] Russian from Russian: language 80/20 percent; literature 90/10 percent; culture 85/15 percent.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Kassof.
Mr. Toumanoff.
[Mr. Toumanoff's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF

Mr. Toumanoff is Executive Director of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, President of the corporation, and a Trustee ex-officio. He has held these positions since 1978 when the Council was founded. He was Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University from 1974 to 1978.

He graduated from Harvard in 1945, and subsequently attended the University of Chicago, Harvard's School of Public Administration, and the Canadian National Defense College. He joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1951 and retired in 1973 as an FSO-2, having served most of his career as a Soviet specialist. In the Foreign Service he held the following assignments:

1951-53 State Department, personnel administration.
1953-56 Reykjavik: Consular and Administrative Officer.
1957-58 Frankfurt: peripheral reporting, U.S.S.R.
1958-60 Moscow: Political Officer.
1960-61 State Department: Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Soviet domestic developments.
1961-63 INR, research on science, technology and foreign policy; member of Guided Missiles & Astronautics Intelligence Committee and Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; State Dept. representative on military, atomic energy and space National Intelligence Estimates for U.S.S.R. and China; detailed to Cuban missile task force.
1964-68 Department of State: European Bureau, Officer-in-Charge of Soviet multilateral political affairs. Outer Space Treaty, SALT, NPT, U.N., Soviet foreign relations; also detailed to Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and to Czech crisis task force.
1968-73 Ottawa: Political Counselor.

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to contribute to the information available to the Congress as you consider the legislation. I have a written statement for the record and I will try to summarize very briefly a few points.

There are two studies that I am aware of which provide hard data on the national decline in Soviet studies. They were conducted by Stanford University in 1976 and by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1981. If you combine their findings, you discover that in constant dollars, university centers of Soviet and East European studies have had their budgets cut by 77 percent from 1965 to 1982.

The center budgets obviously are not the total funding in the field of Soviet and East European studies in the United States, but these centers concentrate and specialize in advanced training and research, and that 77 percent cut is in fact, I think, the most valid information we have on the state of advanced studies, advanced research, which is indeed what this bill addresses.

A good deal has been said by previous witnesses on the subject of the consequences of this decline. I would like to stress the fact that all elements really suffer together. Gifted students who have just completed their B.A. and look around to see whether in fact they should make a professional commitment to this particular field, perceive, perhaps first of all, the decline in research materials, research libraries, the staffing that supports research, computer

time, office space and equipment, faculty appointments, scholarships, course offerings, and they turn elsewhere.

They look to see what kinds of support there may be for their ongoing studies and what they see is a very severe decline of scholarships and fellowships available and an uncertainty and unreliability of financial support in the field. This process, which forms a kind of vicious spiral, has been going on now for something on the order of 15 years, and the national capability is really in serious jeopardy.

I would like to make the point that the funding proposed by the legislation is not by any sense a substitution of total funding for even this level of study. By one calculation, the support that this legislation would provide would constitute somewhere around 15 percent of the total center funding.

Over the last 4 years, the executive branch and the academic community have, in fact, been making a very cooperative joint effort to address this decline and the problem for the nation that it constitutes. They created and have been operating the National Council. That effort, I believe, is detailed in previous testimony. It has in fact been very unreliable, to such a degree that it will not, I think, in the long run accomplish the purposes for which the Council was created. It will not seriously encourage a lifelong commitment to this field as a profession. It is too uncertain.

There are a lot of reasons for that uncertainty, but it seems to me that the root cause is the lack of a congressional mandate. What happens in the absence of congressional support, congressional sanction for that effort, and for the activities that are entailed in it, is that there is no single responsibility to act within the executive branch.

There is neither a locus which has both the responsibility to act and the resources, nor is there a duty to do anything in the absence of a congressional mandate. There is really no appeal of inaction except to the courage and the conviction of an ever-changing cast of executive officials.

The consequence is that without your sanaction and your direction, the haphazard quality of this effort, which has now been underway for 4 years, as epitomized by the creation and operation of the National Council, the haphazard quality of that effort will probably go on until it finally stops altogether, and that, unfortunately, would only make matters worse.

Senator BIDEN. Doctor, you do not know how good it makes us feel to hear that there is someplace where Congress could lead. We are so accustomed to hearing that we should be out of every business in the world, I am delighted to hear that you have faith that a congressional mandate could mean something. [Laughter.]

Mr. TOUMANOFF. To my view, Senator, it is absolutely essential. Without it, this attempt by the exective branch and the academic community will in the long run fail, and when it fails because this effort has been mounted in full view of the profession and with the support of the professional, when that failure occurs it will make matters substantially worse.

Let me talk about just a few little pieces of information about the actual operation of the National Council. In the first place, it is very cost efficient. The Council requires cost sharing and it limits

the administrative surcharge that universities place on every Federal research contract to 20 percent or less. As a consequence of that fact alone, the Council receives about $4 worth of research for every $3 that it pays. The rest is contributed by the universities. Put another way, if the Government were to contract directly for the same research, it would cost about one-third more.

The Council's own administrative costs have been held to 10½ percent of the total funds entrusted to it. All the rest has gone to the research program. There have been no cost overruns. On the contrary, there have been modest recoveries from under expenditure on completed contracts.

The commitment of the academic community to this effort, its management by trustees who are themselves skilled and knowledgeable research scholars, and other sources of savings which are detailed in my written testimony have produced a national research program, on an agenda formulated in consultation with the Government, that probably costs about one-half as much or perhaps less than a comparable program run directly by Government contract.

There has been one systematic measure of the quality of research that the Council has sponsored. The CIA requested an evaluation by its own specialists of 25 of the Council's research reports on two counts—on the quality of the research and on its usefulness. In 21 of the 25 reports they were judged good or excellent on both counts. There have also been two outside reviews of the Council overall—one by the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies and the other by the General Accounting Office. Both have commended the Council as a model for Federal funding of advanced research.

Thank you.

[Mr. Toumanoff's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF

Mr. Chairman, Senators, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to contribute to the information available to yourselves and the rest of the Senate as you consider the legislation proposed in S. 2919. For the most part I will speak about the National Council, of which I am the Executive Director. But I'd like to start with the most accurate financial data we have on what has been happening to Soviet and East European studies over the last 15 years or so.

According to two systematic surveys, funding dropped by almost 70 percent between 1965 and 1980, and is projected to drop by another 8 percent by the end of 1982. Stanford University conducted one of these surveys. In 1976 it requested data for the period 1965–1975 on the operating budgets of leading United States university centers of advanced research and training in the Soviet and East European field. In 1981 the Rockefeller Foundation conducted a similar survey covering the period 1975–1980, and estimated budgets for 1981 and 1982. Together, these surveys show a drop, in constant dollars, of almost exactly 77 percent from 1965 to 1982.

By these measures, programs of advanced training and research are trying to survive on 23 percent of their 1965 funds. They are not doing well. Gifted students are the first to turn elsewhere as they perceive the effects of the catastrophic decline, and with their departure goes the rationale for everything else at universities. All of the elements are affected, and reinforce each other in decline: the staffing and maintenance of research libraries, administrative and secretarial support staff, office space and equipment, allocations of computer time, publications support, advanced course offerings, appointments for young faculty to replace those who retire, and weight in university counsels and decisions. Bit by bit the apparatus that was built after the second World War to give us our national capability for expert knowledge and analysis of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe is coming apart. It is a slow process, but it has been going on for more than ten years now. If it is allowed

to continue, in another ten years we will not have a capability outside the government and recruits for Government needs will be unavailable. To recreate the national capability after that would take another decade or more, at enormous cost. Just to reconstitute a discontinued research library would be a staggering task. That is the nature of the national problem that has matured to the point of bringing it to Congress, and which is addressed by S. 2919.

The legislation is not a total remedy, nor is it appropriate that the Federal Government should bear the burden of remedy alone, or even in major part. Universities, properly, provide the great preponderance of support. Foundations, corporations, private citizens, and other sources also provide a share. But in spite of continuing appeals to all of these traditional supporters, the fact is inescapable of the precipitous decline in the face of a national need that can only increase in the future. Under the circumstances it is most appropriate that the Federal Government, as the single most direct, and largest beneficiary of trained personnel, and end-user of research, should contribute a share of the remedy. The legislation seems to me carefully drawn to address those functions in the field of Soviet and East European studies for which the Government is the most natural constituent: the presence of American specialists in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, the broadest public use of Washington's research data, ongoing contact between U.S. Government specialists and those outside, a modest program of advanced training in skills relevant to Government concerns, a national research program on an agenda designed in consulation with the Government, and the public dissemination of reliable, independently developed information about the Soviet bloc.

In recognition of the national interest in checking the decline in our capability, officials of the Executive Branch, and academic specialists on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, conceived of and established the National Council in 1978 as a vehicle for federal support for the field. The Council's charter is to conduct a national program of advanced research, and thereby to help ensure a future cadre of specialists. It has done quite well, and I will return to some measures of its performance later in my testimony. Of greater importance, however, is the need for Congressional action. Let me turn to that.

Professor Levine has testified to the critical uncertainties of whether, at what level, and when, funds for the work of the Council may be available from year to year. As he says, such a stamp of unreliability deters gifted individuals from making a professional commitment to the field, and threatens to defeat the ultimate purpose of the effort. Why does such uncertainty mark the work?

It happens for a number of contributary reasons, and one overwhelming one. Among the lesser reasons are:

There is no locus within the Executive Branch that has both the responsibility and the financial resources to maintain our current knowledge of the Soviet bloc, and our national capability to develop such knowledge, outside of the Government.

Funding by contribution from a number of different Departments and Agencies involves elaborate administrative machinery, the cooperation of hundreds of individuals who do not know of each others' existence, and unending problems and complications.

The personnel involved in the decisions each year whether or not to fund the effort, and if so at what level, as well as those involved in executing the decisions, turn over rapidly. As a consequence individuals who know nothing of this unique undertaking are constantly appearing in positions where their positive action, and even initiative, is critical. Catching their attention for a program costing a few hundred thousands, when their concerns are with hundred of millions of billions, is sometimes next to impossible.

The processs of budget formation in each Department, in the Executive Branch, and in Congress, as well as the subsequent processes of appropriations, allocations, etc. are themselves uncertain. At the microscopic level of the Council's funding, it simply gets overlooked, or shunted aside for larger concerns.

All of these circumstances contribute to the funding problems which threaten to defeat the purposes for which the Government and academic community created the National Council. But the overwhelming reason is the lack of a Congressional mandate.

Without a Congressional mandate, every Executive Branch official involved in supporting the Council is apprehensive that either he, or worse, his superiors in whose name he acts, will be subject to criticism. It is infinitely easier for an apprehensive official to say "No," or take no action, especially one new to his responsibilities, who doesn't know about the Council or its background. In the absence of a mandate from Congress, there is no responsibility to act, and there is no basis on which to appeal inaction except conviction and courage. There lies the root cause of

delay, of hazardous and haphazard existence. Without your endorsement through legislation, the entire effort flounders in accidental neglect, in administrative complication, and in doubt. Four years have taught me that this unique start of a truly collaborative program by Government and scholars to address an urgent national need, cannot be effective, and will ultimately fail without your sanction and approval. What's worse, is that having been started in the full view and support of the profession, its failure will only make matters worse.

What is its track record, is this effort worth supporting?

Economy of operations.—By requiring cost sharing, the Council receives one-third more research effort than it pays for. Every university that receives federal research contracts negotiates with the Government annually an administrative overhead rate that applies to every federal contract it receives. This administrative surcharge, called the "indirect cost rate," is based on a complicated formula and varies from institution to institution, and from year to year. Roughly speaking, it runs from about 50 percent to over 100 percent of the direct costs. From the start, the Council has limited this charge to 20 percent or less on all of its research contracts, and requires universities to contribute the difference as their share of the cost of the project. This is a step the Government cannot legally take. On that score alone, the Council has calculated that the universities have been contributing one dollar for every three Council dollars. Put another way, if the Government had contracted for the same research, it would have cost one-third more.

Since the start, the Council's own total administrative costs have been 10.5 percent of the funds entrusted to it by the Government. All the rest have gone into the research program. In part this is done by simple fruguality. Government contracting officers estimated that the Council would need a staff of thirty to administer the program. The Council has a staff of four. In part it is the product of voluntary service by Trustees who either charge less than their usual rates, or not at all, for their work on the Council's behalf.

There are other sources of economy. In addition to indirect cost savings, the Council encourages university contributions to direct costs, and makes that an element of judgment in the competition for award of contracts. Scholar-applicants know that their budgets will be scrutinized by the Trustees, who are experienced research scholars themselves, and know real costs from inflated ones. The Trustees also frequently know the financial conditions of universities and even of applicants. That awareness not only deters budget inflation in a competitive setting, but often results in further reduction of applicants' budgets by the Trustees as a condition of award. Moreover scholars know that evey dollar they save will go to make possible the work of some colleague in the profession, and therefore the researchers themselves practice economy. As a consequence the Council has had no cost-overruns, but, on the contrary, has had modest recoveries from under-expenditure on completed contracts.

It is impossible to calculate an accurate dollar figure, but the savings as against the cost of an equivalent research program contracted for directly by the Government are between 25–50 percent, and perhaps more.

Quality.—Individual reactions to individual research reports done under Council auspices vary. Understandably so, given the wide variety of knowledge and interests among the Government readers. There has been only one systematic judgment, and the results of that were gratifying. The CIA requested an evaluation by its own specialists of 25 of the Council's reports on two counts, quality of research, and usefulness. Twenty-one of the reports were judged "good" or "excellent" on both counts.

The Council has built quality control into the program from start to finish. The proposals are reviewed by all the Trustees, know their professional colleagues (and have taught many of them), know the subject matter, the research methods, available data, and current, as well as past, work in the field. Once a contract is awarded, they designate one of their number best qualified in the subject to stay in close touch with the researchers to monitor progress, and to help with problems should they arise. The Trustees also review all research reports, and frequently request additions or improvements, before submitting them to the Government.

There have also been two outside reviews of the structure and functions of the Council overall. Both the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and the General Accounting Office have commended the Council as a model for federal funding of advanced research.

Finally, it seems appropriate to identify the ways in which the Government would maintain oversight of the programs to be conducted under the provisions of the proposed legislation.

The research agenda which would guide the national research program on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe would be drawn up in consultation with federal offi-

cials designated by the Secretary of State. If current practice is any indicator, these same individuals would be among those who would receive the reports of research and findings, and would thereby monitor the program.

The annual disbursement from the Government to the National Council would be preceded by application to the Secretary of the Treasury which would have to describe the purposes and programs for which the payment would be used. The Secretary of the Treasury would be free to seek the advice of the same group of individuals designated by the Secretary of State, or any other advisors he might choose.

The National Council would submit annual reports of its activities under the Act, including an annual financial audit, to the President and the Congress.

The principal of the fund, kept within Treasury, could, of course, be withdrawn from the fund and retired to general funds whenever the Government wished to terminate the program.

It is also one of the duties under the act to facilitate research collaboration between Government and private specialists, which will ensure a wide awareness within knowledgeable Government circles of the quality of the work sponsored under the Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Toumanoff.

Dr. Billington, would you give us your testimony?

[Mr. Billington's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF JAMES HADLEY BILLINGTON

Current position: Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Office: The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Telephone: (202) 357-2763.

Residence: 2723 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007.

EDUCATION

1946—Graduated from Lower Merion Senior High School (Pennsylvania). Valedictorian; president of the school; captain of both high school and all-Philadelphia area soccer teams.

1950—B.A. in history summa cum laude, Princeton University. Valedictorian; Phi Beta Kappa; editorial chairman, Daily Princetonian; varsity soccer; lead roles in dramatic productions.

1953—D.Phil. in modern history, Oxford University, England. Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford; founder of journal, Oxford Angle.

CURRENT POSITION

Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., since September 1973. This center is the congressionally created, official national memorial to Woodrow Wilson and is located in the original red "castle" building of the Smithsonian Institution. It is an international institute for advanced study dedicated to advancing scholarship and interacting "the world of affairs and the world of ideas." It is unique in being (1) a living memorial to a head of state, (2) an openly accessible institute for advance study run largely through annual competition, and (3) directly led by the scholar-director without any in-house faculty.

Programs introduced during Dr. Billington's directorship include a program on problems of state and local government, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and programs in Latin American studies, in International Security Studies, on East Asia, and on American Society and Politics.

The Center has developed under Dr. Billington a wide variety of innovative meetings (more than 200 annually), including an "evening dialogue" series (that involves high-level scholars and policy-makers) and a growing number of special conferences lasting more than one day in Washington.

Under Dr. Billington, the Center conceived, planned, and successfully launched the Wilson Quarterly as a national journal of ideas for laymen (not just for other scholars) in October 1976. It has more than 100,000 subscribers.

During Dr. Billington's directorship, the Center has increased its annual congressional appropriation from $800,000 in fiscal year 1973 to $1,621,000 in fiscal year 1980 and its annual private fundraising from $129,400 in fiscal 1973 to $1,056,796 in fiscal year 1980. Dr. Billington has testified 19 times before five different committees of the Congress both in his official capacity as Center Director and as an inde-

pendent expert on Russian and revolutionary history and on international cultural matters.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Television.—Historical Consultant to NBC documentary, 1967. Guest Commentator for CBS network television on presidential summits, 1971 and 1972. Historian-host of 12-program series on National Public Television (with all script introductory material and all choice and interviewing of 28 guest scholars entirely done by Mr. Billington) sponsored by National Endowment for the Humanities as their first show on prime-time television, entitled "The Humanities Film Forum," 1973 and repeated in 1974. Consultant for ABC television, 1975–76.

Lecturing.—Series of lectures on BBC, 1969–71. Special (endowed or graduation) university lectures at Furman, St. Louis, Rice, Syracuse, and Pittsburgh Universities. Principal address at Triennial Conference of National Association of Episcopal Schools, San Antonio, Texas, November 1975. Graduation address at St. Albans, the National Cathedral School for Boys, Washington, D.C., June 1979.

Board responsibilities.—Director, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1968–71. Member, advisory board, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, 1968–70. Editorial Board, Foreign Affairs, 1969-present. Editorial Board, Theology Today, 1972-present. Member, Board of Directors, Association of American Oxonians, 1958-present. Committee on Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 1971–75. Board of Visitors, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1979-present. Advisory Council, National Humanities Institute, Yale University, 1975–78. Visiting Committee, Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies, University of Indiana, 1977–79. Board of Visitors, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 1977–80. Member, Board of Trustees, Council on Learning, 1977-present. Member, Board of Trustees, St. Albans School, 1977-present, and Vice-Chairman of the Board, 1978-present.

Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships, September 1971–September 1973; elected Vice-chairman, May 1971; elected Chairman, September 1971. This is an elected position of executive authority within the board, directing and supervising all international academic exchanges with 110 countries under the Fulbright-Hays Act. This job involved four annual board meetings of 2–3 days each and four meetings of the executive and planning committee in addition, as well as a broad range of responsibility—all while serving as fulltime teaching professor at Princeton. Membership on the board began Janaury 1971; term as chairman involved launching the Lincoln Lecturer program (a new short-term distinguished lecture series), planning and hosting the first reunion of Fulbright program ever held on occasion of 30th anniversary of launching the program. Dr. Billington was convocation chairman of the 3-day program of meetings that were held in Washington (partly hosted by The Wilson Center) in May 1976 after 10 regional meeting throughout the United States. From these regional meetings came the beginnings of a National Alumni Association for the 45,000 American alumni of the program. Dr. Billington created a special board committee to develop ways of increasing awareness of and representation in the exchange program of black and smaller colleges.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL INFORMATION

Wife: Marjorie Anne (Brennan). Married June 22, 1957. Native of Wilmington, Delaware; graduate of Tower Hill School; honors graduate of the University of Delaware; formerly worked in Washington as personal secretary to Senator J. Allen Frear, Democrat of Delaware.

Children: Susan Gilber Billington, b. 1958, 1980 graduate of Yale University, Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford, 1981–; Anne Holmes Billington, b. 1960, senior, Princeton University; James Hadley Billington, Jr., b. 1961, junior, Harvard University; Thomas Keator Billington, b. 1964, senior, St. Albans School.

ARTICLES

"Science in Russian Culture," American Scientist, 1964, June.

"Soviet Youth Is Getting Out of (Party) Line," University: A Princeton Quarterly, 1965–66, Winter (No. 27).

"Six Views of the Russian Revolution," World Politics, 1966, April.

Articles on Russia in Life, 1967, Sept. 22 and Nov. 10.

Two articles on the Czech Crisis in Life, 1968, Aug. 2 and Sept. 6.

"The Humanistic Heartbeat Has Failed," Life, 1968, May 24.

"Force and Counterforce in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, 1968, October.

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A number of the above articles have been reprinted in anthologies and/or translated into foreign languages.
Not included are a number of columns on Communist affairs and politics in New York Journal American; and book reviews on historical and educational subjects in New York Times Book Review, Book World, and Life.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES H. BILLINGTON, DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BILLINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have heard eloquent testimony about the needs. As the last man out here, I would like to submit my larger statement for the record and will summarize, briefly concentrating on the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which I have directed for more than 9 years now and which was of course mentioned in the bill.

It is a unique institution, as you know, with programs that have been proven, which I think might very well be developed and expanded in ways well suited to the purpose of this legislation. As a national institution in Washington with international interests, the Center encourages the creative use of really unparalleled human, archival and bibliographical resources here in the District to support fundamental research, much of which can only be done here because of the enormous concentration of materials, which we have recently itemized in our Scholars' Guide to the enormous resources of this area.

The Center also serves to strengthen and symbolize, as its congressional charter instructs us, the fruitful interaction between the world of learning and the world of public affairs. The Center has been a focal point, I think, where resources of the past can be used to help the present, and where the issues of concern to the large and diversified community in this area are discussed in a congenial and open atmosphere, involving at least, we estimate, 7,000 to 8,000 participants each year.

Now, in the Soviet area the Center has provided a well-balanced field of scholars in the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. In its only 7 years of existence, there have been 47 long-term fellows representing many disciplines, 29 American institutions, 2 Government agencies, as well as 13 institutions from 8 different foreign countries; and shorter term guest scholars from 3 American academic institutions, 2 Government agencies, and 4 foreign countries.

The institute also provides visiting grants for periods of up to 1 month to help junior scholars in institutions widely dispersed over our country and far from major library facilities to come to Washington. We have had 120 such visiting grants—82 to scholars from 58 American academic institutions, representing more than 30 States, and 38 awards have been made to scholars under this program from 11 foreign countries.

The Center also conducts conferences, colloquia, and seminars related to Soviet and East European studies. Since its inception, the Kennan Institute has sponsored 40 conferences attended by area specialists, Government analysts, and interested private organizations. Our Wednesday noon discussions give a wide range of participants a format for questions and discussion and a regular chance to meet with each other for the kind of informal discussion and exchange of ideas which is uniquely possible in a town with such a high concentration of people working in the field.

In addition to contact with analysts and policymakers in Washington, researchers working at the Center have the opportunity to be with students of the U.S.S.R. from Western Europe, Canada and other parts of the world, as well as with scholars from other Eastern European countries, all of whom regularly come as fellows and guest scholars to the Center. We have had, for instance, eight distinguished Polish fellows for long terms at the Center just since the founding of the Kennan Institute, and the Center is currently developing plans for formalizing another international program concentrating on Europe, which will specifically include Eastern Europe as well.

Publications and dissemination of current research is also an important aspect of the Center's activities. The Kennan Institute has issued 160 occasional papers, distributing them free of charge to interested readers all over the country.

The institute has also published this guide as I have indicated, and a three-volume guide to Soviet research institutes, a guide to sources of support in Russian and Soviet studies, and several bibliographic reference works in widely diverging fields.

I think that gives you some idea of what we can do and I would be happy to answer any further questions.

[Mr. Billington's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES H. BILLINGTON

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, centrally located in the Smithsonian Institution Building, is uniquely situated in the Nation's capital to provide access to the scholarly resources of Washington, D.C.: the Library of Congress, the National Archives, local universities and other academic institutions, and the many government agencies and private organizations with specialized sources of information. The Wilson Center was created by a joint resolution of Congress in 1968 as the Nation's official living memorial to Woodrow Wilson in order to promote advanced scholarship and dialogue between the world of affairs and the world of ideas. As a national institution with international interests, the Center encourages the creative use of the human, archival, and institutional resources of the Nation's capital for fundamental studies which will illuminate our understanding of the past and the present. The Center encourages historical and philosophical depth in its scholarly work; a broad representation of disciplines and institutions in its Fellows; and an active life of dialogue—within the Center and within Washington.

The Wilson Center has several international programs: the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Latin American Program, the International Security Studies Program, and the East Asia Program—as well programs on American Soci-

ety and Politics, and the general area of History, Culture and Society. The Center is currently developing plans for another international program concentrating on Europe, including Eastern Europe.

The Wilson Center awards fellowships annually on a competitive basis. Men and women of intellectual distinction from the United States and other countries are selected from diverse disciplines and backgrounds to perform advanced research in their field. Fellows do not engage in classified research. The Wilson Center receives both private and public funds for its fellowship program. Public funds, in the form of a congressional appropriation, provide grants and stipends directly to the fellows. Private funds, from foundations, corporations, academic institutions, and individual donations, provide the services and support necessary to maintain the fellows at the Center.

The Wilson Center serves as a focal point where issues of concern to the large community of academic institutions, government agencies, and private organizations in the greater Washington area are discussed in a congenial atmosphere. Approximately 7,000 people a year participate in Center events.

The need for a national and non-governmental center for Russian and Soviet studies in Washington, D.C. was discussed at a meeting of 23 senior specialists in May 1972, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Largely as a result of this meeting, the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars established the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in 1974. The institute serves the following purposes: bringing scholars and researchers in the field in closer contact with the resources available in Washington—specifically the Library of Congress; giving guidance and structure to the field of Russian Studies throughout the country; providing a place where mature researchers can pursue advanced studies relieved of regular teaching commitments and other involvements; supporting the publication of monographs and periodicals and facilitating channels of scholarly communication in the field; maintaining liaison with foreign institutions and extending hospitality and research facilities when possible to foreign scholars.

The Kennan Institute attempts to provide a well-balanced field of scholars: 29 American academic institutions and two government agencies as well as 13 institutions in 8 foreign countries have been represented by Institute Fellows. Since its inception, the Institute has sponsored 47 Fellows from a wide variety of disciplines—mainly history, political science, economics, and Russian language and literature.

The Director of the Wilson Center awards a small number of Guest Scholarships each year for periods of time from one month to four months. The Kennan Institute has sponsored 15 Guest Scholars since 1975, representing three American academic institutions, two government agencies, and academic institutions in four foreign countries. Research disciplines include history, political science, economics, language and literature, and geography.

The Kennan Institute, with private foundation support, has established a program of Visiting Grants intended to help scholars at institutions distant from major library facilities and to provide opportunities for junior scholars to conduct advanced research in Washington, D.C. The grants are awarded quarterly (March, June, September, and December) for periods of up to one month. Since 1976 when the program was initiated, 120 Visiting Grants have been awarded. These scholars have come from 58 academic institutions, public and private, representing over 30 different states. In keeping with the international focus of the Center, 38 awards have been made to scholars from 11 foreign countries. Again, the majority of these scholars pursue topics in history, political science, and economics. Research is also conducted on such topics as art, music, law, philosophy, demography, and anthropology.

The Wilson Center and the Kennan Institute conduct conferences, colloquia, seminars, meetings, media briefings, and other events related to Soviet and East European studies. Since its inception the Kennan Institute has sponsored 40 conferences attended by area specialists, government analysts and interested private organizations. Four conferences are being planned for 1983. In addition many colloquia, meetings and seminars are held—often in cooperation with other organizations and government agencies. Wednesday Noon Discussions are held each week during the academic year on topics of broad interest for a wide range of participants in a format that permits questions and discussion.

Publication and dissemination of current research is an important aspect of the Center's activities. The Kennan Institute has issued 160 Occasional Papers and distributed them free of charge to a wide range of interested readers. The Institute has also published a 403-page scholars' guide to Russian and Soviet resources in the Washington area. A second edition of the guide is in preparation. Three volumes resulting from conferences held at the Institute are to be added to its Special Stud-

ies series. Other publications of the Institute include a three-volume guide to Soviet research institutes, a guide to sources of support in Russian and Soviet studies, and several bibliographic reference works.

The objectives of the proposed legislation, Soviet Bloc Research and Training Act of 1982, appear to be consistent with the charter for the Wilson Center, particularly in the area of Soviet studies. If enacted, the legislation would provide funding to various institutions involved in Soviet and East European studies. The Wilson Center has been specifically identified in the proposed legislation.

In fiscal year 1983, the Wilson Center plans to allocate about $316,000 from its federal appropriation and private contributions to continue the above activities at the Kennan Institute. A similar level of support is expected for fiscal year 1984. We believe that this level of funding is appropriate to carry out the current objectives and direction that the Center's Board of Trustees has identified for the Institute. This planned funding level is consistent with the President's budget and fiscal objectives. If additional responsibility is given the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars by this legislation, in the area of Soviet and East European studies, the Board of Trustees will need to examine ways existing programs would change.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Billington.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize to our guests and our witnesses, but I have to leave in order to catch a ride to Wilmington, Del. Anyone who would like to come out to Wilmington tonight is welcome to do it. But, with the Chair's permission and the cooperation of the witnesses, I would like to submit my questions for you and you could submit responses at your leisure. There is no more than three for any one of you and for a few there is only one, but I would appreciate it if you would submit your answers to my questions for the record.

Senator LUGAR. If the witnesses would be willing to cooperate in this way, we would much appreciate it, so that the record would be complete.

The Chair will accede to the request from the Senator from Delaware and ask the witnesses to respond.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. You have already, in various ways, addressed this question, but would you zero in, if you can, specifically on how do you envision that the fund established in this bill would work? Can you give us at least your own understanding as you understand the structure of this endowment, in the interest of how the funds would be allocated and specifically who would make decisions on that? Dr. Levine?

Mr. LEVINE. If I might start, it seems to me the way the bill is currently written, the funds, the interest from the endowment that we have estimated at an 8-percent return, would be allocated to the National Council as an executive body, and the National Council would give a part to IREX, a part to the Wilson Center, a part to the National Council itself for its own research program and a part to the National Council, which would set up an administrative body for the training and development program.

Senator LUGAR. That is my understanding, too. Is this a practical way to proceed? Do you see difficulties?

Mr. LEVINE. I think it is a practical way to proceed. I think people who are not familiar with the National Council might be concerned about giving this authority to one body, but the National Council, after all, is run by a board of trustees who have been designated by the presidents of 10 major research universities, the head of the Kennan Institute within the Wilson Center, and the

president of the membership organization of all the scholars who study the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

Any sort of fixed division of the funds in the bill would, I think, be very shortsighted. Any amounts or clear proportions that might be established now would, in time, be outdated as the field develops different needs and as different programs develop different needs.

There are many checks on the types of allocations that might be made under the organization presently in the bill. A report has to be submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. There will be a committee of Government-using agencies set up by the Secretary of State. That committee will be able to monitor the divisions of the funds. And there will be reports to the Congress and to the President.

So, it seems to me that there is ample control over the distribution of the funds, and the use of the phrase "a part" rather than a fixed proportion I think gives the bill and the enterprise it supports the flexibility that they need.

Senator LUGAR. To follow up on that, Dr. Levine, is it your judgment that the whole realm of Soviet scholars, universities involved, and research institutes will accept this allocation, that they see the Council as the logical body to be parceling up this money and to be making these allocations over the course of time?

The reason I ask is, I am unaware of the politics of your field and who the players are, what the loci of authority might be. Clearly, that bill is aimed toward this governnance procedure, a fairly simple one as it is. But, I am probably likely to have testimony from others that this is really not the proper vehicle or the proper procedure, or that it should be broadened or shortened or what have you.

Mr. LEVINE. I think in academia, as in any field, if you ask me, "Will there be unanimity of support for this?" in all modesty my answer would be, "No." But, will there be wide support for this? I would hope there would be.

Senator LUGAR. Where will the opposition come from?

Mr. LEVINE. The thrust of the National Council, not the thrust of this legislation but the thrust of the National Council, has been directed toward the social sciences, including history, and only to the extent that projects in the humanities have had a bearing upon policy-related issues has the National Council in its research program funded such proposals. I could imagine, therefore, that some in the humanities might raise questions about the National Council's role in the program supported by this legislation.

However, let me quickly call to your attention, that the IREX program has been a very strong supporter of graduate students and faculty going to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the humanities, in literature and in history, and not only in current history but in 19th-century and earlier history.

The Kennan Institute in the Wilson Center supports the humanities. And the training and development program in the legislation is not limited to the social sciences. Therefore, I would hope that there will not be significant opposition to the administrative arrangements in the legislation. I hope, and expect, that the program embodied in the legislation will get wide support.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Mr. Toumanoff?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I would add perhaps one point. The condition of the field is really in such bad shape that any contribution of funds which might come through this legislation would in fact be an increment which would release funds, other funds for redistribution to other disciplines and other sources of concern by the profession.

I think there is another point which is perhaps tangential. There are built into the Council, and built into the mechanism which is conceived of in this legislation, a lot of safeguards.

One is the process by which the Board of Trustees of the National Council is designated; that is, by university presidents. If concern in the field develops that in some way the Council is not paying attention to or not making proper distribution by disciplines, or for some other reason, it is those same university presidents who will hear the complaint first, and who will have the power by their appointments to correct such disbalances.

In the same way the trustees themselves, those 12 who are appointed by presidents, have the power to elect 6 additional members, and by that process they can respond to concerns in the field by electing to the board of trustees those who are the most concerned about the Council's operations. So there are those kinds of checks and balances and safety measures built in.

Another one, of course, is that if there is serious concern over the manner in which this whole program is conducted, there is no limit to the access that the field has, that the profession has, to the Federal officials who would be designated by the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of the Treasury, to Congress.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Dr. Kassof?

Mr. KASSOF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a general remark about the nature of the Soviet and East European studies fields in the context of area studies in general in the United States. We are very fortunate in the Soviet field, for reasons which would require some further comment, not to be highly politicized. If you look at Latin American studies or African studies, you find that the scholars themselves are often very badly split over political and ideological issues, for example, over questions of U.S. policy. While I have been in meetings with some of my colleagues from other fields where the disagreements are intense and bitter, for a variety of complex reasons, that does not seem to happen in the East European and Soviet field. We appear to approach a consensus about the nature of the beast with which we are dealing.

As a result, there is widespread agreement on the research priorities within the field. It is no accident that this is really the first area field which has been able to organize itself in a coherent way in order to enter a creative dialog with the Government on issues underpinning our foreign policy analysis.

Another comment. The distinctions between the humanities and the social sciences are very blurred, and rightly so, in the Soviet and East European field. You could not begin to understand the contemporary Soviet Union without a very deep understanding of its literature and history. Economists who study the Soviet Union know that, for example, the central place that has been occupied

by language, literature, and history in the development of this field has diffused a sense of commonality which makes us very fortunate.

For these reasons I would not anticipate family squabbles of any great proportion over this legislation.

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Kassof, just to follow up your last comment, clearly the intent of at least many of us in the Congress in pursuing this would be for information that was of national value in foreign policy. As you say, that derives from many sources, including poetry, literature, religious studies, and other things.

Would scholars be able to recognize the fact that all of these distinctions are blurred or this is sort of one family of scholarship? I ask this simply because during the course of this program because of its long range we may go through many ebbs and flows in which some people in the Congress, as well as in the Soviet scholarship field, feel that we ought to be emphasizing the military, and some would say, no, we ought to be looking at religious roots.

I do not know how these things ebb and flow, but clearly the original intent that we are after right now is to try to make certain that policymakers, decisionmakers in Government, have the very best information available for the good of us all to make decisions. And I would hope that that would not be inimical to anyone's interests in the course of time.

But I suppose in raising this question I was looking not only in terms of the diversity of people who may have various programs to offer, but the general acceptance of a need as American scholars for us to try to make sure that we have this policymaking capability. Do you see any problems with this over the long range?

Mr. KASSOF. I think if you talk to the leadership in the field you will find a very widespread recognition that there are important gaps in our coverage of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and that many of these gaps, in fact most of them, are policy-relevant. There really is no struggle in the field, let us say, between the historians and the sociologists. It is a question of improving the profile of the field. No one says there are too many historians, that they were doing too much historical research on the Soviet Union. They have said we are not doing enough sociological research on the Soviet Union.

To the extent that area studies bring together people from various disciplines who understand the interaction among the various disciplines as necessary to produce an accurate and whole picture of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the field works very well together.

This is one of the great accomplishments of Soviet area studies. We have been able to go to the various university departments and pull special talent out into centers where there is a very healthy and very productive interaction. We have had some experience at IREX in trying to fill in those gaps in our research coverage and I can only say that we have had the most wonderful cooperation from people in allied disciplines, who recognize the need to close these gaps and the need, as well, to encourage scholars to interpret their work in an intelligent and effective way so that it can be used by people who are in the spot to make policy decisions.

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Billington, do you have a comment?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes; I want to address myself first to your question about the mechanism. I think we are assuming that the question, which is necessarily kept somewhat undefined, of distribution and so forth, and certainly in our case if any funds were appropriated we would have to have further discussion with our board of trustees and various others.

But this final determination will involve at some point the chairmen of the boards or such people as they would designate from all three institutions to make some kind of reading on the figures that the Council would generate and so forth.

I would say also that I concur, there is a strong sense of shared concerns and also of areas of need and neglect. I would just like, as somebody who is a cultural historian on the humanistic side of things, to reinforce what our colleagues have said about this area.

It is not only a question of rather difficult foreign languages; there is also the whole question of ideological languages that are used, the language of communism itself. Its whole ideological apparatus is not familiar to most Americans. The language of earlier culture, Eastern Orthodoxy, particularly the Russian variant, is not something that has a large domestic constituency in America.

So all of the various cultural filters through which Russia comes to us mean that preparation in this area is one that requires a terrific exertion.

I would also stress the need for diversified exposures. The exchange in which I myself participated illustrates that one of the reasons there is a strong sense of shared purpose in the field is that many have had this experience, and there is a great deal more realism about this field than many others, because they have been exposed to the animal in its native pasture, so to speak. I think that has been a great help.

Access to Washington-area resources is increasingly important, because the talent is diversified throughout the United States. There is a great deal of diversified talent, and yet the exploding amount of publications, not only in Russian but in other languages, to which my colleagues have alluded, mean that you are accumulating a vast amount of material which really nobody but the Library of Congress and the resources of Washington can fully accumulate.

So we have to bring the various "Mohameds" that are widely dispersed to the mountain, as well as try to get them over to see the animals in their native pasture. Pardon my metaphors, Mr. Chairman, but I did want to make those points.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Dr. Levine?

Mr. LEVINE. Senator Lugar, if I understand part of the thrust of your question, it is will the field accept the Congress' concern for the policy relevance of the research that it wishes to support. The experience of the National Council, though still short (4½ years) is, I feel, relevant to this issue. The National Council meets annually with Government agencies. We discuss their problems and research needs, and what we see the field as capable of doing and what is appropriate for it to do. On the basis of such consultations, we have on two occasions developed research agendas, which we then dis-

tributed to the entire field, and which we have used in making judgments about the contracts that we fund.

I think this procedure has been accepted by the field. The fact that we have tried very hard to get support for so many of the people in the field, when they do propose research that we feel has, either directly or indirectly, policy relevance, I think, contributed to the fact that the reputation of the National Council has been relatively good.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that comment. Each of you gentlemen heard our first panel. We had distinguished Americans who have served in the U.S. Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. One of the things that came through their testimony was that the analysis of what is occurring, the data that comes from all sources, may be of the essence in the decade that is ahead.

As Admiral Inman, as I recall, testified, he said frequently we have had some pretty good idea of what was going to happen, could almost count the forces and know where they were heading and what have you, but the problem of analyzing what all this meant sometimes has eluded our decisionmakers in the executive branch or in the Congress, and led to some grievous errors that are of great consequence then to Americans and the rest of the world.

So we are I think mindful of this, at least on this committee. This has been the basis for this particular legislative initiative.

Yes, sir.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Senator Lugar, we have now in actuality spoken continuously with specialists in the executive branch over the last 4½ years, and even before that when the concept of the Council was just a gleam in the eye, about their needs. What we find is that they range over a very, very wide area, that capabilities within the Government are in some ways superb, but they are focused on precisely those immediate questions of current events, to the exclusion very largely of what you might call basic research.

I should not speak for universities, because my experience is limited to 6 years at the Russian Research Center at Harvard. But my own impression from my Government service, from my work in universities, and with the Council, is that scholars are not at their best when they are attempting to address current policy issues in a quick fashion. That contribution they can make by consultation, by being called in as frequently as they are to various offices in Washington for discussion.

The kind of research which seems to match best the needs of the executive branch as we have come to know them through these 4½ years, and the process of funding, which is a fairly time-consuming one, and the academic strengths is not to get quick answers.

The most valuable level of research—and this is my impression; the others can speak to this point—is something in between. It is either very fundamental research—what does the data show us about what happened, where the societies came from—or it asks what influence that history has upon their current posture, and what is it that is going on there now in terms of basic trends, to their economies for instance.

It is on the basis of the background of this kind of research that policy is formulated. But it is not policy-specific. It is not specific to a particular issue.

Senator LUGAR. I think that is a very important distinction, and clearly the thrust of what we are about, some of us—and you have been a part of this process, Dr. Toumanoff—are concentrating frequently on the next vote and rather immediate decisions.

We have just simply discovered that the data base in many areas is rather deficient, and it is uncomfortable to fly blind when you really could have something more supporting you, and we are looking forward to that.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Mr. Chairman, may I just finish one last thought. It is precisely for this reason of basic research that I think the concerns of the humanists will indeed, to the extent that they exist, be satisfied, because as Dr. Billington has testified, you cannot really comprehend those societies unless you know their history, their literature, the humanities aspects of those civilizations.

Mr. BILLINGTON. I would like to say that what is interesting to me is there is no question that the data base or its sophisticated use is important, nor is there any question about the way in which the humanities and social sciences really reinforce each other. But what is interesting to me in your first panel was, listening to them, the questions that were the most pressing for the people on the line were often questions of longer term judgment. I mean, what is the next generation thinking? How is this kind of political culture going to sort itself out faced with these kinds of problems?

These are questions that require judgment, the reflection of a variety of disciplines and a long-term view. One of the attractive features of this legislation is that it does take a longer term strategic view.

The other point I would just like to make on the basis of our experience of bringing people in from many wide sections, even from smaller centers or no centers at all, but where someone has been very well trained, we have an enormous amount of very well trained talent that is not getting its full chance to develop. I think giving them a chance both to participate on the exchanges and to come to Washington, in a sense we are talking not only about the beginning of the pipeline but people in the middle of the pipeline.

This is a bad metaphor, too, I realize, Mr. Chairman. But it does seem to me that it is terribly important that the talent we already have, that we develop younger talent particularly. A generation that cannot look forward to tenure at universities can still have some opportunity to develop the already substantial investment that society has made in them and to bring that to fruition for this.

Finally, I would like to say that the question of impact on policy involves both discrete studies on important questions and also a kind of contact, a kind of interaction, between thinking people and those on the line. Those with the freedom to do research on important questions often do not assume the responsibility; those with responsibility do not have the freedom.

If one could bring the two together, we would have the kind of mix the founding fathers had in mind when they put this Nation

together in the first place, reading Plutarch in the morning and solving practical problems in the afternoon.

Senator LUGAR. That is a splendid summary comment.

I appreciate very much your coming here, and I speak on behalf of Senator Biden and the other members of the committee when I say we are grateful to you for the time you have devoted to this. We look forward to working with you in the months ahead as we try to develop this legislation. Thank you very much.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

MR. BILLINGTON'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question 1. How would this legislation affect your program?

Answer. If additional responsibility is given to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars by this legislation, the Board of Trustees of the Center will examine ways existing programs will change.

Funding available from this legislation will allow the Wilson Center to expand its existing program of advanced study in the Soviet and East European areas. The Center includes the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and sponsors a number of fellowships and meetings dealing with Eastern Europe. The Center is currently planning a new program on European studies including Eastern Europe.

Question 2. Why do scholars doing research in the Soviet and East European fields need to come to Washington?

Answer. Washington, D.C. is rich in scholarly resources such as the Library of Congress, the National Archives, local universities, government agencies, and private organizations with specialized collections. These resources are, in most respects, unequaled outside the U.S.S.R. Providing access to them is one of the most important services the Wilson Center provides to the national academic community. Scholars in these fields are also stimulated, and at times helped, by contact with the large professional group studying problems of these areas within the Federal Government.

The Wilson Center creates a community of mature scholars doing full-time advanced research within Washington, D.C. and provides the collegial atmosphere and administrative support necessary to promote high-level scholarship.

Question 3. Are there special differences in doing research on the U.S.S.R. and East European countries from doing research on, say, Italy and France?

Answer. There are several differences, the first being the language barrier. The Russian language requires many years of hard work and training to master. It is essential for anyone being trained in the Russian field to know the language. Material from Russia and the Soviet Union is generally not available in translation; material from Italy and France would be more likely to have been translated. Often researchers must have access to materials in any of dozens of different languages spoken in the Soviet Union—many of which are even more difficult than Russian.

Doing research with Russian and Soviet sources is limited not only by the language barriers but also by the difficulty in obtaining access to it. Scholars often travel to the Soviet Union only to discover that the material they need is not open to foreigners. Researchers in Italy and France have more opportunity to travel to these countries and access to information is not so arbitrary.

Question 4. In your experience as the Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, how has the interaction between government and private specialists been beneficial to both, particularly in the Soviet field?

Answer. One of the most important functions of the Wilson Center is facilitating the interaction between the academic community and the government. Private scholars have much to offer to the government analysts in Washington, and the academic community has much to gain from contact with the public sector and government research. On the one hand, private scholarship offers a broad perspective on issues with thorough consideration of historical implications and philosophical depth. On the other hand, government analysts research topics of immediate interest and are concerned with practical applications of research and scholarship.

In the Soviet field, this interaction is vital. It is necessary that our policy making officials be informed as accurately and in as much detail as possible about the nature and activities of the Soviet Union. The scholars doing research in the field have the capability of providing this information and government analysts have the capability of utilizing it.

Senator LUGAR. This subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:51 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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